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A public-domain text about Boston, accessioned whole so the archive can quote it.","text_extract":"Presented to the \nLIBRARY of the \n\nUNIVERSITY OF TORONTO \n\nby \n\nOntario \nLegislative Library \n\n\n• \n\n\nTHE SIEGE OF BOSTON \n\n\nTHE MACMILLAN COMPANY \n\nNEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO \nATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO \n\nMACMILLAN & CO., LIMITED \n\nLONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA \nMELBOURNE \n\nTHE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD. \n\nTORONTO \n\n\nOLD STATE HOUSE \n\n\nTHE SIEGE OF BOSTON « \n\n\n*' W$ -3 \n\n\n(/intatiu \n\nOf I\" \n\n\nBY \n\nALLEN FRENCH \n\n\na, ' i \n\n\n. \n\n\nOf \n\n\nTHE MACMILLAN COMPANY \n1911 \n\nAll rights reserved \n\n\nCOPYRIGHT, 1911, \nBY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. \n\n\nSet up and clectrotyped. Published February, 1911. \n\n\nNortooott \n\nJ. S. Gushing Co. — Berwick & Smith Co. \nNorwood, Mass., U.S.A. \n\n\nTO C. E. S. \n\n\nPREFACE \n\nIN writing this book I have endeavored to \nproduce a brief and readable account of the \nSiege of Boston, and of the events which \nbrought it about. These were, of course, \nparts of a larger history, the connection with \nwhich I have carefully indicated. My main \nendeavor, nevertheless, has been to treat my \nsubject as a single organic series of events. \nTo select the more interesting and significant \nmasses of detail, and properly to coordinate \nthem, has not been an easy task. The minor \nincidents were conditioned by the scale of the \nbook ; the result, I hope, is fluency and a more \nevident connection between the larger events. \n\nSo far as possible, I have relied upon con- \ntemporary statements. But no writer on the \nSiege can fail to acknowledge his deep obliga- \ntions to the \"History of the Siege \" by Richard \nFrothingham. This acknowledgment I gladly \n\n\nVll \n\n\nviii Preface \n\nmake. Since 1849, however, the date of the \npublication of the book, there has come to \nlight interesting new material which I have \nendeavored to incorporate here. The other \nauthorities upon which I have chiefly de- \npended will be found by referring to the foot- \nnotes. \n\nALLEN FRENCH. \n\nCONCORD, MASSACHUSETTS, \nJanuary, 1911. \n\n\nCONTENTS \n\nCHAPTER PAGE \n\nI. BEGINNINGS AND CONDITIONS I \n\nII. WRITS OF ASSISTANCE AND THE STAMP ACT . 21 \n\nIII. CHARLES TOWNSHEND, SAM ADAMS, AND THE \n\nMASSACRE . . . . . .41 \n\nIV. THE TEA- PARTY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES . . 71 \nV. THE OCCUPATION OF BOSTON . . .91 \n\nVI. THE POWDER ALARM AND THE WINTER OF \n\n1774-1775 . . '.123 \n\nVII. MILITARY PREPARATIONS . . . .161 \n\nVIII. THE NINETEENTH OF APRIL . •. . .187 \n\nIX. BOSTON BELEAGUERED 216 \n\nX. THE BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL , . .256 \n\nXI. WASHINGTON TAKES COMMAND . . .288 \n\nXII. EVENTS IN BOSTON FROM JUNE TO DECEMBER, \n\n1775 • \" 331 \n\nXIII. WASHINGTON'S DIFFICULTIES . . . .361 \n\nXIV. THE WINTER IN BOSTON . . . • 392 \nXV. THE EVACUATION . . . • 4!5 \n\n\nQ)ttt«uo \n\nILLUSTRATIONS \n\nOLD STATE HOUSE ..... Frontispiece \n\nPAGE \n\nTHE HUTCHINSON HOUSE . . . . -35 \n\nFANEUIL HALL ...... facing 58 \n\nSAMUEL ADAMS ...... facing 69 \n\nTHE INVESTMENT OF BOSTON .... facing 127 \n\nREVERE'S PICTURE OF BOSTON IN 1768 . . .175 \nTHE OLD NORTH CHURCH .... facing 181 \n\nTHE BATTLE OF LEXINGTON .... facing 193 \n\nPLAN OF THE SIEGE . . . . . 235 \n\nTHE MINUTE. MAN ..... facing 303 \n\nTHE OLD NORTH BRIDGE .... facing 303 \n\nWASHINGTON'S HEADQUARTERS .... facing 374 \n\nDORCHESTER TOWER ...... 407 \n\nGOLD MEDAL COMMEMORATING WASHINGTON'S VICTORY 434 \n\n\nXI \n\n\nTHE SIEGE OF BOSTON \n\nCHAPTER I \n\nBEGINNINGS AND CONDITIONS \n\nTHE Siege of Boston was the culmina- \ntion of a series of events which will \nalways be of importance in the his- \ntory of America. From the beginning of the \nreign of George the Third, the people of the \nEnglish colonies in the new world found them- \nselves at variance with their monarch, and \nnowhere more so than in Massachusetts. \nSince the New England people were fitted by \ntheir temperament and history to take the \nlead in the struggle, at their chief town nat- \nurally took place the more important inci- \ndents. These, which were often dramatic, \nhad nevertheless a political cause and sig- \nnificance which link them in a rising series \n\n\n2 The Siege of Boston \n\nthat ended in a violent outbreak and the \neleven months' leaguer. \n\nAs to the siege itself, it varies an old situa- \ntion, for Boston was beset by its own neigh- \nbors in defence of the common rights. Pre- \nviously the king's troops, though regarded \nas invaders, had been but half-hearted op- \npressors; it was the people themselves who \npersistently provoked difficulties. The siege \nproper is of striking military interest, for its \nhostilities begin by the repulse of an armed \nexpedition into a community of farmers, con- \ntinue with a pitched battle between regular \ntroops and a militia, produce a general of \ncommanding abilities, and end with a stra- \ntegic move of great skill and daring. It is \nthe first campaign of a great war, and precedes \nthe birth of a nation. Politically, the cause \nof the struggle is of enduring consequence to \nmankind. Socially, the siege and its prelim- \ninaries bring to view people of all kinds, \nsome weak, some base, some picturesque, \nsome entirely admirable. The period shows \nthe breaking up of an old society and the for- \n\n\nBeginnings and Conditions 3 \n\nmation of a new. A study of the siege is \ntherefore of value. \n\nIt will be observed that the siege cannot \nsatisfactorily be considered as a distinct \nseries of military or semi-military events, \nabruptly beginning and still more abruptly \nending. Such a view would reduce the siege \nto a mere matter of local history, having little \nconnection with the larger movements of the \nAmerican Revolution, and appearing almost \nas an accident which might have happened \nat any other centre of sufficient population.1 \nOn the contrary, neither the siege nor the \nRevolution were accidents of history. That \nthe Revolution was bound to come about, \nand that its beginnings were equally bound to \nbe at Boston, these were conditioned in the \nnature, first of the colonists in general, and \nsecond of the New Englanders in particular. \n\n1 It may appear to a hasty consideration that Froth- \ningham's \" Siege of Boston \" treats the siege as an isolated \nmilitary event. It must, however, be remembered that \nMr. Frothingham had treated previous events in a pre- \nliminary volume, his \" Life of Joseph Warren.\" \n\n\n4 The Siege of Boston \n\nHowever striking were certain of the occur- \nrences, they were of less importance than \ntheir causes and consequences. \n\nAccordingly I shall consider as an organic \nseries the more important of those events \nwhich happened in Boston during the reign \nof George the Third, and which ended when \nthe last of his redcoats departed from the \ntown. In fact, in order to be perfectly in- \ntelligible I must first devote a few pages to \na consideration of previous conditions. \n\n\"Any one,\" wrote George E. Ellis in the \n\" Memorial History of Boston,\"1 \"who at- \ntempts to trace the springs, the occasions, and \nthe directing forces of the revolt . . . cannot \nfind his clew a year short of the date when \nthe former self-governed Colony of Massa- \nchusetts Bay became a Royal Province.\" \nHe is right in pointing out that in 1692 the \nstruggle took open form. Yet even then \nthe controversy was not new. In other \nform it had been carried on for more than \nhalf a century previous. Its ultimate origin \n\n1 \"Memorial History of Boston,\" ii, 31. \n\n\nBeginnings and Conditions 5 \n\nlay in the fact that the very charter under \nwhich the colony was planted differed from \nall other documents granted by any English \nking. \n\n. This difference lay in the omission of the \ncondition, usual in such charters, that its \ngoverning board should meet in London \npractically for the purpose of supervision \nby the king. That the omission of this con- \ndition was the result of wisdom on the part of \nthe founders, and stupidity on the part of \nthe officers of the king, seems undeniable. \nThe founders, unhappy and alarmed at the \npolitical and religious situation in England \nunder Charles the First, were seeking to pro- \nvide for themselves and their families a refuge \nfrom his oppressions. Secure in their charter, \nthey presently left England for good. When \nthey sailed for America they did all that \ncould be done to cut themselves off from in- \nterference by the crown. \n\nAt intervals, extremely valuable for the \nfuture of America, the Massachusetts colony \ncertainly was free of all restraint. Charles's \n\n\n6 The Siege of Boston \n\nbenediction seems to have been \"Good rid- \ndance ! \" From the crown the colonists re- \nceived no assistance whatever, and it was \nlong both their boast and their plea that they \nhad planted the colony \"at their own ex- \npense.\" They were left to work out their \nown salvation.1 As a result, their passionate \ndesire for freedom from interference by the \nking grew into the feeling that they had earned \nit as a right. Englishmen they were still, and \nsubjects of the king; but to the privileges \nof Englishmen they had added the right to \nmanage their own affairs. The English king \nand the English law were to help them in \ntheir difficulties and to settle cases of appeal. \nIn return they would grant money and fight \nfor the king when necessary ; but in the mean- \ntime they would live by themselves. \n\nTaking advantage of the clause in their \ncharter which authorized them \"to ordain \nand establish all manner of wholesome and \n\n1 \" They nourished by your indulgence ? They grew \nup by your neglect of them !\" Barre's speech in Par- \nliament, February, 1765. \n\n\nBeginnings and Conditions 7 \n\nreasonable orders, laws, statutes, and ordi- \nnances,\" they speedily took to themselves \neverything but the name of independence. \nThey instituted courts for all purposes, set \nup their legislative government, raised their \nown taxes, whether general or local, and \nperfected that wonderful instrument of re- \nsistance to oppression, New England town \ngovernment. They even coined money. And, \ndifferent from most of the other colonies, they \nchose their governor from among their own \nnumber. \n\nDistance and home difficulties — for the \nStuart kings usually had their hands full of \ntrouble with their subjects — favored the non- \ninterference which the colonists craved. \nWhen, however, the Stuarts had any leisure \nat all, they at once devoted it to quarrelling \nwith their subjects in New England. Even \nto the easy-going Charles II the cool aloof- \nness of the colonists was a bit too strong ; \nto his father and brother it was intolerable. \n\nThe invariable methods of the colonists, \nwhen facing a demand from the king, were \n\n\n8 The Siege of Boston \n\nevasion and delay. \"Avoid or protract\" \nwere Winthrop's own words in 1635. In \n1684 the General Court wrote advising their \nattorney, employed in England in defending \nthe charter, \"to spin out the case to the utter- \nmost.\"1 Once and once only until the Revo- \nlution — in the case of the seizing of Andros \n— did the men of Massachusetts proceed to \naction. Their habitual policy was safe, and, \non the whole, successful. Slow communication \n(one voyage of commissioners from Boston \nto England took three months), and the ex- \nistence in England of a strong party of friends, \nhelped powerfully to obscure and obliterate the \nissues. Yet Charles I in 1640, and James II \nin 1689, made preparations to reduce the \ncolony to proper subjection, by force if nec- \nessary. \n\nIt was doubtless well for Massachusetts \nthat both Charles and James were presently \ndethroned, for against the power of England \nno successful resistance could then have been \nmade. New England, indeed, might have \n\n1 \"Memorial History of Boston,\" i, 340, 376. \n\n\nBeginnings and Conditions 9 \n\nbeen united against the king, but it is very \nunlikely that the other colonies would have \ngiven their help. Some generations more \nwere needed before the aristocrats of Virginia \ncould feel themselves at one with the Puritans \nof New England. \n\nYet it is interesting to notice the spirit of \nMassachusetts. On the news of Charles's in- \ntentions the colony prepared for resistance. \nIn James's time it went a step further. When \nthe news came of the expedition of William \nof Orange, Massachusetts cast in its lot with \nhim. Without waiting to learn the result \nof the struggle, Boston rose against James's \nunpopular governor, and imprisoned him in \nthe Castle. The act was heroic, for the \nBloody Assizes had taught the world what \npunishment the cowardly king meted out to \nrebels. \n\nIt will be noticed that the political status \nof Massachusetts was already changed. After \nmany delays Charles II had abrogated the \ncharter. His death followed almost immedi- \nately, and Andros had been appointed at \n\n\nio The Siege of Boston \n\nthe head of a provisional government. Doubt- \nless the resistance to him had been inspired \nby the hope that the old charter might be \nrestored. Instead, William, when once se- \ncure on the throne, issued a new charter. \nUnder its provisions the colony, now a prov- \nince, lived until the Revolution. In order \nthat the events leading up to the siege may \nbe understood, it will be well to consider \nthe provisions of the new governmental \nmachinery. \n\nAt the head of the province were to be a \ngovernor and a lieutenant-governor, both ap- \npointed by the king. Their powers were ex- \necutive, with the right of veto over legislation, \nand also over certain appointments by the \nlegislature. Laws passed by this legislature \nand not vetoed by the governor or the king \nwere to go in force three years after their en- \nactment. The legislature had two houses, \nthe lower a popular chamber, called the As- \nsembly, elected by the towns. The upper \nbranch was called the Council. The first \nCouncil was appointed by the king ; later \n\n\nBeginnings and Conditions n \n\nmembers were to be nominated by the As- \nsembly for the approval of the governor. \nThe Assembly and Council formed together \nthe Great and General Court. Judges were \nto be chosen by the governor and Council, but \nall officers were to be paid by the General \nCourt. As will be seen later, in the case of the \nWrits of Assistance, appeal could be taken \nto the English courts. \n\nAnd now for the first time became evident \nthe fact that three generations of practical \nindependence had bred in America a race of \nmen — or it may be better to say had fostered \na school of thought — that never could agree \nin submitting to a distant and arbitrary \nauthority. In the seventy years which fol- \nlowed, New England showed this spirit in \nmany ways. The most prominent cause of \ndisagreement was the question of the gov- \nernor's prerogatives, resulting in constant \nbickerings with the crown. \n\nThe principle, of course, lay deeper still. \nOn the one side were sovereigns whose powers \nwere not yet definitely restricted, and who \n\n\n12 The Siege of Boston \n\nwere likely to resent any apparent tendency \nto make them less. On the other side was \na people who had progressed far in self-gov- \nernment, and who resisted any limitation of \ntheir rights. It is not the purpose of this book \nto trace the earlier unification of the colonies \nunder pressure from without. By the year \n1760 that process was approaching com- \npletion ; there was, therefore, in America a \nstronger feeling than ever, while across the \nwater was that new ruler into whose youth- \nful ears his mother had continually dinned \nthe words, \"George, be king!\" \n\nIt is well to understand the status of a \ncolony in those days, and the difficulties with \nwhich its inhabitants struggled. Yet it is \nhard for the modern man to conceive the \nrestrictions upon freedom. From earliest days \nthere had been discontent with the king's \nclaim to the finest trees in the public forests, \nthe \"mast trees\" which, reserved for the king's \nnavy, no man might lawfully cut.1 Exporta- \ntion of lumber, except to England and the \n\n1 See, on this point, Sabine's \"American Loyalists,\" 7. \n\n\nBeginnings and Conditions 13 \n\nBritish West Indies, was long illegal. Trade \nwith the French and Spanish islands was pro- \nhibited entirely, and trade in many products \nof home manufacture (tobacco, sugar, wool, \ndye-stuffs, furs, are prominent examples) was \nforbidden \"to any place but Great Britain — \neven to Ireland.\" 1 Certain merchandise might \nbe imported at will, subject to duty ; but \nmost articles could be bought, and sold, only \nthrough Great Britain. \n\nFurther, internal commerce and manufac- \nture were severely hampered. No wool or \nwoollen product might be carried from one \nprovince to another. The Bible might not \nbe printed. The making of hats was almost \nentirely suppressed. The manufacture of iron, \non a scale Sufficient to compete with English \nwares, was practically prohibited — as a \"nui- \nsance.\"2 \n\nUnder all these restrictions the colonies \nwere not as yet restive. To be sure there \n\n1 Bancroft's \"United States,\" ed. 1855, v, 265. Ref- \nerences to Bancroft will at first be to this edition. \n\n2 Bancroft's \"United States,\" v, 266. \n\n\n14 The Siege of Boston \n\nwere smuggling and illicit trade, and griev- \nances in plenty; yet the stress of colonial \nlife, the continual danger from the north \nand west, had kept the provincials satisfied \nas a body. And now, at the opening of the \nreign of George III, with the French driven \nout of Canada and the Mississippi Valley, \nand the Indians subdued, there should have \nbeen concord between the colonists and the \nking. \n\nThe comparison between the two is very \nstriking, while at the same time it is not \neasily brought home to the city dweller of \nto-day. City government gives the individual \na chance to bury himself in the mass, and to \navoid his duties ; further, our cities are now \nmany, and very large, while we are notoriously \npatient under misrule. In 1760, on the \nother hand, few towns had as yet adopted \ncity government. Boston was the largest \ntown, and its population was little more than \nfifteen thousand. So well did its enemies \nunderstand one reason for its truculence, that \nthey even considered means to force upon \n\n\nBeginnings and Conditions 15 \n\nthe town a city charter. The question came, \nhowever, to no definite proposition. The \ntown therefore proceeded with its open dis- \ncussion of all public questions, with its right \nof free speech in town meetings extended \neven to strangers, and with its viva voce vote \nletting each man know where his neighbor \nstood. \"The town\" was an entity of which \neach man felt himself a part. As a whole, its \nself-consciousness was like that of an indi- \nvidual : it could feel a trespass on its privi- \nleges as quickly as could the haughtiest mon- \narch of the old world. And all New England \nwas filled with towns whose feelings, on all \nessential points, were one and the same. \n\nAgainst the town-meetings of America stood \nGeorge III, as determined to assert his pre- \nrogatives as was any member of the house of \nStuart. Still comparatively young, he had \nnot yet learned that there are limitations of \npower, even to a king. And it was to the \nmisfortune of his empire that there were few \nin England to teach him. \n\nFor the old Puritan middle class of the \n\n\n1 6 The Siege of Boston \n\nStuart days was gone. Its fibre had softened ; \nthe class itself had disappeared in the easier- \ngoing masses of a more prosperous day. For \nseventy-five years England had had no in- \nternal dissensions, and her foreign wars had \nadded to her wealth and contentment. To \nher well-wishers it seemed as if the people \nhad given itself to sloth and indulgence. \"I \nam satisfied,\" wrote Burke, \"that, within a \nfew years, there has been a great change in \nthe national character. We seem no longer \nthat eager, inquisitive, jealous, fiery people \nwhich we have been formerly, and which we \nhave been a very short time ago.\" 1 Eng- \nland was the country of Tom Jones, hearty \nand healthy, but animated by no high prin- \nciples and keyed to no noble actions. It \nneeded the danger of the Napoleonic wars to \nbring out once more the sturdy manliness of \nthe nation. Through all the earlier reign of \nGeorge III there was, to be sure, a remainder \nof the old high-minded spirit. Chatham and \nRockingham, Burke, Barre, and others, spoke \n\n1Trevelyan, \"American Revolution,\" Part i, 21. \n\n\nBeginnings and Conditions 17 \n\nin public and private for the rights of the \ncolonists, to whom their encouragement gave \nstrength. But the greater part of the Eng- \nlish people was so indifferent to the moral \nand political significance of the quarrel that \nthe king was practically able to do as he \npleased. \n\nHe proceeded on the assumption that every \nman had his price. The assumption was \nunhappily too correct, for he was able to \ngather round him, in Parliament or the civil \nservice, his own party, the \"King's Friends,\" \nwho served him for the profit that they got. \nNo tale of modern corruption can surpass \nthe record of their plundering of a nation. \nWith this goes a story of gambling, drinking, \nand general loose living which, while the at- \ntention is concentrated on it, rouses the \nbelief that the nation was wholly degenerate, \nuntil the recollection of the remnant, Chat- \nham and the party of the Earl of Rocking- \nham, gives hope of the salvation of the coun- \ntry. \n\nAt any rate, for more than fifteen years of \n\n\n1 8 The Siege of Boston \n\nhis reign the king was in the ascendant. \nThere was no party to depose him, scarcely \none strong enough to curb him, even at times \nof popular indignation. He was, therefore, \nas no other king had been before him, able to \nforce the issue upon the colonies, in spite of \nthe protests of the few friends of liberty. In \ncomplete ignorance of the strength of the \ncolonists, both in resources and in purpose, \nhe proceeded to insist upon his rights. When \nit is remembered that those rights, according \nto his interpretation of them, were to tax \nwithout representation, to limit trade and \nmanufactures, and to interfere at will in the \nmanagement of colonial affairs, it will be \nseen that he was playing with fire. \n\nThe danger will appear the greater if it is \nconsidered that the population of the colo- \nnies had not progressed, like that of England, \nto days of easy tolerance. The Americans, \nand especially the New Englanders, were of \nthe same stuff as those who had beheaded \nCharles I, and driven James II from his \nkingdom. They had among their military \n\n\nBeginnings and Conditions 19 \n\nofficers plenty of such men as Pomeroy, who, \ndestined to fight at Bunker Hill, wrote from \nthe siege of Louisburg : \"It looks as if our \ncampaign would last long ; but I am willing \nto stay till God's time comes to deliver the \ncity into our hands.\" 1 Many besides himself \nwrote, and even spoke, in Biblical language. \nThere were still heard, in New England, the \nechoes of the \"Great Awakening\"; the \npreaching of Whitefield and others had every- \nwhere roused a keen religious feeling, and \nthe people were as likely as ever to open \ntown-meeting with prayer, and to go into \nbattle with psalms. \n\nSuch, then, were the contestants in the \nstruggle. On the one side was the king with \nhis privileges, backed by his Parliamentary \nmajority, and having at command an efficient \narmy and navy, and a full treasury. There \nwas at hand no one to resist him successfully \nat home, none to whose warnings he would \nlisten. And on the other side were the colo- \nnists, quite capable of fighting for what they \n\n1 \"Memorial History of Boston,\" ii, 116. \n\n\n2O The Siege of Boston \n\nknew to be the \"rights of Englishmen.\" \nBoth hoped to proceed peaceably. In igno- \nrance, each was hoping for the impossible, for \nthe king would not retreat, and the colonists \nwould not yield. As soon as each under- \nstood the other's full intention, there would \nbe a rupture. \n\n\n(put**!* \n\n\nCHAPTER II \n\nWRITS OF ASSISTANCE AND THE STAMP ACT \n\nTHE men who, whether in America or \nEngland, took sides with the king or \nthe colonies as Tories and Whigs, or as \n\"prerogative men\" and \"friends of liberty,\" \nfall naturally into two classes. A line of \ncleavage could be seen at the time, and can \neven be traced' now, among the supporters of \neither side, according as they followed prin- \nciple or self-interest. There were those who \nsought profit in supporting the colonies, as \nwell as those who knowingly faced loss in \ndefending the king. It is well for Americans \nto remember, therefore, that while many \nsided with the king for what they could get, \nthere were others whose minds could not \nconceive a country without a king, or a sub- \nject with inalienable rights. The best of the \nTories honestly believed the Whig agitation \n\n\n21 \n\n\n22 The Siege of Boston \n\nto be \"unnatural, causeless, wanton, and \nwicked.\" 1 Such Americans were, in the in- \nevitable struggle, truly martyrs to their \nbeliefs. \n\nNevertheless, just as there was naturally \nmore profit or prominence (and the two were \noften the same) on the king's side, so his \nparty had the more self-seekers. \"The cause \nis not worth dying for,\" said Ingersoll, facing \nthe Connecticut farmers, and spoke the senti- \nment of all the stamp-officers who resigned \ntheir positions at the demand of the people. \nThe cause, however, did seem worth working \nfor. There were many, in England and \nAmerica, who, like those whom Otis saw \naround him, \"built much upon the fine \nsalaries they should receive from the planta- \ntion branch of the revenue.\" Position, pay, \nand the chance to exploit the revenues as this \nwas done in England, were the temptations \nwhich brought many to the side of the king, \n\n1The adjectives are those of Massachusettensis, the \nablest Tory pamphleteer, as quoted in Frothingham's \n\"Siege,\" 33. \n\n\nWrits of Assistance and the Stamp Act 23 \n\nand which made men unite to urge upon him \nthe acts which he desired for less selfish rea- \nsons. \n\nUrged by principle, then, or excited by \nself-interest, the proposers of new measures \nwere strong. The earliest act of the king's \nreign showed what could and what would be \ndone, and brought upon the Boston stage the \nfirst of the actors in the drama. On the one \nhand were the governor, the justices, and the \nminor officials, on the other the people's self- \nappointed — but willingly accepted — leaders. \n\nFrancis Bernard was the first Massachu- \nsetts governor under George III. Bernard \narrived August 2, 1760 ; the old king died on \nOctober 25 ; and in November the customs \nofficials, stimulated by orders from home to \nenforce the provisions of the Sugar Act of \n1733, petitioned for \"writs of assistance,\" to \nempower them to summon help in forcible \nentries in search of smuggled goods. Now \nthere can be no doubt that there was smug- \ngling in the colony, even in Boston itself. On \nthe other hand, the officials were inquisitorial \n\n\n24 The Siege of Boston \n\nand rapacious. Once they were armed with \nwrits of assistance, no dwelling would be safe \nfrom entry by them. The struggle was at once \nbegun, and in the council chamber of the old \nTown House was fought out before the eyes of \nthe province. \n\nThe scene is pictured on the walls of the \nmodern State House. Chief among the jus- \ntices sat Thomas Hutchinson, a man of \nproperty and education, and an excellent \nhistorian, but the very type of office-holder, \nand by prejudice and interest a partisan of \nthe king. Against him stood James Otis, the \nfirst of the Massachusetts orators of liberty, \na man of good family, and, like so many of \nthe patriot leaders, a lawyer. His speech was \nthe first definite pronouncement for a new \norder of things. \n\n\"I am determined,\" he said, \"to sacrifice \nestate, ease, health, applause, and even life, \nto the sacred calls of my country.\" He \nreferred to the \"kind of power, the exercise \nof which cost one king of England his head \nand another his throne.\" Such language, \n\n\nWrits of Assistance and the Stamp Act 25 \n\npublicly spoken, was new. His argument \nwas, to Englishmen, irrefutable. No prece- \ndent, no English statute, could stand against \nthe Constitution. \"This writ, if declared \nlegal, totally annihilates\" the privacy of \nthe home. \"Custom-house officers might \nenter our houses when they please, and we \ncould not resist them. Upon bare suspicion \nthey could exercise this wanton power. . . . \nBoth reason and the Constitution are against \nthis writ. . . . Every act against the Con- \nstitution is void.\" l The speech, continued \nfor four hours, was a brilliant example of \nkeen logic combined with burning eloquence. \n\nThis is Otis's great service to the cause of \nthe Revolution. Fiery and magnetic, but \nmoody and eventually unbalanced, he gave \nplace in the public confidence to men per- \nhaps of lesser talents, but with equal zeal and \nsteadier purpose. Yet his service was in- \nvaluable. His speech expressed for his coun- \ntrymen the indignation of the hour, and it \npointed the way to younger men. To one \n\n1 \"Memorial History of Boston,\" iii, 5. \n\n\n26 The Siege of Boston \n\nat least of his hearers, John Adams, it was \n\"like the oath of Hamilcar administered to \nHannibal.\" 1 To many it was the final appeal \nthat settled them in their patriotism. For \nhistory the scene has been called the begin- \nning of the Revolution. \n\nYet it had no immediate results, for Hutch- \ninson — and the service was forgotten by \nneither his friends nor his opponents — se- \ncured delay of judgment in the case until the \nEnglish courts could uphold him against his \nwavering associates. Nevertheless, it is safe \nto assume that the public indignation secured \nmoderate measures on the part of the cus- \ntoms officials, since we hear of few com- \nplaints. And the affair had its influence on \nthe public attitude toward the Stamp Act, \nfive years later. \n\nThe Stamp Act was the first definite asser- \ntion of the right to tax America. In 1763 \nthe Sugar Act had been reenacted, but its \nprovisions, taxing only importations from \nforeign colonies, yielded little revenue. The \n\n1 \"Memorial History of Boston,\" iii, 7. \n\n\nWrits of Assistance and the Stamp Act 27 \n\nking's treasury was already feeling the drains \nupon it, and a pack of eager office-seekers \nwas clamoring to be let loose upon the rev- \nenues of the colonies. Together the king and \nhis friends pushed through Parliament the \nlegislation which was to secure their purposes. \nTo meet any such danger as in the recent \nFrench and Indian wars, ten thousand sol- \ndiers were to be quartered on the colonies, \nwhich were to pay for their maintenance. \nCertain sops to public sentiment were given, \nin the shape of concessions, yet new restric- \ntions were laid on foreign trade. And finally \nand most important, a stamp-tax, the easiest \nto collect, was laid on business and legal \nformalities of all kinds. After its passage no \nland title might be passed, no legal papers \nissued, no ship might clear from a home port, \nwithout a stamp affixed to the necessary \ndocuments. Not even inheritances might be \ntransferred, nor marriages be legalized. \n\nThis was the first internal taxation laid \nby England on America. A word is neces- \nsary as to the meaning of the phrase in those \n\n\n28 The Siege of Boston \n\ndays. An external tax, perhaps merely an \nexport duty, was levied and paid in Eng- \nland ; its effect was seen in higher prices in \nthe colonies. Internal taxation would in- \nclude all taxes actually paid in America on \ngoods coming from England. The provisions \nof the Sugar Act were regarded as \"trade re- \nstrictions,\" and not as intended to raise an \nEnglish revenue. \n\nThere is perhaps no better place to discuss \nthe justice of the Revolution than right here. \nEven to-day the illegality, the utter wrong- \nfulness of the American position, is occasion- \nally raised among us by those who see the \ngreat obligations to the mother country under \nwhich the colonies lay, and who recall the \nneedless hardships suffered by the wretched \nTories, the martyrs of a lost cause. Doubt- \nless wrongs were inflicted in the course of the \nstruggle, and the great expenditures of Eng- \nland were in large part unrequited. But it \nmust be remembered that the world had not \nyet reached the point where the losers in a \nwar were gently treated, and that no amount \n\n\nWrits of Assistance and the Stamp Act 29 \n\nof financial obligation will ever compel to the \nacceptance of political servitude. By habit of \nmind and force of circumstances America had \ndeveloped a political theory puzzlingly novel \nto the old world and as yet not thoroughly \nunderstood by the new. It was upon this \nunformulated theory that all future differences \nwere to arise. It interfered in all affairs in \nwhich the question arose : Should the colonies \nbe governed, and especially should they be \ntaxed, without a voice in their own affairs ? \nNo one in England doubted that Parlia- \nment had a right to tax America without its \nconsent. Customs restrictions were long fa- \nmiliar. As to internal taxation, why, it was \nasked, should the colonies have a voice in \nParliament ? Birmingham and Manchester, \ngreat centres of population, were not repre- \nsented, while that uninhabited heap of stones, \nOld Sarum, sent a member to the Commons. \nResting on these abuses, even Pitt and Burke \nwere content to argue that taxation of America \nwas just. For them it was a question whether \nthat right should be exercised. \n\n\n3O The Siege of Boston \n\nWith the best will in the world to be on \ngood terms with the mother country, America \ncould not agree in such reasoning. The case \nhad nothing to do with obligations. As for \nthese, the colonists knew that England would \nnever have won against the French in Canada \nwithout their aid. But that was not the \nquestion. Should those who for a hundred \nand thirty-five years had paid no tax to Eng- \nland pay one now ? Were the people who \nfor seventy years had drawn a fine distinc- \ntion between paying their governor of their \nown accord and paying him at the command \nof the king, and who in every year of royal \ngovernorship had made their contention plain \n— were they to be satisfied to pay taxes \nbecause Birmingham did ? \n\nUndoubtedly there were other causes for \ndiscontent. \" To me,\" says Sabine, in the \npreface to his \"American Loyalists,\" \"the \ndocumentary history, the state papers of the \nperiod teach nothing more clearly than this, \nnamely, that almost every matter brought \ninto discussion was practical, and in some \n\n\nWrits of Assistance and the Stamp Act 3 1 \n\nform or other related to LABOR, to some \nbranch of COMMON INDUSTRY.\" He reminds us \nthat twenty-nine laws limited industry in the \ncolonies, and concludes that \"the great object \nof the Revolution was to release LABOR from \nthese restrictions.\" Undoubtedly these re- \nstrictive laws had their effect upon the temper \nof the people. Undoubtedly also there was \nmuch fear lest there should be established in \nthe colonies a bureaucracy of major and \nminor officials, corruptly, as in England, win- \nning fortunes for themselves. Yet the ques- \ntion of taxation, a matter of merely theoretical \nsubmission, which produced no hardship and \nwould not impoverish the country, was the \nmain cause of trouble. The two branches of \nthe race had long unconsciously parted their \nways, and the realization of it was upon them. \nUpon the proposal of the Stamp Act the \ncolonies did everything in their power to \nprevent the passage of the bill. They urged \nthat internal taxation had never been levied \nbefore. Protests, arguments, and petitions \nwere sent across the water, but in vain. The \n\n\n32 The Siege of Boston \n\nCommons fell back upon its custom \"to re- \nceive no petition against a money bill,\" and \nwould listen to nothing. \"We have the \npower to tax them, and we will tax them.\" 1 \nAnd following this utterance of one of the \nministry, the bill was passed. \n\nIt is interesting to note that no resistance \nto the tax was expected. Its operation was \nautomatic; there was no hardship in its pro- \nvisions ; of course the colonists would yield. \nEven Franklin, who should have known \nhis countrymen better, expected submission. \n\"The sun is down,\" he wrote, but \"we may \nstill light candles. Frugality and industry \nwill go a great way toward indemnifying us.\" \nHis correspondent, Charles Thomson, had in \nthis case the truer foresight, and predicted \nthe works of darkness.2 \n\nThroughout the colonies there was not \nonly sorrow, but anger. When even Hutch- \ninson had protested against the Stamp Act, \n\n1 Bancroft's \"United States,\" v, 247. \n\n2 Fiske, \"American Revolution,\" illustrated edition, \ni, 17. \n\n\nWrits of Assistance and the Stamp Act 33 \n\nit can be seen how the Whigs would feel. \nNon-importation agreements were widely \nsigned, and people accustomed to silks and \nlaces prepared to go into homespun. But \nthe act, passed in February, 1765, was not \nto go into effect until November. Before \nthat date, much could be done. \n\nWhat was done came from the lower as \nwell as the upper classes. The people acted \npromptly. One colony after another sent \ncrowds to those who had accepted, in advance, \nthe positions of stamp-officers. One by one, \nunder persuasion or intimidation, the officers \nresigned until none were left. In New York \nthe governor fled to the military for pro- \ntection, and from the parapet of the fort \nlooked helplessly on while the people burnt \nbefore his eyes his own coach, containing \nimages of himself and the devil. But before \nthis happened, Boston, first of all the capitals \nto take a positive stand, began to draw upon \nitself the particular resentment of the king. \n\nEarly in August came to Boston the news \nof the nomination of its stamp-collector, \n\n\n34 The Siege of Boston \n\nAndrew Oliver, long prominent upon the \nTory side. The lower class of the inhabitants, \nafter a week of delay, stirred itself to action. \nOn the 1 4th the image of Oliver was seen \nhanging on the bough of a large elm, then \nknown as the Great Tree. Hutchinson \nordered the image down, but as the sheriff \ndid not act, Bernard summoned his council, \nand until evening fruitlessly endeavored to \nurge them to action. Then the populace, \nhaving themselves removed the image, came \nto the Town House, and, passing directly \nthrough it, shouted to the council, still sitting \nupstairs, \"Liberty, property, and no stamps !\" \nProceeding with perfect order, the crowd next \ntore down the frame of a building which Oliver \nwas suspected of raising to use as his office, \nand, carrying the beams to Fort Hill, burnt \nthem and the image before Oliver's house. \nHutchinson, who never lacked personal \ncourage, called on the militia colonel to \nsummon his men and disperse the crowd, but \nthe colonel replied that his drummers were \nin the mob. Hutchinson then went with the \n\n\nWrits of Assistance and the Stamp Act 35 \n\nsheriff to order the crowd to disperse, but \nwas himself forced to depart in order to \nescape violence. The next day Bernard, the \ngovernor, whose courage left him at the very \nthought of another such night, fled to Castle \n\n\nTHE HUTCHINSON HOUSE \n\nWilliam, behind whose ancient walls he con- \nsidered himself safe. Oliver hastily resigned \nhis office, lest the mob should visit him again. \nThe people were not satisfied with the \nconduct of Hutchinson, who, although he \nhad actually opposed the passage of the \n\n\n36 The Siege of Boston \n\nStamp Act, was under suspicion of secretly \nabetting and profiting by it. After twelve \ndays there was a second outbreak ; the mob \nbegan by burning the records of the vice- \nadmiralty court, went on to invade the house \nof the comptroller of customs, and finally, \nworked to the usual pitch of a mob's courage, \nattacked Hutchinson's house. With his family \nhe escaped, but the mob broke into the hand- \nsome mansion, and sacked it thoroughly. \nHis library, with priceless manuscripts con- \ncerning the history of the colony, was scattered \nin the mud of the street. , \n\nThis was the most disgraceful event that \nhappened in Boston during all the long period \npreceding the Revolution. It was due to \npopular feeling, wrongly directed ; and to \nnew working-men's organizations, not as yet \nunderstanding the task that was before them. \nThese organizations, as yet almost formless, \nand never so important that records were \nkept, called themselves the Sons of Liberty, \nafter a phrase used by Isaac Barre, in a speech \nin Parliament opposing the Stamp Act. The \n\n\nWrits of Assistance and the Stamp Act 37 \n\ntree on which they had hung the image of \nOliver was from this time called Liberty Tree. \nThe better class of Boston citizens at once, \nin a town meeting called the following morn- \ning, declared their \"detestation of these \nviolent proceedings,\" and promised to sup- \npress them in future. We shall see that one \nmore such outbreak, and one only, was made \nby a Boston mob. There is here suggested \nan unwritten, perhaps never to be written, \nchapter of the history of this time. By \nwhat means did the Boston leaders, Samuel \nAdams chief among them, manage to control \nthe Boston workmen ? However it was done, \nby what conferences and through what reason- \ning, it is safe to say that the loose organizations \nof the Sons of Liberty, and still another set \nof clubs, the caucuses which met in various \nparts of the town, were utilized to control the \nlower classes. We know the names of a few \nof the leaders of the workmen: Edes the \nprinter, Crafts the painter, and, most noted \nof them all, Paul Revere the silversmith. \nThese sturdy men, and others in different \n\n\n38 The Siege of Boston \n\ntrades, were the means of transmitting to \nthe artisans of Boston the thoughts and \ndesires of the upper-class Whigs. The or- \nganization was looser than that of a political \nparty of to-day, but as soon as it was com- \npleted, it produced a subordination, secrecy, \nand self-control which cannot be paralleled \nin modern times. \n\n( The opposition to the Stamp Act con- \ntinued. More formidable than mobs were \nthe actions of the town meetings and legis- \nlatures. Protests and declarations were sol- \nemnly drawn up ; for the first time was \nheard the threat of disaffection. Represent- \natives from nine provinces met in the Stamp \nAct Congress, and passed resolutions against \nthe new taxation. \n\n•• It was impossible for England to ignore \nthe situation. Reluctantly — it was an act \nwhich the king never forgot nor forgave — \nmore than a year after its passage, when it \nwas proved that its enforcement was im- \npossible, the Stamp Act was repealed. \n\nThis was the time for England to change \n\n\nWrits of Assistance and the Stamp Act 39 \n\nher whole policy. Not Boston alone, but \nall America, had declared against American \ntaxation. The principles of liberty had again \nand again been clearly pointed out. Further, \nthere would have been no disgrace in ad- \nmitting a mistake. The whole colonial \nquestion was new in human history, for \nRoman practice was inadmissible. \"The \nbest writers on public law,\" reasoned Otis, \n\"contain nothing that is satisfactory on the \nnatural rights of colonies. . . . Their re- \nsearches are often but the history of ancient \nabuses.\" 1 The natural rights of man should \nhave been allowed to rule, as in the course \nof time, with England's other colonies, they \ncame to do. \n\nBut, for better or for worse, sides had been \ntaken. Few thought of turning back. In \nEngland there were no breaks in the ranks of \nthe king's supporters ; in America the office- \nholding class, the \"best families,\" the people \nof settled income and vested rights, were as \na rule, selfishly or unselfishly, for the king. \n\nBancroft's \"United States,\" v, 203. \n\n\n4 for a duty still main- \ntained upon tea. \n\nThe response was such that England was \nrelieved. New York began to import those \narticles which had been made free of duty. \nThe non-importation agreement was broken, \n\n1 Trevelyan, \"American Revolution,\" Part I, 104. \n\n\nThe Tea-Party and its Consequences 73 \n\nas the colonies perceived. \"You had better \nsend us your old liberty pole,\" wrote Phila- \ndelphia scornfully to New York, \"since you \nclearly have no further use for it.\" 1 Whigs and \nTories both saw that, the agreement thus \nbroken, other colonies would follow the ex- \nample of New York. \n\nThe advantage was now clearly with the \nking, and he endeavored to make the most \nof it, not by abiding in peace, but by taking \na further step. He ordered that colonial \njudges should in future be paid from the Eng- \nlish treasury. No one in the colonies could \nfail to see that the blow was aimed directly at \nthe independence of the judiciary. \n\nMassachusetts was alarmed. Boston sent \nresolutions to the governor, but Hutchinson, \nnow at last in the chair, refused to listen to \nthe town meeting. In this moment of in- \ndignation, Samuel Adams conceived a scheme \nwhich was the longest step yet taken toward \nindependence. \n\n1 \"A Card from the Inhabitants of Philadelphia,\" \nBancroft, vi, 366. \n\n\n74 The Siege of Boston \n\nThis was the idea of Committees of Cor- \nrespondence, to be permanently maintained \nby each town and even by each colony. The \nidea of such committees was not novel. It \nhad been suggested years before by Jonathan \nMayhew, and had more than once been used \nin emergencies. But permanent committees, \nwatching affairs and at any time ready to act, \nwere new. Naturally composed of the best \nmen in each town, they would at all times \nbe ready to speak, and to speak vigorously. \nThe plan, when perfected, eventually enabled \nthe colonies to act as a unit. From the first \nit gave strength to the Americans ; in the \npresent instance it spread the news of the \nking's action and roused indignation, and \nbefore long it brought about an act which \nstartled the English-speaking world. \n\nThis was the Boston Tea-Party. The king \nhad a hand in making the fire hot. He had \nbeen vexed by his unsuccessful tariff, and \nwas now especially irritated that his con- \ncessions had brought about no result in one \nimportant particular. \n\n\nThe Tea-Party and its Consequences 75 \n\nUntil the present every shipmaster had \nbeen a smuggler, and all the Whigs dealt \nin smuggled goods. This was according to \nold English practice, but as a matter of fact \nillicit trade was more decorous in America \nthan in England. Whereas in Cornwall the \nforces of the smugglers were so strong that \nthey chased the revenue cutters into harbors \nand landed their goods by bright moonlight, \nin America the appearances of legality were \ngravely preserved. \n\nNevertheless the result was the same, and \nin one quarter was actually serious. The \nrecent tariff had brought to the royal treasury \nscarcely three hundred pounds from tea. The \nsituation was no better now that the tea- \nduty was the only one remaining. So com- \npletely did America, while still drinking tea \nin quantity, avoid the duly imported article, \nthat the revenue of the East India Company \nfell off alarmingly. On pathetic representa- \ntions of the financial state of the company, \nthe king gave permission, through a subser- \nvient Parliament, for the company to export \n\n\n76 The Siege of Boston \n\ntea to America free even of the English duty. \nThe company had lost hundreds of thousands \nof pounds since the Townshend Acts went in \nforce ; now by favorable terms it was to be \nenabled to undersell in the colonial market \neven the smuggled teas. Taking advantage \nof this new ruling, tea was promptly shipped, \nin the autumn of 1773, to different consignees \nin Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and \nCharleston. \n\nIt was confidently expected that the col- \nonies would buy the tea. No one in the gov- \nernment supposed that the Americans would \nbe blind to their own interests. This much, \nindeed, was admitted by the leaders among \nthe Whigs, that once the tea was on sale Yankee \nprinciple might be sorely tempted by Yankee \nthrift. Indignant at the insidious tempta- \ntion, determined that no such test should be \nmade, and resenting the establishment of a \npractical monopoly throughout the colonies, \nthe leaders resolved that the tea should not \nbe landed. \n\nIt is an odd fortune that connected the \n\n\nThe Tea-Party and its Consequences 77 \n\nChinese herb so closely with the struggle \nof principle in America. To this day, while \nthe issues are obscured in the mind of the \naverage American, he remembers the tax on \ntea, and that his ancestors would not pay \nit. Picturesque tales of ladies' associations \ndepriving themselves of their favorite bev- \nerage, of men tarring and feathering un- \npopular tradesmen, have survived the hundred \nand thirty odd years which have passed since \nthen ; and the impression is general that the \ncolonists would not pay a tax which bore \nheavy on them. But it will be noticed by \nthose who have attentively read this account \nthat the colonists were refusing to pay \nless, in order that they might have the \nsatisfaction of paying more. They balked, \nnot at the amount of the tax, but at its \nprinciple. \n\nIn the case of the tea-ships the duty of \naction fell upon Boston. Charleston and \nPhiladelphia had taken a positive stand \nresolving not to receive the tea ; but the ships \nwere due at Boston first. The eyes of the \n\n\n78 The Siege of Boston \n\ncontinent were upon this one town. Boston \nmade ready to act, yet of the preparations \nwe know nothing. While the story as it is \ntold is interesting enough, there is no record \nof the secret meetings in which the events \nwere prepared. Hints are dropped, and it \nis asserted that within the Green Dragon \ntavern, a favorite meeting-place of the Whigs, \nwere finally decided the means by which the \nworkmen of the town should carry out the \nplans of the leaders. But of these meetings \nnothing is positively known ; all we can say \nwith certainty is that the plans worked per- \nfectly, and that Sam Adams must have had \na hand in their making. \n\nThe Sons of Liberty took the first step \ntoward forcing the consignees of the tea to \nresign. \"Handbills are stuck up,\" writes \nJohn Andrews, \"calling upon Friends! Citi- \nzens ! and Countrymen ! \" To Liberty Tree \nthe \"freemen of Boston and the neighboring \ntowns\" were invited, by placard and adver- \ntisement, \"to hear the persons, to whom the \ntea shipped by the East India Company is \n\n\nThe Tea-Party and its Consequences 79 \n\nconsigned, make a public resignation of their \noffice as consignees, upon oath.\" 1 \n\nBut the consignees did not come, though \nthe freemen did. The townspeople, forming \nthemselves into a \"meeting,\" sent a com- \nmittee to the consignees, demanding that \nthey refuse to receive the tea. But the con- \nsignees believed themselves safe. They were \nmerchants of family and property, the gov- \nernor's sons were among them, and it was \nrumored that Hutchinson had a pecuniary \ninterest in the success of the venture. They \nrefused to give the pledge. \n\nThe official town meeting now took up \nthe matter. Before the tea arrived, and \nagain after the appearance of the first ship, \nthe town called upon the consignees to resign. \nEach time the consignees refused. The second \ntown meeting, after thus acting in vain, dis- \nsolved without the customary expression of \nopinion. Hutchinson himself records that \n\"this sudden dissolution struck more terror \ninto the consignees than the most minatory \n\n1 \"Memorial History of Boston,\" iii, 45. \n\n\n8o The Siege of Boston \n\nresolves.\" From that moment the matter \nwas in the hands of the Boston Committee \nof Correspondence. \n\nBy means of the committee, at whose \nhead was Adams, communication was held \nwith the towns throughout Massachusetts. \nThe province was greatly excited, and re- \npeated demands for resignation were made \nupon the consignees, but they clung to their \noffices and the hope of profit. Delays were \nskilfully secured, and the first ship was \nentered at the customs, after which accord- \ning to law it must within twenty days either \nclear for England or land its cargo. The \ngovernor was resolved not to grant a clear- \nance, and rejoiced over his opponents. \"They \nfind themselves,\" he said, \"in invincible diffi- \nculties.\" \n\nBut everything was prepared. To the last \nminute of the twenty days the Whigs were \npatient. Petition after petition, appeal af- \nter appeal, went to the governor or the con- \nsignees. There was no success. On thex \nlast day, the i6th of December, 1773, all \n\n\nThe Tea-Party and its Consequences 81 \n\nthree of the tea-ships were at Griffin's Wharf, \nwatched by the patriots. A town meeting, \nthe largest in the history of Boston, crowded \nthe Old South, and again resolved that the \ntea should not be landed. \"Who knows,\" \nasKed John Rowe, \" how tea will mingle with \nsalt water ? ': The remark was greeted with \ncheers, yet one more legal step might be \ntaken, and the meeting, sending Rotch, the \nmaster of the first tea-ship, to the governor \nat Milton to ask for a clearance, patiently \nwaited while he should traverse the fifteen \nmiles of his journey. During the hours of \nhis absence there was no disturbance ; when \nhe returned, the daylight had gone, and the \nOld South was lighted with candles. Seven \nthousand people were silent to hear the re- \nport. It was brief, and its meaning was \nclear : the governor had refused ; the last \nlegal step had been taken. Then Samuel \nAdams rose. \n\n\"This meeting,\" he declared, \"can do \nnothing more to save the country.\" \n\nIt was the expected signal. Immediately \n\n\n82 The Siege of Boston \n\nthere was a shout from the porch, and the \nwarwhoop sounded out of doors. The meeting \npoured out of doors and followed some fifty \nmen in the garb of Indians, who suddenly \nappeared in the street. They hurried to \nGriffin's Wharf. There they posted guards, \ntook possession of the tea-ships, and hoisting \nthe chests from the holds, knocked them \nopen and emptied the tea into the water. \nUnder the moon the great crowd watchecl \nin silence, there was no interference from the \ntroops or the war-ships, and in three hours \nthe last of the tea was overboard. Nothing \nremained except what had sifted into the \nshoes of some of the \"Indians,\" to be pre- \nserved as mementoes of the day. \n\n\"They say,\" wrote John Andrews dryly \ntwo days later, \"that the actors were Indians \nfrom Narragansett. Whether they were or \nnot, to a transient observer they appear'd \nas such, being cloath'd in Blankets with the \nheads muffled, and copper color'd counte- \nnances, being each arm'd with a hatchet or \naxe, and pair pistols, nor was their dialect \n\n\nThe Tea-Party and its Consequences 83 \n\ndifferent from what I conceive these geniusses \nto speak, as their jargon was unintelligible to \nall but themselves. Not the least insult was \noffer'd to any person, save one Captain Con- \nner, a letter of horses in this place, not many \nyears since remov'd from dear Ireland, who \nhad ript up the lining of his coat and waist- \ncoat under the arms, and watching his op- \nportunity had nearly fill'd 'em with tea, \nbut being detected, was handled pretty \nroughly. They not only stripp'd him of his \ncloaths, but gave him a coat of mud, with a \nsevere bruising into the bargain ; and noth- \ning but their utter aversion to make any \ndisturbance prevented his being tar'd and \nfeather'd.\" \n\nSuch was the Boston Tea-Party, \"the \nboldest stroke,\" said Hutchinson, \"that had \nyet been struck in America.\" Much has \nbeen written about it. It has been minimized \ninto a riot, and magnified into a deed of \nglory. As a matter of fact, it was neither \nthe one nor the other, yet if either it was \nnearer the latter. Carried out by Boston \n\n\n84 The Siege of Boston \n\nmechanics, but doubtless directed by Boston \nleaders, it was a cool and deliberate law- \nbreaking, the penalty for which, could the \noffenders but have been discovered, would \nhave been severe. But none of the actors \nin the affair were betrayed at the time, though \nhundreds in the town must have had posi- \ntive knowledge of their identity. Names, \nlike those of the burners of the Gaspee eighteen \nmonths before, were not given out until after \nthe Revolution, and even to-day the list of \nthem is not complete. \n\nThe project of the king and the East India \nCompany was a failure. In one way or other \nthe other three seaports either destroyed \nor sent back their tea. But Boston was the \nfirst and most violent offender. It was on \nher that punishment was to descend. \n\nnews of the Tea-Party came to England \nat a time when king and Parliament were \nless amiably disposed than usual toward \nMassachusetts. Some weeks before had hap- \npened the affair of the Hutchinson letters. \nBenjamin Franklin, then Postmaster-General \n\n\nThe Tea-Party and its Consequences 85 \n\nof England, and agent for Massachusetts, \nhad secured possession of certain letters written \nby Governor Hutchinson and by others in \noffice in the colony. These letters proved be- \nyond doubt that the Massachusetts officials \nhad been secretly urging upon the home gov- \nernment repressive measures against the col- \nony. This was but what Bernard had done, \nand what had been suspected of his successor ; \nyet the actual proof was too much for Frank- \nlin. He sent the letters, under pledge of \nsecrecy, home to be read by the leaders among \nthe Massachusetts Whigs. But the pledge \nof secrecy could not be kept. The letters \nwere read in the Assembly and then published. \n\"He had written,\" says Bancroft of Hutch- \ninson, \"against every part of the Constitution, \nthe elective character of the Council, the \nannual choice of the Assembly, the New \nEngland organization of the towns ; had \nadvised and solicited the total dependence \nof the judiciary on the Crown, had hinted at \nmaking the experiment of declaring Martial \nLaw, and of abrogating English liberty; had \n\n\n86 The Siege of Boston \n\nadvised to the restraint of the commerce of \nBoston and the jj^clus^ \nfrom the fisheries..\" 1 Hutchinson's defence \nwas tliat he \"had never wrote any public \nor private letter that tends to subvert the \nConstitution.\" But he was thinking of the \nConstitution rather than the Charter. The \nprovince was thoroughly roused, and sent to \nEngland a firm yet respectful petition de- \nmanding his dismissal. \n\nBut Hutchinson had been serving the \nking as the king wished to be served. The \nwrath of the government fell upon Franklin. \nIn a crowded meeting of the Privy Council, \nwith scant respect for the forms of law, \nFranklin was subjected to elaborate abuse. \nThere were none to defend him who could \ngain a respectful hearing ; he stood immovable \nunder the tongue-lashing of the Solicitor- \nGeneral, and made no reply. \"I have never,\" \nhe said afterwards, \"been so sensible of the \npower of a good conscience, for if I had not \nconsidered the thing for which I have been \n\nBancroft, vi, 461, 462. \n\n\nThe Tea-Party and its Consequences 87 \n\nso much insulted, as one of the best actions \nof my life, and what I should certainly do \nagain in the same circumstances, I could \nnot have supported it.\" 1 The suit which he \nwore that day he put carefully away, and \ndid not wear it again until as Commissioner \nfor the United States he signed in Paris the \ntreaty of alliance with France. \n\nFranklin was deprived of his office under \nthe crown, and the king who directed the \npunishment, the council who condemned him, \nand the Parliament which cheered them both \non, were not yet satisfied. When the news of \nthe Tea-Party came, they felt that their chance \nhad come to strike at the real culprit. The \nking consulted General Gage, who was fresh \nfrom Boston, and listened eagerly to his \nfatally mistaken account of the situation. \n\"He says,\" wrote the king to Lord North, \n\" 'They will be lions while we are lambs ; \nbut if we take the resolute part they will \nundoubtedly prove very meek.' Four regi- \nments sent to Boston will, he thinks, be \n\n1 Bancroft, vi, 498. \n\n\n88 The Siege of Boston \n\nsufficient to prevent any disturbance.\" 1 On \nsuch a basis the king and his prime minister \nplanned the laws which should punish the \ntown of Boston. \n\nThe first act was the Boston Port Bill. It \nclosed the port to all commerce until the \nEast India Company should be paid for its \ntea, and the king satisfied that the town was \nrepentant. Nothing except food and fuel \nwas to be brought to the town in boats ; in \nfact, as Lord North promised the Commons, \nBoston was to be removed seventeen miles \nfrom the ocean. For Salem was made the \nport of entry, and there the governor and \nthe collector, the surveyor and the comp- \ntroller, and all underlings were to go. It \nwas planned to station war-ships in Boston \nHarbor to enforce the law. \n\nThe second law was the \"Bill for the better \nRegulating the Government of the Massachu- \nsetts Bay,\" generally called the Regulating \nAct. This virtually swept away the charter \nof Massachusetts. It provided first that the \n\n1 Avery, \"History of the United States,\" v, 190. \n\n\nThe Tea-Party and its Consequences 89 \n\nCouncil was to be appointed by the king, \nand next that without the consent of the \nCouncil the governor might appoint or re- \nmove all officers of justice, from judges to \nconstables. By the provisions of the law even \nthe jury lists could be controlled by appointive \nofficers. Finally town meetings were made \nillegal throughout the province, except for \nthe election of town officers, and other nec- \nessary local business. \n\nThe third proposal of the government was \na bill \"for the Impartial Administration of \nJustice,\" in proposing which \" it was observed \nthat Lord North trembled and faultered at \nevery word of his motion.\" It provided that \nmagistrates, officers, or soldiers might be tried \nfor \"murder, or any other capital offence,\" in \nGreat Britain. \n\nThe fourth act made provision for quarter- \ning troops in Boston. \n\nThe bills went through Parliament without \nmuch opposition. Says Trevelyan, \"Even \nafter the lapse of a century and a quarter the \ndebates are not pleasant reading for an Eng- \n\n\n9O The Siege of Boston \n\nlishman.\" 1 It was assumed that the punish- \nment was just, and that not only Boston but \nalso the whole continent would take it meekly. \nA few voices were raised in protest, but as a \nrule even the Opposition was silent. One by \none the bills became law. One more step \nwas taken toward separation. \n\n1U American Revolution,\" Part I, 181. \n\n\nCHAPTER V \n\nTHE OCCUPATION OF BOSTON \n\nEARLY in May of 1774 Hutchinson, \nostensibly called to England to advise \nthe king, gave up his offices in Massa- \nchusetts. His exile was approaching. Never \nagain was he to see the fair hill of Milton, \nnor to look from its top upon the town and \nharbor that he loved. The Whigs exulted \nover the fall of \"the damn'd arch traitor;\" \nyet surely, though as an official he failed in \nhis task, and as a patriot misread the temper \nand the capacity of his countrymen, he com- \nmands our pity. Amid the booming of the \ncannon which welcomed his successor he pre- \npared for his departure. Except for his pa- \nthetic letters and journals he made no further \nmark upon his times or ours. His Milton \nestate remains, but his house is gone, and \nthe very street that he lived on bears \n\n91 \n\n\n92 The Siege of Boston \n\nthe name of Adams, his most persistent \nenemy. \n\nHutchinson's successor was Thomas Gage, \nthe first governor sent to Boston with an \narmy at his back. He was well known in \nthe colonies, for he had fought well at Brad- \ndock's defeat, had married an American wife, \nand was courteous and affable. It remained \nto be seen whether one of his hesitating tem- \nperament could meet the situation. With \nfour regiments he had undertaken to pacify \nMassachusetts. He had his four regiments \nand more, yet he must occasionally have \nwondered why he found no more signs of \nweakness in the ranks of his opponents. \n\nAt this time there were in Boston four \nchief classes of Whigs. The first were the \nministers, and these for many years had been \nAmerican to the core. As the first settlers \nof Massachusetts, whether Puritan or Pilgrim, \nhad fled away from prelacy, so their spiritual \ndescendants still hated the name of bishop. \nIn fact, episcopacy in New England was still \nweak, and its greater part was concentrated \n\n\nThe Occupation of Boston 93 \n\nin Boston itself. Some few of its ministers \npreached submission ; but they either had to \ncontent themselves with Tory congregations, \nor lost their pulpits, or had them boarded up \nagainst them. The wiser part was taken by \nmost in avoiding politics. The sole Congre- \ngational minister who supported the king was \nMather Byles, famed for his witticisms, and \nhe likewise declined to bring into the pulpit \nany mention of the affairs of the day. \"In \nthe first place,\" he told those who demanded \nan expression of his opinion, \"I do not under- \nstand politics ; in the second place you all \ndo, every man and mother's son of you; in \nthe third place you have politics all the week, \nso pray let one day in the seven be devoted \nto religion ; in the fourth place I am engaged \nin work of infinitely greater importance. \nGive me any subject to preach on of more \nconsequence than the truth I bring to you, \nand I will preach on it next Sabbath.\" 1 \n\nGage's support from the pulpit was there- \nfore weak, while at the same time the oppo- \n\n1 Sabine's \" Loyalists,\" 190. \n\n\n94 The Siege of Boston \n\nsition from the same source was strong. \nThose country ministers who were of the \npolitical creed of Sam Adams confessed it \neach Sabbath, and desisted not on week days \nfrom strengthening the wills of their congre- \ngations. More than that, like their prede- \ncessors in older times, many held chaplain- \ncies in the militia, and on training days turned \nout, not only to approve by their presence the \nobject of the drill, but also to stir the spirit \nof the homespun soldiery by prayers to the \nGod of Moses, and of Joshua, and of David. \nThose in Boston, under the very nose of the \ngeneral and in the presence of his soldiery, \nabated nothing of their zeal, but preached \nresistance as before. Gage, as he looked \namong them for signs of wavering, could \nhave found very little comfort. \n\nThe lawyers next, like the clergymen, had \nsupplied the Whigs much of their strength. \nSurely, up to the present the patriot party \nhad been distinguished by pliancy and per- \nsistence. These characteristics had come from \nthe lawyers, whose rejoinders and remon- \n\n\nThe Occupation of Boston 95 \n\nstrances, petitions, resolves, and appeals were \nfamiliar professional devices. Yet Gage might \nhave found hope in these men. For the pur- \npose of all their delays had been compromise, \nand their hope was the avoidance of blood- \nshed. The lawyers had showed, too, a love \nof fair play ; for while they pressed the Tories \nhard, they had also taken the lead in protest- \ning against mob violence. Again, leading \nWhig lawyers had defended — and acquitted \n-the perpetrators of the Massacre. Possi- \nbly such men might be made to see reason. \n\nA more numerous class than the lawyers \nwas made up of the merchants, small and \nlarge. Some few of these men had made \ntheir own way in the world, yet most of them \nmay almost have been said to have held \nhereditary positions in the provincial aristoc- \nracy. By far the larger number of them \nwere Whigs, some of considerable estate, \nothers — like that John Andrews from whose \nletters I have already quoted and shall quote \nmore — were men of moderate means, \nshrewdly working for a \" competency.\" Gage, \n\n\n96 The Siege of Boston \n\nlooking forward to the enforcement of the \nPort Bill, could see that these men would be \nhard hit. While they had so far been firm \nin the colonial cause, the coming temptation \nto desert their party would be very strong. \nIncome, security, and the favor of the king \nawaited them. \n\nAt the end of this series was the largest \nclass of all, the mechanics. Until now these \nmen had been eager in their demonstrations \nagainst technical oppression — which yet was \ntechnical after all. No Boston Whig had \never known a tithe of the wrongs of the \nFrench peasant or the Russian serf. No \nlaboring class on earth enjoyed or ever had \nenjoyed greater freedom or less hampered \nprosperity. But with the enforcement of the \nPort Bill all this would change. Gage hoped, \nand the Tories declared, that the mechanics, \nso soon as pressure was applied, would \"fall \naway from the faction.\" \n\nThe first results of the new regime were \nnot promising. To begin with, on the news \nof the passage of the Port Bill the Committee \n\n\nThe Occupation of Boston 97 \n\nof Correspondence of Boston called a meeting \nof the committees of the neighboring towns. \nThis meeting scouted the idea of paying for \nthe tea, and in a circular letter to the other \ncolonies proposed a general cessation of trade \nwith Great Britain. Similarly the town meet- \ning of Boston discussed the situation, pro- \nnounced against the Port Bill, and appealed \nto all the sister colonies, entreating not to be \nleft to suffer alone. In more homely language \nthe merchants appealed to their friends. \n\"Yes, Bill,\" wrote John Andrews to his \nbrother-in-law in Philadelphia, \" nothing will \nsave us but an entire stoppage of trade, both \nto England and the West Indies. . . . The \nleast hesitancy on your part to the Souther d, \nand the matter is over.\" \n\nThere was little hesitancy. The suggestion \nmade by the Boston Whigs was taken up, and \nthe maritime towns, which had been expected \nto take advantage of Boston's predicament, \nbegan to discontinue trade, not merely with \nGreat Britain, but also with the West Indies. \nThen Salem, which was to be the capital in \n\n\n98 The Siege of Boston \n\nplace of Boston, formally repudiated the idea \nof profiting by the situation. The news \nspread to the other colonies, and they began \nto act. New York proposed, and the sister \nprovinces agreed in, a call for \"a general \nCongress.\" In less than a month after the \ncoming of the news of the Port Bill, Boston \nwas assured that the continent would not \nleave her to suffer alone. i \n\nBut then, on the first of June, 1774, the \nPort Bill went into effect. So literally was \nit interpreted, that all carriage by boat in the \nharbor was forbidden. No owner of a pas- \nture on the harbor islands might bring his \nhay to the town ; no goods might be brought \nacross any ferry; not even carriage by water \nfrom wharf to wharf in the town was allowed. \nFurther, while food and fuel, according to the \nprovisions of the act, might be brought to \nBoston by water, all vessels carrying them \nwere forced to go through troublesome formal- \nities. They must report at the customs in \nSalem, unload, load again, and receive a \nclearance for Boston. Returning, they might \n\n\nThe Occupation of Boston 99 \n\ncarry enough provision to last them only to \nSalem. Besides all this, the Commissioners \nof Customs at Salem undertook to decide \nwhen Boston had enough provisions. The \nblockade, as enforced by them and the ships \nof war in Boston Harbor, was minutely com- \nplete and vexatious. \n\nYet at their mildest its provisions were \ncomplete enough. Trade by sea with the \ntown was stopped. Consequently, so mari- \ntime were the town's activities, prosperity \nwas instantly checked. All the workers im- \nmediately dependent on the sea for a living, \nsailors, wharfingers, longshoremen, and fisher- \nmen, were at once thrown out of employ- \nment. Then by a severe interpretation of \nthe act all ship-building was stopped, since the \nauthorities declared that, on launching, any \nboat would be confiscated. The shipyards \nshut down, the boats ready to launch were \nfilled with water \"for their preservation,\" 1 \nand ship-carpenters, calkers, rope-makers, \nand sailmakers were thrown out of work. \n\n1 Andrews Letters. \n\n\nioo The Siege of Boston \n\nMuch misery to the unemployed would have \nbeen the result but for the forethought of \nthe patriot leaders. \n\nThese men, early realizing the threatened \nhardship, called for help from the rest of the \ncountry. The response was prompt. \"A \nspecial chronicle,\" says Bancroft, \"could \nhardly enumerate all the generous deeds.\" \nWhile Lord North, fresh from an interview \nwith Hutchinson, cheered the king with the \nbelief that the province would soon submit, \nSouth Carolina was sending a cargo of pro- \nvisions in a vessel offered for the purpose by \nthe owner, and sailed without wages by the \ncaptain and her crew. Sheep were driven \ninto Boston from all New England; provi- \nsions of every kind were brought in; wheat \nwas sent by the French in Quebec ; money \nwas subscribed and sent from the more distant \npoints. All supplies thus received were put \nin the hands of a donation committee, who \ndistributed the gifts to the needy. \n\nYet in spite of such relief as this, and \nthough for a short time employment was \n\n\nThe Occupation of Boston 101 \n\ngiven to workmen by permitting them to \nfinish, launch, rig, and send away the ships \nthen on the stocks, the situation was hard at \nbest. It was felt not only by the lower \nclasses, but by the merchants, whose profits \nceased, and by all who depended for their \nincome on the current trade and activity of \nthe town. Gossipy John Andrews gives us \nthe situation as it affected him. \"If you'll \nbelieve me (though I have got near two \nthousand sterling out in debts and about as \nmuch more in stock), I have not received \nabove eighty or ninety pounds Lawful money \nfrom both resources for above two months \npast ; though previous to the port's being \nshut, I thought it an ordinary day's work if \nI did not carry home from twenty to forty \ndollars every evening.\" So little ready money \ncirculated in the town \"that really, Bill, I \nthink myself well off to satisfy the necessary \ndemands of my family, and you may as well \nask a man for the teeth out of his head as to \nrequest the payment of money that he owes \nyou (either in town or country, for we are \n\n\nIO2 The Siege of Boston \n\nalike affected), for you'll be as likely to get \nthe one as the other.\" 1 \n\nNow was, indeed, the time to discover the \nweak points in the cause and organization of \nthe Americans. Even strong Whigs were at \ntimes discontented, and chiefly among the \nmiddle class, without whom the leaders could \nhave no strong support. Much of the distress \nof the shopkeepers and merchants came from \nthe \"Solemn League and Covenant\" which, \nproposed on the first news of the Port Bill, \nwas now in actual operation. Andrews's case \nmust have been typical of many. He had \ncountermanded all goods on the news of the \nPort Bill, and acquiesced in the non-importa- \ntion agreement: \"but upon y? measure not \nbeing adopted by the Southern Colonies, I \nembraced the first opportunity and re-ordered \nabout one-fourth part of such goods as I \nthought would be in most demand, and be- \n\n1 The Andrews Letters, as already noted, are in the \nMassachusetts Historical Society's Proceedings for \nthe volume of 1864-1865. I shall refer to them fre- \nquently without quoting pages. \n\n\nThe Occupation of Boston 103 \n\nhold ! in about three or four weeks after \nthat, I heard of y? amazing progress the non- \nconsumption agreement had made through \ny? country; which, in my opinion, has \nserv'd rather to create dissensions among \nourselves than to answer any valuable \npurpose.\" \n\nMany of the Tories held the same opinion. \nCould not the waverers, they asked Gage, be \ninduced to change their political faith, and \nespecially could not the leaders be tempted ? \n\nAmong these leaders the influence of Otis \nwas waning. He had always been eccentric \nand unreliable, and now his intellect was \nthreatened. An assault upon him had nearly \nruined both his health and his reason. But \nhis place had been taken by others. Samuel \nAdams, John Adams, Joseph Warren, and \nJohn Hancock were the men whose names \nwere oftenest mentioned. Sinister rumors \nwere frequent that Gage had been directed \nto seize them and deport them to England. \nWhether or not more evidence against them \nwas needed, no arrest was as yet attempted. \n\n\n104 The Siege of Boston \n\nInstead, in at least three quarters there was \nsome hope of corruption. \n\nWarren the general left untempted ; it is \nno small tribute to the patriot's character \nthat there could be no doubt of his integrity. \nWarren was not yet thirty-five years old, \nwas of good social position, had an excellent \npractice and an assured future. His tempera- \nment was frank and manly, and so enthusias- \ntic as to be fiery. Once already, on the \nanniversary of the Massacre in 1772, he had \naddressed the town meeting in condemnation \nof the government measures ; on many other \nopportunities, before and since, he had either \nspoken in public or expressed his opinions \nthrough the press. While no advocate of \nviolence, he was unreservedly a Whig, and \nnothing could be made of him. So far as is \nknown, no attempt was made to corrupt him. \n\nThe case of John Adams was different, \nat least to Tory eyes. He was ambitious : \nno one who knew him could doubt that he \nwas conscious of his own ability. Further, \nhe was poor, with a growing family to support ; \n\n\nThe Occupation of Boston 105 \n\nhe was known, with the troubled times which \nhe clearly foresaw, to be anxious for his \nchildren's future. Surely there was a pos- \nsibility that Adams might be wise, and be \ntempted to the safer course; and fortunately \nthere was at hand an instrument to induce \nhim to become a Tory. Adams was the close \npersonal friend of Jonathan Sewall, the king's \nattorney-general for the province, and an \nadmirable character. The chance of dis- \ntinction, the certainty of prosperity, and \nthe importunities of such a friend, might in \nthe end persuade Adams. \n\nOf John Hancock it was often argued among \nthe Tories that he might almost be left \nto himself. If Adams was ambitious, Han- \ncock was more so ; known to be vain, he was \nbelieved to be jealous by nature. With these \nweaknesses, he was also instinctively an aris- \ntocrat. How long, asked the Tories, would \nhe continue to consort with men of low \nsocial position ? How soon would he rebel \nat being led by the nose by the wily Adams ? \nPosition and influence were ready for him as \n\n\n106 The Siege of Boston \n\nsoon as he chose to go over to the king. The \nbait was always plain, and he might be \ncounted on eventually to take it. \n\nEven Samuel Adams, so reasoned the ad- \nvisers of Gage, might be bought. For Adams \nwas poor. In his devotion to public affairs \nhe had let his business go to ruin, had seen his \nmoney melt away, had even sold off parts of \nhis own house-lot. His sentiments were no \nbetter known in Boston than his threadbare \nclothes. His sole income was from his salary \nas clerk of the house of representatives, only \na hundred pounds a year. To the new gov- \nernor it was the most natural thing in the \nworld to suppose that the discontent of such \na man could soon be removed. He forgot \nHutchinson's words : \" Such is the obstinacy \nand inflexible disposition of the man, that \nhe never would be conciliated by any office \nor gift whatever.\" * \n\nGage sent, therefore, Colonel Fenton to \nAdams with offers which would tempt any \nman that had a price. No definite knowl- \n\n1 Wells, \"Life of Adams,\" ii, 193. \n\n\nThe Occupation of Boston 107 \n\nedge of the inducements has come down to \nus : money, place, possibly even a patent of \nnobility. We know, however, that they were \ncoupled with a threat in the form of advice \nto make his peace with the king. And we \ncan imagine Adams as, rising from his \nseat, and standing with the habitual nervous \ntremor of head and hands which often led \nhis adversaries to mistake his mettle, he \ndelivered his fearless reply. \n\n\"Sir, I trust I have long since made my \npeace with the King of kings. No personal \nconsideration shall induce me to abandon \nthe righteous cause of my country. Tell \nGovernor Gage that it is the advice of Samuel \nAdams to him no longer to insult the feelings \nof an exasperated people ! \" 1 \n( And this was in the face of a situation the \nlike of which had never been known in \nAmerica. \"Notwithstanding which,\" wrote \nJohn Andrews, \"there seems to be ease, \ncontentment, and perfect composure in the \ncountenance of almost every person you \n\n1 Wells, \"Adams,\" ii, 193. \n\n\nio8 The Siege of Boston \n\nmeet in the streets, which conduct very much \nperplexes the Governor and others, our lords \nand masters, that they are greatly puzzled, \nand know not what to do or how to act, as \nthey expected very different behaviour from \n\n\nus.\" \n\n\nThere is but one explanation of such a \nstate of mind in the Whigs, in the face of \nthe evidently approaching trial. Their con- \nsciences were clear. This revolution, when \nfinally it came about, was quite within the \nspirit of the British Constitution. The Whigs \nbelieved they were right, and had no fear \nof the consequences. No testimony to their \nvirtues, as the backbone of a new nation, \nwill speak louder than their present attitude. \nExternal testimony is not hard to quote. \n\"The people of Boston and Massachusetts \nBay,\" wrote Thomas Hollis but a few weeks \nbefore this time, \"are, I suppose, take them \nas a body, the soberest, most knowing, vir- \ntuous people at this time upon earth.\" Other \nEnglish opinion to the same effect, and French \nadmiration by the chapter, might be quoted. \n\n\nThe Occupation of Boston 109 \n\nYet a truer proof of the quality of the people \nis to be found in the calm self-confidence \nwhich \"very much perplexed\" the governor. \n\nOne more comment may safely be ventured \nhere. Before two years were over it was \nknown that Gage, and perhaps even Hutch- \ninson during his administration, had had \nthe most complete information of the secret \ndoings of the Whig leaders. In fact, even \nthe deliberations of the workmen's caucuses \nmust have been known to Gage. That no \narrests were made can mean but one thing : \nthat the Whigs were honest in their endeavor \nto work their ends by legal means. Samuel \nAdams may have foreseen the eventual out- \ncome, and knowing it to be inevitable may \nhave striven to make it speedy and complete. \nBut there was no general scheme for inde- \npendence, no plot for a revolt. \"The Father \nof the Revolution\" laid his plans in silence, \nand waited for the ripening of the times. \n\nGage and his advisers, \"greatly puzzled,\" \nalso watched the crystallizing of opinion. \nOf the temper of the Bostonians, although \n\n\nno The Siege of Boston \n\noppressed by the Port Bill, there could pres- \nently be no doubt. Emboldened by the pres- \nence of troops in the town, the Tories called \ntown meetings, first to resolve to pay for the \ntea, and then to dismiss the Committee of \nCorrespondence. These two actions, if taken, \nwould have totally changed the situation. \nThe meetings were crowded, every courtesy \nwas shown the Tories, and in the second \nmeeting, since Adams was absent, the Whigs \nhad to be content with the leadership of \nWarren. But there was no hesitation in \neither case. The first meeting rejected the \nproposal to pay for the tea. In the second \nthe discretion of Warren proved equal to his \nzeal, his management of the meeting was \nperfect, and the vote upheld the Committee \nof Correspondence by a large majority. \n\nThe next action explains the absence of \nAdams from Boston at such an important \ntime. According to the new laws, the As- \nsembly met at Salem, under the eye of \nthe governor and in the presence of his \ntroops. Gage knew very well that a call \n\n\nThe Occupation of Boston ill \n\nhad been sent throughout the colonies for an \nelection of delegates to a general Congress \nwhich should deliberate on the present situ- \nation. He had no intention that delegates \nshould be elected from Massachusetts. He \nhad partisans in the Assembly, and an inform- \nant on the committee to introduce legislation. \nEvery move was reported to him. Never \ndid Sam Adams dissemble more cleverly. \nSo dull and spiritless did public matters \nseem, that Gage's informant thought it \nsafe to go home on private business. \nThen Adams acted. Quietly laying his \nplans, on the morning of the seventeenth \nof June, 1774, he locked the door of the \nchamber and proposed that the Assembly \nelect delegates to the Continental Congress. \nA Tory pleaded sickness and hurried to Gage \nwith the news ; but the door was again locked, \nand the business proceeded. Though the \ngovernor sent his secretary with a message \ndissolving the Assembly, the secretary knocked \nin vain. The doors were not opened until \ndelegates had been elected to the Congress, \n\n\n112 The Siege of Boston \n\na tax laid to pay their expenses, and reso- \nlutions passed exhorting the province to \nstand firm. \n\nOne of the delegates-elect was John Adams. \nFor years he had declined to hold public \noffice, and had even avoided town meetings. \nThere was now a natural Tory hope that he \nmight refuse this office; there was even a \nlast chance to wean him from the Whig \ncause, for he was presently to ride on circuit, \nand there would meet his friend Sewall. \nWhen the two met, the Tory reasoned ear- \nnestly, pointing out the irresistible power of \nGreat Britain. But Adams was ready with \nhis answer. \"Sink or swim, live or die, \nsurvive or perish with my country is my \nunalterable determination.\" l And so went \nanother hope of the Tories. \n\nThe summer of 1774 wore along, with no im- \nprovement in the situation. Rather it became \nworse. So much time had elapsed without \ndefinite news of the passing of the Regulating \n\n1 Bancroft, edition of 1876, iv, 344. Subsequent \nreferences to Bancroft will be to this edition. \n\n\nThe Occupation of Boston 113 \n\nAct, that there was hope that the measure \nhad failed. But early in August came news of \nits passage, and with it a list of appointments \nfor the new Council. The appointees were \nall chosen from among the Tories, or from \nthose inclined to the king's side. \"It is \napprehended,\" wrote Andrews, \"that most \nof 'em will accept.\" \n\nNow at last it was natural to suppose \nthat the Whigs had come to the end of their \nresources. Their Assembly was dissolved, a \nTory held each appointive position, Boston \nwas filled with soldiers, and the harbor was \nguarded by ships of war. Active opposition \nto the troops would have been madness, and \nit seemed impossible to conduct even the \nordinary business of the town, for now town \nmeetings might legally be called only for \nthe purpose of electing officers. Yet when \nGage called the selectmen before him, and \ngraciously indicated his willingness to allow \nmeetings for certain harmless purposes, the \nreply surprised him. There was no need, \nsaid the selectmen, to ask his permission for \n\n\n114 The Siege of Boston \n\na meeting : they had one in existence already. \nIn fact they had two, the May meeting and \nthe June meeting, each legally called before \nthe enforcement of the Regulating Act, and \neach legally \"adjourned\" until such time \nas it was needed. The technical subterfuge \nwas too much for Gage, and the adjournments \ncontinued in spite of the law. \n\nAs the Massachusetts delegates prepared \nfor their journey to Philadelphia, where the \nCongress was to be held, there occurred, if \nwe can believe the story told by John Andrews \n— it was certainly believed in Boston at the \ntime — a demonstration of affection for Sam- \nuel Adams. \"For not long since some per- \nsons (their names unknown) sent and ask'd \nhis permission to build him a new barn, the \nold one being decay'd, which was executed \nin a few days. A second sent to ask leave \nto repair his house, which was thoroughly \neffected soon. A third sent to beg the favor \nof him to call at a taylor's shop and be meas- \nur'd for a suit of cloaths and chuse his cloth, \nwhich were finish'd and sent home for his \n\n\nThe Occupation of Boston 115 \n\nacceptance. A fourth presented him with a \nnew whig,1 a fifth with a new Hatt, a sixth \nwith a pair of the best silk hose, a seventh \nwith six pair of fine thread ditto, a eighth \nwith six pair shoes, and a ninth modestly \ninquired of him whether his finances want \nrather low than otherways. He reply'd it \nwas true that was the case, but he was very \nindifferent about these matters, so that his \npoor abilities was of any service to the Pub- \nlick ; upon which the Gentleman obliged him \nto accept of a purse containing about 15 or \n20 Johannes.\" It is possible that these \nattentions to Adams grew out of the desire \nthat he, so well known in Boston that his \nshabbiness meant nothing, should appear \nwell at the Congress, where his dress might \nprejudice others against him. True or not, \nthis little story has its significance, for, says \nAndrews to his correspondent, \" I mention this \nto show you how much he is esteem'd here. \nThey value him for his good sense, great \nabilities, amazing fortitude, noble resolution, \n\nlSic! \n\n\nn6 The Siege of Boston \n\nand undaunted courage : being firm and un- \nmov'd at all the various reports that were \npropagated in regard to his being taken up \nand sent home,1 notwithstanding he had \nrepeated letters from his friends, both in \nEngland as well as here, to keep out of the \nway.\" \n\nIf the governor desired to arrest Adams, he \nhad plenty of opportunity. There was even \na public occasion to take all the delegates \ntogether, when they left the town on their \nway to Philadelphia. \"A very respectable \nparade,\" wrote Andrews, \"in sight of five of \nthe Regiments encamp'd on the Common, \nbeing in a coach and four, preceded by two \nwhite servants well mounted and arm'd, with \nfour blacks behind in livery, two on horse- \nback and two footmen.\" Perhaps Gage \nbreathed a sigh of relief with the \"brace of \nAdamses\" away, but his real troubles were \nonly beginning. \n\nMassachusetts would have nothing to do \nwith the newly appointed officers. The thirty- \n\n1 Note the use of the word, as meaning England. \n\n\nThe Occupation of Boston 117 \n\nsix councillors, appointed under writ of man- \ndamus, excited the most indignation. Of the \nBoston nominees thirteen accepted, two de- \nclined, and four took time to consider; \nthroughout the province the proportion was \nabout the same. But those who wavered and \nthose who accepted presently heard from \ntheir neighbors. Leonard of Taunton, hear- \ning of a surprise party mustering from the \nneighboring towns, departed hastily for Bos- \nton. His father, by promises that he would \nurge his son to resign, with difficulty pre- \nvailed on the disgusted neighbors to leave the \ncouncillor's property unharmed. In Worces- \nter, Timothy Paine was taken to the com- \nmon, and, in the presence of two thousand \nstanding in military order, he read his declina- \ntion of his appointment. Ruggles of Hard- \nwick was warned not to return home; his \nneighbors swore that he should never pass \nthe great bridge of the town alive. Murray \nof Rutland, like Leonard of Taunton, escaped \nthe attentions of his townspeople, who scorned \nthe threat of confiscation and death, and \n\n\nn8 The Siege of Boston \n\ndemanded his resignation. \"This,\" wrote his \nbrother to him, \"is not the language of the \ncommon people only: those that have here- \ntofore sustained the fairest character are the \nwarmest in this matter; and, among the \nmany friends you have heretofore had, I \ncan scarcely mention any to you now.\" \n\nThe people did not always act with vio- \nlence, but the compulsion which they put \nupon their fellow-townsmen was strong. \nWatson of Plymouth, long respected in the \ntown, had been appointed by the king to the \nCouncil, and had intended to accept. But \nwhen he appeared in church on the following \nSunday, his friends rose and left the meeting- \nhouse. In the face of their scorn he bowed \nhis head over his cane, and resolved to resign.1 \n\nMore than twenty of the thirty-six coun- \ncillors either declined their appointment, or \nresigned. The rest could find no safety ex- \ncept in Boston, under the protection of the \ntroops. Even the courts were prevented from \n\n1 1 take these facts from Bancroft and the Andrews \nLetters. \n\n\nThe Occupation of Boston 119 \n\nsitting, in one case by the ingenious method \nof packing the court-room so solidly with \nspectators that judge and sheriff could not \nenter. Only among the garrison at Boston \nwas there comfort for the Tory officials. \n\nBoston itself was troublesome enough. \nWhen Gage, regarding himself as \"person- \nally affronted\" by John Hancock,1 removed \nhim from command of the Cadets, the com- \npany sent a deputation to Salem and returned \nhim their standard, declining longer to keep \nup their customary service as the governor's \nbody-guard. The governor, vexed, replied \nthat had he previously known of their inten- \ntions, he would have dismissed them himself. \n\nThe town meetings troubled him also. \nSalem held one under his nose, in spite of a \nfeint to interrupt them by the soldiers. When \nhe summoned the committee of correspond- \nence of the town to answer for the meeting, \nthey were stubborn and defiant, refused to \n\n1 Hancock seems to have practised upon Gage the \nsubterfuge which he afterwards used with Washington, \npretending to be too ill to wait upon him. \n\n\nI2O The Siege of Boston \n\ngive bail when arrested, and were conse- \nquently — released ! Other towns held meet- \nings to elect delegates to a county conven- \ntion, and the governor was powerless to stop \nthem. Although he had many more troops \nthan the four regiments with which he first \ndeclared that he could do so much, he felt \nhis helplessness, and, cursing the town meet- \nings, waited for more soldiers. He sum- \nmoned the remnant of his council to meet in \nSalem ; but the members were afraid to come, \nand, departing from his orders, he allowed \nthem to sit in Boston. \n\nAnd now, as the weeks passed on, even \nBoston was rumbling with the thunder of \nthe coming storm. Israel Putnam, having \ndriven to Boston a flock of sheep, the gift \nto the poor of Boston from his Connecticut \ntown, became the lion of the day. Meeting \non the Common some of his old friends in \nthe regular army, they chaffed him on the \nmilitary situation. Twenty ships and twenty \nregiments, they told him, were to be expected \nif the country did not submit. \"If they \n\n\nThe Occupation of Boston 121 \n\ncome,\" returned the stanch old Indian fighter, \n\"I am ready to treat them as enemies.\" \n\nAt length the forms of law failed even in \nBoston. When the judges summoned a jury, \nit not only refused to take oath, but pre- \nsented a written protest against the au- \nthority on which the court acted. The judges \ngave up the attempt in despair, and the \ngovernor and his advisers thought that mat- \nters were come to a pretty pass when a mere \npetit juror could declare \"that his conscience \nwould not let him take oath whiles Peter \nOliver set upon the bench.\" 1 There was \napparently no punishment to meet such \nobduracy. \n\nBut at last news came to Gage on which \nhe felt compelled to act. Much powder had \nbeen stored in the magazine at Quarry Hill \nin Charlestown. He was informed that dur- \ning August the towns had removed their \nstock, until there remained only that which \nbelonged to the province. This stock Gage \ndetermined to secure against possible illegal \n\n1 Andrews Letters. \n\n\n122 The Siege of Boston \n\nseizure, by seizing it himself. On the morning \nof the first of September, by early daylight, \ndetachments of troops in boats took the \npowder to the Castle, and also secured \ntwo cannon from Cambridge. Rumors of \nviolence and bloodshed spread rapidly, and \nby nightfall half of New England was in \nmotion, marching toward Boston. \n\n\nCHAPTER VI \n\nTHE POWDER ALARM AND THE WINTER OF \nI774-I77S \n\nGAGE had by this time given up hope \nof winning to his side the leaders of \nthe Whigs. If he still retained a \ndoubt of the temper of the people, the events \nof the first and second of September would \nhave made him certain. Marching in com- \npanies, they converged upon Cambridge, \nwhence the Lieutenant-Governor, Andrew \nOliver, hastily departed to Boston, to implore \nGage to send out no troops, lest not a man \nof them should return alive. On his way in, \nOliver passed Warren hastening out. But \nhis influence was not needed. The militia \ncompanies had already laid aside their weapons \nand were parading peacefully upon Cambridge \ncommon. There they were addressed by \ntwo of the Mandamus Council, who confirmed \n\n123 \n\n\n124 The Siege of Boston \n\ntheir resignations and promised in no way \nto be concerned in the acts of Gage's govern- \nment. Then the high-sheriff came under \nthe attention of the meeting, and likewise \npromised to do nothing under the new laws. \n\nHallowell, the Commissioner of Customs, \nescaped more serious handling. Passing by \nthe common and its assemblage of Whigs, he \n\"spoke somewhat contemptuously of them.\" \nThey promptly sent some mounted men after \nhis chaise. On seeing them coming he stopped \nhis chaise, unhitched his horse and mounted, \nand ran his pursuers a close race to Boston \nNeck, where he found safety with the guard. \n\nOliver, returning to Cambridge with the \ngovernor's promise to send out no troops, \nwas waited upon by the great assemblage. \nThe Whigs demanded his resignation as a \ncouncillor. This, after demurring, Oliver \ngave, and offered to resign also from the \nlieutenant-governorship. But this the com- \npany allowed him to keep. Andrews records, \n\"It is worthy remark that Judge Lee re- \nmarked to 'em, after he had made his resig- \n\n\nThe Powder Alarm 125 \n\nnation, that he never saw so large a number \nof people together and preserve so peaceable \norder before in his life.\" \n\nThis orderly meeting, proceeding with par- \nliamentary forms, passed a resolve that Gage \nwas within his legal rights in removing the \npowder from the store-house. They then \n\"voted unanimously their abhorrence of mobs \nand riots,\" 1 and with these lessons given for \nany one to learn, they peaceably turned toward \ntheir homes. On their way they turned back \nthose who, from further away, were eagerly \ncoming to avenge the rumored death of their \ncountrymen and the bombardment of the \ntown. Putnam, after disbanding his Con- \nnecticut company, wrote to urge the men of \nMassachusetts to take better care of the \nremainder of their powder. \n\nThe \"Powder Alarm\" stirred the country \neverywhere. At Philadelphia its exaggerated \nreports greatly disturbed the Congress, but \nthe response was significant. \"When the \nhorrid news was brought here of the bombard- \n\n1 Bancroft. \n\n\n126 The Siege of Boston \n\nment of Boston,\" wrote John Adams, \"which \nmade us completely miserable for two days, \nwe saw proofs both of the sympathy and \nthe resolution of the continent. War ! war ! \nwar ! was the cry, and it was pronounced in \na tone which would have done honor to the \noratory of a Briton or a Roman. If it had \nproved true, you would have heard the thun- \nder of an American Congress.\" 1 < \n\nGage now, for the first time, seems to have \nhad a glimmer of an idea of the formidable \nforces that were against him. He began to \nconsider the military situation, and the de- \nfence of the town against another such rising. \nIf on the next occasion the provincials should \nattempt to pursue a commissioner not merely \nto the Neck, but past it, there must be means \nof stopping them. Gage gave orders to for- \ntify the Neck, which was in those days the \nsingle land approach to Boston. \n\nThe modern city in no way resembles the \nold town. Now, between South Boston and \nCambridge, a score of highways lead into the \n\n1 Adams Letters, 39. \n\n\nThe Powder Alarm 127 \n\ncity. Bridges and even tunnels give direct \ncommunication from South Boston, Cam- \nbridge, Charlestown, Chelsea, and East Bos- \nton. But in 1774 South Boston was a mud- \nflat ; the Back Bay — at least at high water \n— was what its name implies ; Chelsea was \nWinnisimit, with but half a dozen houses; \nand East Boston was an island, having but \ntwo houses on it. Now the flats have been \nfilled up, the mainland brought closer, and \nthe approaches bridged. In Governor Gage's \nday Boston was still a peninsula, roughly \npear-shaped, and connected with the main- \nland by a strip of land which was, at high \ntide, scarcely a hundred yards wide. \n\nBatteries commanding the road which \ncrossed this isthmus seemed, at the time, \nquite sufficient to defend the town. It was \nnot till later that Gage began to consider the \nheights of Dorchester and Charlestown, which, \nto the south and north, threatened Boston. \nNow he set to work upon an earthwork at the \nNeck, brought cannon there, and began to \nbuild block-houses. It was reported that he \n\n\n128 The Siege of Boston \n\nwas to cut a ditch across the Neck, and con- \nfine traffic to a narrow bridge ; but at the \nobjection of the selectmen such an idea, if \nhe had considered it, was given up. Protest \nagainst the new earthworks was also lodged. \nThe selectmen of the town, and a committee \nfrom the convention for Suffolk County \nwhich then happened to sit, came to Gage \nwith remonstrances. Warren, from the con- \nvention, twice urged his demands. \"Good \nGod, gentlemen,\" responded the harried gov- \nernor, \"make yourselves easy, and I will be \n\n\nso.\" \n\n\nThere was no more ease of mind for Gov- \nernor Gage. Within the limits of Boston \nand Charlestown were several cannon belong- \ning to the militia organizations of the town. \nWhen the general tried to secure the Charles- \ntown guns from secretion by the provincials, \nthey disappeared. \"Ever since,\" wrote An- \ndrews a fortnight later, \"the General has \nordered a double guard to y? new and old \ngun houses, where y? brass field pieces be- \n\n1 Andrews Letters. \n\n\nThe Powder Alarm 129 \n\nlonging to our militia are lodged: notwith- \nstanding which . . . We'n'sday evening, or \nrather night, our people took these from the \nOld house (by opening the side of the house) \nand carried away through Frank Johonnot's \nGarden. Upon which he gave it in orders \nthe next day to the officer on guard to re- \nmove those from the New house (which \nstands directly opposite the encampment of \nthe 4th Regiment and in the middle of the \nstreet near the large Elm tree), sometime the \nnext night into the camp ; and to place a \nguard at each end, or rather at both doors, \ntill then. At the fixed hour the Officer went \nwith a number of Mattrosses to execute his \norders, but behold, the guns were gone!\" \nLest the guns in the North Battery should \nsimilarly be spirited away, the bewildered \ngeneral ordered them to be spiked. \n\nHis state of mind was not improved when \nhe received, as he did early in September, \nthe resolutions passed by the Suffolk conven- \ntion. The Suffolk Resolves, as they are \ncalled, covered the whole of the existing situa- \n\n\n130 The Siege of Boston \n\ntion. Repudiating the king's claim to un- \nconditional obedience, they declared the Regu- \nlating Act unconstitutional, and called on all \nofficers under it to resign their places. They \nadvised that all taxes should be withheld \nfrom the king's treasury, and suggested a \nprovincial congress to deal with the affairs of \nMassachusetts. The resolves further declared \nthat the Americans had no intention of ag- \ngression, advised peaceful measures, but \nthreatened to seize all crown officers if any \npolitical arrest were made. Looking forward \nto the eventual rupture, the resolves advised \nthe towns to choose their military officers \nwith great care, and finally made provision \nto spread alarm or summon assistance at a \nmoment's notice. \n\nAffairs had now reached a new phase. \nThe barrier which Gage had erected at the \nNeck had effectually cut him off from the \nprovince which he had been sent to govern. \nFrom that time on he had no authority be- \nyond the range of his batteries. \n\nBoston was his, to be sure. In spite of \n\n\nThe Powder Alarm 131 \n\nalarms (for once the field day of the Ancient \nand Honorable Artillery Company, the pride \nof the province, aroused the fleet; and once \nthe little navy was awake all night against \nan attack that never came), in spite of such \nalarms, no attempt was made upon his army \nor his ships. The town was quiet, and Tory \nladies and gentlemen were at last at ease. \nOn the Mall they might daily watch the \nparade of the troops, speak their minds about \nthe faction, and agree upon the cowardice of \nthe provincials. Yet the Whigs of Boston \nmade no submission. They were, as Warren \nwrote of them, \"silent and inflexible.\" At \nthe same time they had everything at stake. \nTheir leaders Hancock and Warren still lived \nopenly among them, in the face of the threat \nof arrest. The artisans, too, at this period \nput behind them a great temptation. For \nmany months they had been idle ; now \nwithin a few weeks the governor had com- \nmenced building barracks for the troops, upon \nwhich Boston workmen were engaged. For \nthe first time since the Port Bill went into \n\n\n132 The Siege of Boston \n\neffect they were earning a comfortable living. \nBut now they refused to work longer for the \nking. In vain Gage appealed to the select- \nmen and to Hancock. One and all the \nartisans withdrew, to subsist, as before, upon \nthe donations that still continued to come in \nfrom the other towns and colonies. \n\nOutside the barrier at the Neck was an \nunparalleled state of affairs. In Massachu- \nsetts there was no legal government. The \ncharter had been abrogated, but the new \nsystem had been rejected by the people. \nThere were no judges and no courts, no \nsheriffs ; there was no treasury, and no ma- \nchinery of government whatever. Conse- \nquently there was a striking opportunity \nfor lawlessness. Yet the quiet in the province \nwas remarkable. In the absence of execu- \ntive and judicial officers, the selectmen of \nthe towns and the Committees of Correspond- \nence took upon themselves the work that \nwas to be done, and did it quietly and well. \nThere was no thievery, no murder, no re- \npudiation of debts. So far as their ordinary \n\n\nThe Powder Alarm 133 \n\nlife was concerned, the people simply lived \non in their ancient way. \n\nThere was, nevertheless, plenty of law- \nlessness of the new kind. Just as soon as \nthe people could catch the newly appointed \nofficials, they forced them to resign ; and \nwhenever the courts attempted to sit they \nwere made to adjourn. There continued the \nlittle migration of Tories toward Boston, \nalways in the expectation that the sojourn \nwas to be brief, and that presently Gage \nwould have the situation in hand. Most \nof the refugees, however, never saw their \nhomes again. As for Gage, he was sus- \npected of detaining the remaining councillors \nin Boston, lest he should not have any left \nto him. Indeed, his position in Salem had \nalready become so undignified and uncom- \nfortable that early in September, with the \nCommissioners of Customs and all other \nofficials, he returned to Boston. There he \nalso withdrew the two regiments with which \nhe had ineffectually endeavored to sustain \nhis prestige in Salem. Yet he had not been \n\n\n134 The Siege of Boston \n\nlong in Boston before he was forced to watch \nthe preparations for a new act of defiance. \n\nAlready, unfortunately for him, he had \nconvened the Assembly to meet at Salem. \nNow that he was in Boston he desired the \nlegislators to meet there also; yet he could \nnot adjourn them until they met. This he \nplanned to do. The delegates, however, knew \nthat if they came to Boston they must take \ntheir oaths of office before the Mandamus \nCouncil. To this the representatives would \nnever submit, and accordingly planned an- \nother move. Boston carried out its part \nunder the eye of the governor. The town \nelected its representatives, chief among whom \nwere Hancock, Warren, and the absent Sam- \nuel Adams. The meeting then deliberately, \nreminding the delegates that they could \nnot conscientiously discharge their duty under \nthe conditions which the governor would \nimpose, \"empowered and instructed\" them \nto join with the delegates from other towns \nin a general provincial congress, to act \nupon public matters in such a manner as \n\n\nThe Powder Alarm 135 \n\nshould appear \"most conducive to the true \ninterest of this town and province, and most \nlikely to preserve the liberties of all America.\" \n\nThus the town of Boston, inflexible but \nno longer silent, calmly ignored the gov- \nernor and his troops. A strong governor \nwould have imprisoned the delegates and \ndissolved the meeting; Gage allowed it to \nproceed for the rest of the day with illegal \nbusiness, and did nothing. \n\nIt was at this time that the conduct of \naffairs fell into the hands of Warren. Adams \nwas away at Philadelphia, and Hancock, \nthough older than Warren and an excellent \nfigurehead, had neither Warren's wisdom \nnor his fiery energy. It was Warren who \ncorresponded with the Congress at Phila- \ndelphia and with the Committees of Corre- \nspondence of the Massachusetts towns, and \nit was to him that the province naturally \nturned. When we remember him as the \nhero of Bunker Hill, it is well also to recall \nhim as the tried servant and the excellent \nadviser of the public. \n\n\n136 The Siege of Boston \n\nOne act of his at this point is worth re- \nmembering. As we have seen, Episcopalians \nwere not in good odor with the Massachu- \nsetts Whigs ; the colony had been founded as \nan asylum from \"prelacy,\" and still, after \nnearly two hundred and fifty years, the few \nmembers of the English church were chiefly \nsupporters of the crown. Warren now took \noccasion to remind his brethren that to the \nsouth conditions were different, and that \n\"the gentlemen of the Established Church of \nEngland are men of the most just and liberal \nsentiments.\" In a printed letter he requested \nfair treatment of all Episcopalians, and ended \nby quoting from a letter of Samuel Adams \nan account of the Episcopal chaplain of \nthe Philadelphia Congress, whose first prayer \nmoved many of the members to tears. Al- \nthough this chaplain later turned his coat, \nthe reminder was timely and valuable, for \nmany southern Whigs, among them Wash- \nington himself, were members of the Estab- \nlished Church. \n\nAs to the proposed provincial congress, \n\n\nThe Powder Alarm 137 \n\nGage now hastened to forestall the conse- \nquences of his own action. He declared \nthe convening of the Assembly inexpedient, \nand removed the obligation to attend. Never- \ntheless ninety of the delegates came together, \nwaited a day for the governor, then formed \nthemselves into a provincial congress, and \nadjourned. On the nth of October they \nmet again at Concord, this time with nearly \ntwo hundred more members, and in the old \nmeeting-house began their sessions with Han- \ncock as their president, but with Warren as \nthe most influential member of their body. \n\nHis influence was thrown on the side of \nmoderation. There were plenty in the prov- \nince ready to urge violence. They argued \nthat the old charter should be resumed; and \nas if the present acts were not sufficiently \nrevolutionary, were ready to proceed to vio- \nlent measures. But the time had not yet \ncome. Massachusetts sentiment, responding \nto persecution, was far in advance of the \nfeelings of the rest of the country. No \naction could safely be taken until the other \n\n\n138 The Siege of Boston \n\ncolonies were ready to support New England. \nIn constant touch with Samuel Adams — \nfor Paul Revere and other trusted couriers \nwere always on the road with letters — Warren \nwas able to remind his colleagues of the need \nof patience, and to cool their ardor by his \nwarnings that in open rebellion they would \nstand alone. His services, and those of the \nsteadfast band who supported him, were in- \nvaluable. In these days he rose to the full \nstature of political leadership, in guiding the \nactions of the provincial congress and in con- \nstraining it to patience. \n\nAnd yet its acts were revolutionary enough. \nIt must be remembered that until this time \nthe Whigs of Massachusetts had remained \nwithin their constitutional rights. Apart \nfrom the Tea-Party, no word or act of town \nmeeting or of legislature, or even of any \nprominent citizen, needed for justification \nanything more than the ancient charter \nrights of the province. But now the pro- \nvincial congress went beyond anything that \nhad ever been done before. It appointed a \n\n\nThe Powder Alarm 139 \n\nCommittee of Safety, which should prepare \nfor equipping and raising an army. It ap- \npointed a Committee of Supplies, which \npresently gathered together a few hundred \nspades and pickaxes, some muskets, a thousand \nwooden mess-bowls, four thousand flints, \nand a small supply of peas and flour — a \npitiful attempt to compete with the vast \nresources of Great Britain. More than this, \nit appointed a Receiver-General, to keep the \npublic money of the province. It might be \nargued that all these acts were still within \nthe charter rights, yet the Whig position \nwas no longer so strong as on the occasions \nwhen it had caused the crown lawyers to \ndoubt. With a treasurer engaged in receiv- \ning the taxes which the towns willingly paid \nhim, and with generals appointed to command \nan army, it began to look as if Massachu- \nsetts were in rebellion. \n\nGage was perplexed. His province was \nout of his control, and now came the news \nthat the Continental Congress, before ad- \njourning, had voted approval of the course of \n\n\n140 The Siege of Boston \n\nMassachusetts. In fact, Congress had voted \nits support. \"Resolved, that this congress \napprove of the opposition made by the in- \nhabitants of the Massachusetts Bay to the \nexecution of the late acts of Parliament; \nand, if the same shall be attempted to be \ncarried into execution by force, in such case \nall America ought to support them in their \nopposition.\" With such words in his mind, \nGage had to listen to the ringing of the \nchurch bells in welcome to Samuel Adams as \nhe returned from Philadelphia. Adams and \nGushing, two of the Boston delegates, now \ntook their seats in the provincial congress, \nand the remaining two delegates were in- \nvited to attend. The public acts of the \ncongress continued bold and uncompromis- \ning, and every little while there came to \nthe harried governor some public letter of \nremonstrance, or some delegation from an \naggrieved town or county convention, to \nobject, to expostulate, or to demand. Never \nwere people better trained to politics than \nthe Americans at this moment. Gage was \n\n\nThe Powder Alarm 141 \n\nquite unfitted to cope with them. Hutchinson \nwould have been more vigorous, and even \nBernard more clever. The king fitly charac- \nterized his governor as \"the mild general.\" \n\nGage, in his perplexity, now made trouble \nby suggesting the recruiting of Indians against \nthe day of rebellion, and called for more \ntroops from England. The disgusted king \nsought to replace him as commander-in- \nchief by the one English soldier whom the \nAmericans held in respect, in fact, as the \nhero of the French war, almost in reverence. \nBut Sir Jeffrey Amherst bluntly told the \nking that he would not serve against the \nAmericans, \"to whom he had been so much \nobliged.\" The king was forced to content him- \nself by sending to Gage's support three major- \ngenerals, as if in the hope that their divided \ncounsels would bring about a uniform policy. \n\nOf these three men America was to hear \na good deal in the next seven years. The \nleast important of them was Sir Henry Clin- \nton, of respectable military skill. More strik- \ning in character was Sir John Burgoyne, poet, \n\n\n142 The Siege of Boston \n\ndramatist, parliamentarian, upon whom \nAmerica will ever look with the indulgence \nwhich the victor feels for one who is signally \nand completely defeated. \"General Big- \ntalk,\" the Yankee balladist called him when \nonce the siege was in progress. It is true \nthat Burgoyne had an easy flow of words, \nand we shall before long find him doing his \nshare to make Gage ridiculous. But Bur- \ngoyne had his manly parts, and though he \nlacked greatness, he commands at times our \nsympathy and our respect. He made a \nromantic marriage, which proved a happy \none ; and his real claim to literary distinction \nlies in the letter in which, on his departure \nfor America, he commended his wife to the \ncare of the king. Burgoyne, in a still brutal \nage, was a humanitarian, and was one of the \nfirst, not only to oppose flogging in the army, \nbut also to advocate friendly personal rela- \ntions between officers and men. America \nseldom took Burgoyne seriously, but he is to \nus of to-day a pleasing and picturesque \ncharacter. \n\n\nThe Powder Alarm 143 \n\nThe third of the new generals was Sir \nWilliam Howe, whose chief misfortune was \nthat fate had set him to oppose Washington. \nHe came of a family well known in American \nannals, for one brother was now an admiral \npopular in the colonies, and another was still \nmourned in America for his brilliant talents \nand magnetic personality. William Howe \nhad gained his seat in Parliament by appeals \nto the memory of that brother, and by \npromises to take no active military command \nagainst America. But on being offered the \npost under Gage, Howe asked if this were a \nrequest or an order. The adroit king re- \nturned the proper answer, and Howe, protest- \ning that no other course was open to him, \nprepared to sail for Boston. \n\nMeanwhile Gage, alone, made various futile \nmoves, at which the province looked with \npatience. From time to time his troops \nmarched a few miles into the country, and \nreturned again. In January he sent a de- \ntachment to Marshfield, to occupy the village \nso that the loyal residents might drink their \n\n\n144 The Siege of Boston \n\ntea in peace. It was a comfort to him to \nthink that there was one town in the province \nin which a militia company was drilling for \nhis support, and with the king's muskets. A \nmonth later Gage sent troops to Salem, in \norder to seize some cannon ; but the com- \nmander, finding the country in arms to \nreceive him, wisely withdrew his little force \nafter — to use a term yet to be invented — \n\"saving his face\" by crossing a bridge under \npromise of immediate return. \n\nThe Reverend Jonas Clark, speaking of \nthis event, adds an indignant note to an \nequally indignant sermon.1 \"This unsuccess- \nful expedition was made on LORD'S day, \nFeb. 26, 1775. The party consisted of 200 \nor 300 men ; it was commanded by Lieut. \nCol. Leslie. The vessels which brought them \nto Marblehead, arrived in the harbour, on the \nmorning of the sabbath; and the better to \nconceal their intentions, lay quietly, at anchor, \nnear to the wharves, with but very few hands \nupon deck (the troops being kept close) 'till \n\n1 A Sermon preached at Lexington, April 19, 1776, 26. \n\n\n* \n\n\nThe Powder Alarm \n\n\nthe people of the town were assembled for \nthe services of religion. — While the inhabit- \nants were thus engaged in their devotions to \nGOD, the party landed and made a speedy \nmarch to Salem. But all their precaution \ndid not avail them for the accomplishment of \ntheir enterprize. The eagle-eyes of a watch- \nful and wary people, justly jealous of every \nmeasure of their oppressors, are not easily \nevaded. Their motions were observed, and \nsuch timely notice given, that such numbers \nwere collected and such measures taken, \nbefore they arrived, as effectually frustrated \ntheir design and obliged them to return de- \nfeated and chagrined.\" \n\nSo, throughout the winter, the garrison and its \ngovernor accomplished nothing — or less than \nnothing, if one considers that Gage proved to the \nprovincials the weakness of his character, while \nat the same time he angered them by issuing, \nwhen the provincial congress appointed a day \nof prayer, a proclamation against hypocrisy. \n\nAs the winter passed there was at times \nhope that the political situation might be \n\n\n146 The Siege of Boston \n\nrelieved by action of Parliament. Yet though \nthe worst House of Commons in history had \nbeen dissolved, the one which took its place \nwas, at its beginning, little better. It learned \nwisdom only from the events of the war. \nTo this Parliament Chatham and Burke now \nappealed in vain ; even Fox, at last definitely \ntaking his stand with the supporters of \nAmerica, could not move it from its sub- \nservience to the king. When finally a bill \nwas introduced to deprive America of its \nfisheries, it began to seem that legislative \noppression could go no further. \n\nAnd now to other Americans than Samuel \nAdams it became evident that there was no \nhope of concession from England. The second \nprovincial congress began its sittings. War- \nren was still on the Committee of Safety. \nPreble, Ward, and Pomeroy were reappointed \ngenerals, and to them were added Thomas \nand Heath. Supplies were voted for an army \nof fifteen thousand. There was still hope of \nconciliation, but, wrote Warren, \"every day, \nevery hour, widens the breach.\" \n\n\nThe Powder Alarm 147 \n\nThe town of Boston knew how wide the \nbreach was, and how different the points of \nview. The letters and diaries of the time \nshow the constant little irritations which ex- \nasperated both sides. In those days, if the \nBritish soldier was not so sober as now, the \nBritish officer was far more given to drink. \nFrom \"the Erskine incident\" until almost \nthe outbreak of hostilities, drunken officers \nmade trouble with the inhabitants, and found \nthem less submissive than the average British \ncitizen. Yankee burghers had an uncom- \nfortable trick of arming themselves with \ncudgels and returning to the attack ; the \nwatch occasionally locked up Lieutenant This \nand Ensign That ; and more dignified ckizens, \ndisdaining personal conflict, brought their \ncomplaints to the general, thus adding to his \ntroubles. John Andrews tells the story of \nthe school boys who, in the phrase of the \nday, \"improv'd\" the coast on School Street. \n\"General Haldiman, improving the house \nthat belongs to Old Cook, his servant took it \nupon him to cut up their coast and fling \n\n\n148 The Siege of Boston \n\nashes upon it. The lads made a muster, and \nchose a committee to wait upon the General, \nwho admitted them, and heard their complaint, \nwhich was couch'd in very genteel terms, com- \nplaining that their fathers before 'em had im- \nprov'd it as a coast from time immemorial, &ca. \nHe ordered his servant to repair the damage, \nand acquainted the Governor with the affair, \nwho observ'd that it was impossible to beat \nthe notion of Liberty out of the people, as it \nwas rooted in 'em from their Childhood\" \n\nGage did his best to be fair to the inhabit- \nants, and they acknowledged his endeavor. \nBut the officers, less experienced than he \nand with fewer responsibilities, and also less \nacquainted with the spirit of the colonists, \nwere angry with him for what they called his \nsubservience. They dubbed him Tommy, and \nconfided their indignation to their diaries. \n\"Yesterday,\" wrote Lieutenant Barker of the \nKing's Own,1 \"in compliance with the request \n\n1 His diary is published in the Atlantic Monthly for \nApril and May, 1877, 384 and 544. I shall use it freely \nwithout further definite reference. \n\n\nThe Powder Alarm 149 \n\nof the Select Men, Genl Gage order'd that \nno Soldier in future shou'd appear in the \nStreets with his side Arms. Query, Is this \nnot encouraging the Inhabitants in their \nlicentious and riotous disposition ? Also \norders are issued for the Guards to seize all \nmilitary Men found engaged in any disturb- \nance, whether Agressors or not ; and to secure \nthem, 'till the matter is enquired into. By \nWhom ? By Villains that wou'd not censure one \nof their own Vagrants, even if He attempted \nthe life of a Soldier ; whereas if a Soldier \nerrs in the least, who is more ready to accuse \nthan Tommy ? His negligence on the other \nhand has been too conspicuous in the affair of \nCn. Maginis to require a further comment.\" \n\nDoubtless there is much to be said for the \nsoldiers, both officers and privates, since the \nBostonians had not abandoned their irritating \nways, even in the midst of an army. But the \narmy was also very hard to live with. On \nthe first of January our discontented officer \nrecords, \"Nothing remarkable but the drunk- \nenness among the Soldiers, which is now got \n\n\n150 The Siege of Boston \n\nto a very great pitch ; owing to the cheap- \nness of the liquor, a Man may get drunk for \na Copper or two.\" The officers, we have seen, \ndid not set their men a very good example ; \nbut even in their sober senses they were \nscarcely conciliatory. They formed burlesque \ncongresses, and marched in mock procession \nin the streets, absurdly dressed to represent \nthe leaders of the Whigs. On the queen's \nbirthday a banquet was held, and from the \nbalcony of the tavern the toasts were an- \nnounced, while in the street a squad of sol- \ndiers fired salutes. Toasts to Lord North \nwere not relished in Boston, and reminders \nof Culloden were too significant for those \nwhom the army already called rebels. It is \nan interesting proof of the weakness of Gage's \nhold upon his own army that such childish- \nness should have been permitted, or that \nsuch threats should have been made to a \ntown that still was within its legal rights. \n\nBeneath these petty quarrels we perceive \nthe fundamental differences. Over these the \nmore learned of both sides carried on a war \n\n\nThe Powder Alarm 151 \n\nof words. The newspapers teemed with let- \nters, poems, essays, and dissertations ; and \nNovanglus, Massachusettensis, Vindex, and \nother pseudo-Romans endeavored to convert \neach other, or else to point solemn warnings. \n\"Remember,\" writes a yeoman of Suffolk \nCounty, \"the fate of Wat Tyler, and think \nhow vain it is for Jack, Sam, or Will to war \nagainst Great Britain, now she is in earnest ! \n. . . Our leaders are desperate bankrupts ! \nOur country is without money, stores, or neces- \nsaries of war, — without one place of refuge \nor defence ! If we were called together, we \nshould be a confused herd, without any dis- \nposition to obedience, without a general of \nability to direct and guide us ; and our num- \nbers would be our destruction ! Never did a \npeople rebel with so little reason; therefore \nour conduct cannot be justified before God ! \n. . . Rouse, rouse ye, Massachusetians, \nwhile it be yet time ! Ask pardon of God, \nsubmit to our king and parliament, .whom we \nhave wickedly and grievously offended.\" 1 \n\n1 Frothingham's \"Life of Warren,\" 413. \n\n\n152 The Siege of Boston \n\nThis exclamatory appeal plainly shows a \ntype of mind which often has saved the \nBritish Empire, yet which at periods in his- \ntory has come near to ruining it. English \nconservatism has at most times been invaluable \nto the country ; but when, as repeatedly \nunder the Stuart kings and again under \nGeorge III, it has forsaken its true task in \norder to support absolutism, it has brought \nthe ship of state very near to wreck. In \nreminding of the fate of Wat Tyler our Suf- \nfolk yeoman forgot, if indeed he ever knew, \nthe fate of Charles and James Stuart. The \nmajority of Englishmen have never been will- \ning to admit that in defending their consti- \ntutional rights they were guilty of impiety. \nThough such warnings and appeals were at \nthis time frequent enough, the Whigs paid \nno regard to them. \n\nWhen we leave the Tories and turn to the \nsoldiery we find one other common English \nfailing — underrating an adversary. Eng- \nland had so long been victorious on land and \nsea that it was almost a natural assumption \n\n\nThe Powder Alarm 153 \n\nthat she was superior to any force that could \nbe brought against her. But that she was \nalways right, or her opponents always cowards, \nwere corollaries that did not necessarily fol- \nlow. Yet both of these were implicitly believed, \nnot only by supporters at home, but also by \nthe army in America. As to Yankee coward- \nice, many a Tory could, and later did, warn \nthe troops against belief in it. But now, at \nany rate, the belief was fully indulged. From \nit was an easy step to general contempt. \nRascal and Scoundrel were common synonyms \nfor Whig. Lord Percy was a brigadier-gen- \neral and old enough to form his own con- \nclusions, yet after living in the camp at \nBoston for a month, he gives us a complete \nanalysis of the American character — the sum- \nmary, no doubt, of British military opinion. \n\"The People here,\" he wrote home, \"are the \nmost designing, Artfull Villains in the World. \nThey have not the least Idea of either Re- \nligion or Morality. Nor have they the least \nScruple of taking the most solemn Oath on \nany Matter that can assist their Purpose, \n\n\n154 The Siege of Boston \n\ntho' they know the direct contrary can be \nclearly & evidently proved in half an Hour.\" l \n\nWe see, then, the situation fully prepared : \nan inflexible people, a weak governor, a \nparty of belivers in divine right, and a con- \ntemptuous soldiery. The next event, which \nall but ended in violence, showed that there \nneeded but a little tenser situation in order \nto bring about the rupture. \n\nNow occurred the annual oration on the \nMassacre. Since that tragedy, five years ago, \nthere had been an annual commemoration \nof it in the form of a speech by one of the \nWhig leaders. This year the post was one \nof evident responsibility and even of danger, \nbut Warren, true to his character, solicited \nthe appointment. He announced his sub- \nject as \" The Baleful Influence of Standing \nArmies in Time of Peace.\" On the fifth \nof March the crowd that came to hear him \nfilled the Old South to the doors. \n\nThe chance was one which, had Gage re- \nceived the orders which were supposed to \n\n1 Bulletin of Boston Public Library, x, No. 87, 320. \n\n\nThe Powder Alarm 155 \n\nhave been sent him, and had he been the man \nhe ought to have been, he never should have \nlet slip. There in one building were, of the \nchiefs of the \"faction,\" Warren, Samuel \nAdams, Hancock, and many lesser men. \nThey could be taken at one blow. Some \nforty British officers were present, whether \nto effect a capture or merely to cause a dis- \nturbance was not known. At Samuel Adams' \ninstance they were given front seats, or places \non the steps of the pulpit. There they lis- \ntened quietly to Warren's words. \n\nThe oration was, in the style of the day, \nflorid ; but it was full of genuine feeling. \nWarren spoke of the rise of the British Em- \npire in America, the hope of its future, the \npolicy of the king, and the Massacre. Turning \nthen to the present situation, he spoke in words \nwhich no one could mistake, bolder, perhaps, \nthan ever before had been publicly spoken in \nthe presence of hostile soldiers. He reminded \nhis countrymen of their martial achievements, \nhe spoke of the critical situation, and, \nwhile disclaiming the desire for independence, \n\n\n156 The Siege of Boston \n\nencouraged the colonists to claim their rights. \n\"An independence of Great Britain is not \nour aim. No : our wish is, that Britain and \nthe colonies may, like the oak and ivy, \ngrow and increase in strength together. But, \nwhilst the infatuated plan of making one \npart of the empire slaves to the other is per- \nsisted in, the interest and safety of Britain \nas well as the colonies require that the wise \nmeasures recommended by the honorable, \nthe Continental Congress be steadily pursued, \nwhereby the unnatural contest between a \nparent honored and a child beloved may \nprobably be brought to such an issue that the \npeace and happiness of both may be estab- \nlished upon a lasting basis. But, if these pacific \nmeasures are ineffectual, and it appears the only \nway to safety lies through fields of blood, I \nknow you will not turn your faces from our \nfoes, but will undauntedly press forward until \ntyranny is trodden under foot, and you have \nfixed your adored goddess, Liberty, fast by a \nBrunswick's side, on the American throne.\"1 \n\n1 Frothingham's \" Life of Warren,\" 435-436. \n\n\nThe Powder Alarm 157 \n\nThese were fearless words, and full of mean- \ning. Had there been men of sense among \nthe officers present, they must have been \nimpressed by the solemnity of the warning; \nin fact, they were silent until the end. It \nwas not until after the oration, when the \nmeeting was voting thanks to the orator, \nthat the officers endeavored to interrupt \nthe proceedings. The cry of Fie ! was mis- \ntaken for that of Fire, and there was a \nmoment's panic. We have opposing accounts \nof it. \n\n\"It was imagined,\" wrote our discontented \nLieutenant of the King's Own, \"that there \nwou'd have been a riot, which if there had \nwou'd in all probability have proved fatal \nto Hancock, Adams, Warren, and the rest \nof those Villains, as they were all up in the \nPulpit together, and the meeting was crowded \nwith Officers and Seamen in such a manner \nthat they cou'd not have escaped; however \nit luckily did not turn out so ; it wou'd indeed \nhave been a pity for them to have made \ntheir exit in that way, as I hope before long \n\n\n158 The Siege of Boston \n\nwe shall have the pleasure of seeing them \ndo it by the hands of the Hangman.\" \n\nJohn Andrews looked at the matter dif- \nferently. \" The officers in general behave \nmore like a parcel of children, of late, than \n\nmen. Captain of the Royal Irish first \n\nexposed himself by behaving in a very scan- \ndalous manner at the South meeting. . . . \nHe got pretty decently frighted for it. A \nwoman, among the rest, attacked him and \nthreatened to wring his nose.\" An outbreak \nmay have been what the officers wanted. \n\"But,\" says Samuel Adams, who acted on his \nmaxim that it is good politics to put and \nkeep the enemy in the wrong, \"order was \nrestored, and we proceeded regularly, and \nfinished the business. I am persuaded, were \nit not for the danger of precipitating a crisis, \nnot a man of them would have been spared.\" 1 \n\nThe whole was a type of the existing situ- \nation. Here were the officers, still causing \npetty disturbances ; here too, no doubt, were \nTories, contemptuous of the proceedings. \n\n1 Wells, \"Life of Adams,\" ii, 281. \n\n\nThe Powder Alarm 159 \n\nDeeper still appears the real significance of \nthe occasion. On the one side was the gov- \nernor, unable, with all the power of the king, \nto prevent a meeting of the citizens to con- \ndemn his presence in the town — for the \nmeeting was the \"Port Bill meeting,\" ad- \njourned from time to time since the previous \nMay. And on the other side were the citi- \nzens, legally protesting and exasperatingly \ndefiant, evidently under perfect self-restraint, \ndetermined not to strike the first blow. \n\nThe officers took, as usual, a puerile revenge \nin the form of a burlesque. \" A vast number\" \nof them assembled at the Coffee House in \nKing Street, and chose selectmen and an \norator, \"who deliver'd an oration from the \nbalcony to a crowd of few else beside gaping \nofficers.\" * Others of them caught a country- \nman who had been decoyed into buying a \nmusket from a soldier, and tarred and feath- \nered him. \n\nBut these were surface trivialities. Be- \nneath them the true situation was grow- \n\n1 Andrews Letters. \n\n\n160 The Siege of Boston \n\ning worse. Out in the country military \nstores were being collected at Worcester and \nat Concord ; and over in Parliament the \nfisheries bill, designed to deprive thousands \nin America of their living, was sure of pass- \ning. At last Franklin, who had stayed in \nLondon as long as there seemed anything \nfor him to accomplish, patiently bearing hu- \nmiliation and insults, on the 2Oth of March \ntook ship for Philadelphia. It was the sign \nthat there was no further hope of peace. \n\n\nCHAPTER VII \n\nMILITARY PREPARATIONS \n\nAS the spring of 1775 advanced, matters \ntook on a constantly more threatening \naspect. The governor's force in Bos- \nton was steadily increasing, and was approach- \ning a total of four thousand men. Vessels of \nwar were with equal steadiness being added to \nthe little fleet in the harbor. With each bud- \nget of news from England it became evident \nthat Parliament would not yield, and at last \ncame word that Lord North had offered a joint \nresolution that New England was in a state \nof rebellion, which both houses pledged their \nlives and fortunes to suppress. With such \na military force at his command, and with \nsuch moral support from King and Parlia- \nment, Gage was in a position to take de- \ncided action. \n\nNo one could doubt what that action would \n\nM 161 \n\n\n162 The Siege of Boston \n\nbe. Since September the province had been \ngathering its meagre military supplies. It \nwas but common sense to seize them be- \nfore they could be used. Soon after the \nnew year Gage began his measures. \"Genl. \nOrders,\" writes disgruntled Lieutenant Barker. \n\"If any officers of the different Regts. are \ncapable of taking sketches of a Country, \nthey will send their names to the Dep. Adj. \nGenl. . . . that is an extraordinary method \nof wording the order ; it might at least have \nbeen in a more genteel way ; at present it \nlooks as if he doubted whether there were \nany such.\" However, there were such, and \nin February the governor chose Captain \nBrown and Ensign De Berniere (or Bernicre, \nas the name is sometimes spelled) and sent \nthem out to map the roads. \n\nThe little expedition was somewhat absurd, \nfor the disguise which the officers wore was \nsufficient to conceal them only from their \nfriends. When, at the first tavern at which \nthey stopped, they remarked that it was a \nvery fine country, the black woman who \n\n\nMilitary Preparations 163 \n\nwaited on them answered, \"So it is, and we \nhave got brave fellows to defend it, and if you \ngo any higher you will find it so.\" \"This,\" \nadmits Ensign De Berniere, whose account \nof the expedition was left in Boston at the \nevacuation, and was \"printed for the in- \nformation and amusement of the curious,\" \n\"this disconcerted us a good deal.\" From \nthat time on, any one who took the trouble \nto \"eye them attentively\" was in no doubt \nas to their real character. \n\nThey went first to Worcester, where it was \npossible that the governor might wish to \nsend troops, to protect the courts as well as \nto seize stores. The weather was rough and \nsnowy, and the officers' task correspondingly \ndifficult ; the countrymen, by persevering so- \nciability, kept them in an uneasy state of mind. \nAfter roughly mapping roads concerning which \nthe general should long before have had ac- \ncurate information, the two officers made their \nway to Sudbury, where they hoped to rest with \na sympathizer, after walking in a snow-storm \nfor hours. But the town doctor, though long \n\n\n164 The Siege of Boston \n\na stranger at the house, came to call, and the \ntownspeople showed their host various other \nundesirable attentions, so that in twenty \nminutes the two officers were glad to leave \nthe place. They arrived again safely at \nWorcester, \"very much fatigued, after walk- \ning thirty-two miles between two o'clock and \nhalf-after ten at night, through a road that \nevery step we sunk up to the ankles, and it \nblowing and drifting snow all the way.\" \n\nIn spite of this experience, the two officers, \na month later, undertook a similar journey \nto Concord. In this they succeeded, return- \ning with a rough sketch of the roads, but \nbringing also their Concord host, who did \nnot think it safe to remain after entertaining \nthem. They brought information that in \nConcord there were \"fourteen cannon (ten \niron and four brass) and two cohorns,\" with \n\"a store of flour, fish, salt, and rice; and a \nmagazine of powder and cartridges.\" \n\nThey might, in their two journeys, have \nbrought better information than that the \nConcord Whigs \"fired their morning gun, \n\n\nMilitary Preparations 165 \n\nand mounted a guard of ten men at night.\" \nThe stores at Concord had far better pro- \ntection than these, as the two officers should \nhave learned at Framingham, where they \nwatched the drill of the militia company. \n\"After they had done their exercise, one of \ntheir commanders spoke a very eloquent \nspeech, recommending patience, coolness, and \nbravery (which indeed they very much \nwanted), particularly told them they would \nalways conquer if they did not break, and \nrecommended them to charge us coolly, and \nwait for our fire, and everything would succeed \nwith them — quoted Caesar and Pompey, \nbrigadiers Putnam and Ward, and all such \ngreat men ; put them in mind of Cape Breton, \nand all the battles they had gained for his \nmajesty in the last war, and observed that \nthe regulars must have been ruined but for \nthem.\" \n\nHad the two officers known it, every town \nin the province had just such a militia com- \npany, which at set seasons met, and drilled, \nand listened to good old-fashioned exhorta- \n\n\n166 The Siege of Boston \n\ntions to valor. It would not take long, \ntherefore, for the neighboring towns to send \ntheir companies to reinforce the guard of ten \nmen which Concord set over its stores every \nnight. And yet the province was not satis- \nfied with this ancient militia organization, \nfor it had set up another to strengthen it. \n\nThe militia was composed, as it had been \nsince the foundation of the colony, of the \nwhole body of male inhabitants of proper \nmilitary age. In some cases even clergymen \ndrilled in the ranks. More than once this \nmilitia had gathered to repel an expected \nattack of French or Indians ; it had stood \nbetween the settlers and their foes from the \ndays of Miles Standish down to the French \nand Indian War. The martial spirit still pre- \nvailed among the youth of the colony, and \neach town took pride in its company. In \n1774 John Andrews thus records his innocent \ndelight in the appearance of the Boston \ntrainbands : — \n\n\"Am almost every minute taken off with \nagreeable sight of our militia companies \n\n\nMilitary Preparations 167 \n\nmarching into the Common, as it is a grand \nfield day with us. ... They now vie with \nthe best troops in his majesties service, being \ndress'd all in blue uniforms, with drums and \nfifes to each company dress'd in white uni- \nforms trim'd in y? most elegant manner; \nwith a company of Grenadiers in red with \nevery other apparatus, that equal any regu- \nlar company I ever saw both in appearance \nand discipline, having a grand band of musick \nconsisting of eight that play nearly equal to \nthat of the 64th. What crowns all is the \nCadet company, being perfectly compleat \nand under the best order you can conceive of, \nwith a band of musick likewise, that perform \nadmirably well. What with these and Pad- \ndock's company of artillery make yf com- \npletest militia in America ; not a drummer, \nfifer, and scarcely a soldier but what are in \ncompleat uniforms and thoroughly instructed \nin the military exercises.\" \n\nIt was this Boston Cadet company that, \nat the affront to its leader Hancock had re- \nturned its standard to the governor and dis- \n\n\n1 68 The Siege of Boston \n\nbanded. Gage knew too well that others of \nthe companies were thoroughly disaffected. \nIn fact, many of the Boston young men left \nthe town before hostilities began, and were \nready to join with their country brethren in \nshowing that their military training was worth \nsomething. \n\nYet early in the fall it was recognized in \nthe colony that the militia system was not \nsufficient, being too slow of movement to \nmeet any such sudden expedition as that \nwhich Gage sent to seize the powder. It is \nnot surprising, therefore, to find John Andrews \nreporting on October 5 the existence of a \nnew body of troops, \"which are calPd minute \nmen, i.e. to be ready at a minute's warning \nwith a fortnight's provision, and ammunition \nand arms.\" There is doubt of the origin of \nthis body, but it was first officially accepted \nin Concord, where the town adopted definite \nterms of enlistment, the more important of \nwhich reads : — \n\n\"We will ... to the utmost of our power \nand abilities, defend all and every of our \n\n\nMilitary Preparations 169 \n\ncharter rights, liberties, and privileges ; and \nwill hold ourselves in readiness at a minute's \nwarning, with arms and ammunition thus to \ndo.\" 1 \n\nTradition says that the terms of the en- \nlistment were interpreted literally, and that \nwherever the minute men went, to the field, \nthe shop, or to church, gun and powder-horn \nand bullet-pouch were ready to hand. It is \nscarcely an exaggeration to suppose that, as \nrepresented by French's statue, the farmers \nactually left the plough in the furrow and \nsnatched up the ready rifle. \n\nOne further preparation was also made. \nThe rallying point was possibly Worcester, \nwhere were the courts and some few stores ; \nbut it was more probably Concord. The \nshortest route to Concord, or to the road \nbetween Concord and Boston, was known to \nthe captain of every company of minute men \nwithin a hundred miles. But that the cap- \ntains should be notified of any emergency was \nessential. A complete system of couriers for \n\n1 Tolman, \"The Concord Minute Man,\" 12. \n\n\n170 The Siege of Boston \n\nspreading news was projected in September, \nand now was in good working order, so that, \nwith Boston as a radiating point, the sum- \nmons could be sent over the province with \nthe greatest rapidity. By virtue of his effi- \nciency, trustworthiness, and picturesque per- \nsonality, Paul Revere is accepted as the type \nof the men who stood ready for this service. \n\nThis system, further, had been tested. \nThe spontaneous response to the Powder \nAlarm in September had been ready enough, \nfor the men of Connecticut and New Hamp- \nshire were in motion before the next day. \nBut through the winter of 1774-1775 there \nhad been minor alarms at each little expedi- \ntion on which Gage sent his soldiers. By \nthese the new system was proved efficient. \nWhether the troops marched to Jamaica Pond, \nto the \"punch bowl\" in Brookline, or even \nwent, by sea and land, as far as Salem, the \nmilitia of the surrounding towns showed a \nprompt curiosity as to the object of the \nexcursion. These fruitless musters, far from \nmaking the minute men callous to alarms, \n\n\nMilitary Preparations 171 \n\nserved to prepare them to meet the great \noccasion which they foresaw would finally \ncome. For that they were in excellent prac- \ntice. \n\nAs to Concord itself, it had become very \nimportant. The Congress, which after its \nfirst week in Concord had been sitting in \nCambridge, now returned, and from the 22d \nof March until the I5th of April1 sat daily \nin the meeting-house. The Committee of \nSafety remained still longer, busy with the \ngathering of supplies. It is within this period \nthat Berniere and Brown came on their spy- \ning expedition to Concord, and were directed \nby a woman to the house of Daniel Bliss. A \nthreat of the Whigs to tar and feather her \nsent her to the officers for refuge, and word \npresently came to Bliss that the Whigs \n\"would not let him go out of the town alive \n\n1 1 take many facts in the following pages from the \nthree pamphlets by George Tolman, \"The Concord \nMinute Man,\" \"Preliminaries of Concord Fight,\" and \n\"Events of April Nineteenth.\" These, published by \nthe Concord Antiquarian Society, are invaluable to \nthe student of this period. \n\n\n172 The Siege of Boston \n\nthat morning.\" This fate the officers and \ntheir host avoided by leaving in the night. \nWhat became of the woman is not said, but \nwe may be easy about her : no injury, and in \nfact no serious indignity, was put upon a \nwoman in New England at this period. The \nofficers returned to Boston with a report of \nthe stores in Concord. \n\nThis may have increased the anxiety of \nthe Committee of Safety. Already they had \nvoted, \"requiring Colonel Barrett of Concord \nto engage a sufficient number of faithful men \nto guard the Colony's magazines in that \ntown ; to keep a suitable number of teams \nin constant readiness, by day and night, to \nremove the stores ; and to provide couriers \nto alarm the neighboring towns, on receiving \ninformation of any movements of the British \ntroops.\" 1 A watch was kept upon the British \nmovements; and finally, when, on the I5th, \nWarren sent Paul Revere from Boston with \nwarning of suspicious movements, the Com- \nmittee felt that soon Gage must strike. On \n1 \"Preliminaries,\" 23-24. \n\n\nMilitary Preparations 173 \n\nthe 1 8th it ordered the removal of some of \nthe stores. \"That very night,\" says Tolmari, \nwithout knowledge of affairs in Boston, the \nwork was begun. \n\nMeanwhile, in response to another vote of \nthe committee, the British had been under \nclose observation. The vote was that \"mem- \nbers of this Committee belonging to the towns \nof Charlestown, Cambridge, and Roxbury, be \nrequired at the Province expense to procure \nat least two men for a watch every night to \nbe placed in each of these towns, and that \nsaid members be in readiness to send couriers \nforward to the towns where the magazines \nare placed, when sallies are made by the \narmy by night.\" In view of these prepara- \ntions, it scarcely needs to be said that there \nwas nothing accidental about Concord fight. \nSome day Gage was bound to strike at Con- \ncord, and for that day the Whigs were ready. \n\nIt is now that Paul Revere comes promi- \nnently into the course of events. Revere was \na Boston craftsman of Huguenot descent, \nwho was and is well known as a silversmith, \n\n\n174 The Siege of Boston \n\nengraver, and cartoonist. His prints and \narticles of silverware sell to-day for high \nprices, and his house in North Square has \nrecently been fitted up as a public museum, \nchiefly on account of a single act at a critical \nmoment. One is glad to know, however, that \nRevere's fame is not accidental. His pictures \nare historically interesting; we should be the \npoorer without his prints which give views of \nBoston, and without his picture of the Mas- \nsacre. His silver — we have mentioned his \npunch-bowl for the \"immortal Ninety-two\" \n— is usually beautiful. From the foundry \nwhich he established later in life came cannon, \nand church-bells which are in use to-day. \nAnd finally his famous ride, the object of \nwhich would have been brought about had \nRevere been stopped at the outset, was but \none out of many. \n\n\"In the year 1773,\" says Revere of him- \nself,1 \"I was employed by the selectmen of \n\n1 After the Revolution, Revere wrote a narrative of \nthe events in which he was concerned. It is to be found \nin several books, notably Goff's \"Life of Revere.\" \n\n\nMilitary Preparations \n\n\n175 \n\n\n176 The Siege of Boston \n\nthe town of Boston to carry the account of \nthe Destruction of the Tea to New York, and \nafterwards, 1774, to carry their despatches \nto New York and Philadelphia for calling a \nCongress ; and afterwards to Congress several \ntimes.\" Revere does not mention the fact \nthat he was himself a member of the Tea- \nParty. When he goes on to speak of still \nmore important events, he suppresses the fact \nthat he was one of the leaders, if not the \nchief leader, of the Boston artisans. \n\n\"In the fall of 1774, and winter of 1775, \nI was one of upwards of thirty, chiefly me- \nchanics, who formed ourselves into a com- \nmittee for the purpose of watching the move- \nments of the British soldiers, and gaining \nevery intelligence of the movements of the \nTories. We held our meetings at the Green \nDragon Tavern. We were so careful that \nour meetings should be kept secret, that every \ntime we met, every person swore upon the \nBible that they would not discover any of \nour transactions but to Messrs. Hancock, \nAdams, Doctors Warren, Church, and one or \n\n\nMilitary Preparations 177 \n\ntwo more. ... In the winter, towards the \nspring, we frequently took turns, two and \ntwo, to watch the soldiers, by patrolling the \nstreets all night.\" \n\nSuch was the watch, then, kept upon the \nroyalists, and such were the preparations to \nreceive the troops when they should march \nout. We know now that Gage was informed \nof them, for among those whom Revere \nnames as confidants of the mechanics there \nwas a traitor to the cause. Yet though Gage \nknew of the organization of the Whigs, of its \nefficiency he had apparently not the glimmer \nof an idea. It was with no expectation of \nserious results that, when at last he learned \nthat the resolution declaring the colonies to \nbe in rebellion had passed Parliament, he \nslowly put himself in motion to seize the stores \nof the provincials. \n\nThe Americans were keenly aware of all \nhis movements. There were two common \nmethods of leaving the town, one by the \nNeck, the other over Charlestown ferry. But \nthese routes lay through towns, either Rox- \n\n\n178 The Siege of Boston \n\nbury or Charlestown, and to march so openly \nmeant to give the alarm. The Americans \nwere ready for Gage to take a third route: \nacross the Charles by means of boats, and \nthen by unfrequented roads until striking the \nhighway at Cambridge Common. This way \nthe Whigs suspected he might choose, and this \nthey found he did. \n\nGage's preparations were almost open. The \nboats of the men-of-war were hauled up and \nrepaired at the foot of the Common. On the \nI4th, in the night, they were launched, and \nmoored at the sterns of the men-of-war. On \nthe 1 5th was given out in general orders that \n\"'The Grenadiers and Light Infantry in \norder to learn Grenadrs. Exercise and new \nevolutions are to be off all duties till further \norders.' — This,\" remarks Lieutenant Barker \nof the King's Own, \"I suppose is by way of a \nblind. I dare say they have something for \nthem to do.\" \n\nThis \"something\" was either one or both \nof two objectives : the stores at Concord, \nand the persons of Adams and Hancock, \n\n\nMilitary Preparations 179 \n\nthen known to be staying at the house of the \nReverend Jonas Clark in Lexington. That \nthis latter objective was seriously considered, \nat least by the Americans, we shall see from \nRevere's narrative. There never has been \nproof that Gage endeavored to seize either \nthem or Warren. But in any case the \nstores were in danger, and strict watch was \nkept. \n\nThere was evidence enough of a coming \nexpedition. As before the Massacre, there \nwere soldiers' rumors that something was to \nhappen, and the name of Concord was whis- \npered about. On the night of the i8th \nword came in from the country that parties \nof officers were riding here and there. This \nsame notice was sent by vigilant patriots \nto Hancock at Lexington. In Boston itself \ndifferent persons noticed that the troops were \nastir. Word of all this came from various \nsources to Warren who, relinquishing for a \nwhile his sittings with the Committee of \nSafety, had for some days been working \nfor it at the post of responsibility and danger. \n\n\ni8o The Siege of Boston \n\nWarren finally decided that he must act. He \nsent for the men who had pledged themselves \nfor this service, and gave them his directions. \n\nOne of these men was William Dawes, of \nwhom, except for his actions on this night, \nwe know little. Obeying his instructions, he \ntook horse, and rode across the Neck to go \nto Lexington by way of Roxbury and Water- \ntown. \n\n\"About ten o'clock,\" writes Revere, \"Dr. \nWarren sent in great haste for me, and begged \nthat I would immediately set off for Lex- \nington, where Messrs. Hancock and Adams \nwere, and acquaint them of the movement, \nand that it was thought they were the objects.\" \nRevere was ready. In returning on the I5th \nhe had arranged signals to his friends in \nCharlestown to inform them what route \nthe British would take; he knew, also, how \nhe should cross — for the ferry was closed \nat nine o'clock — and where he should get \nhis horse. From Warren's Revere went home, \ngot his \"boots and surtout,\" and started. \nTwo of his friends rowed him to Charles- \n\n\n• \n\n\nTHE OLD NORTH CHURCH \n\n(From which Paul Revere's signals were displayed.) \n\n\nMilitary Preparations 181 \n\ntown in a boat which was kept ready for the pur- \npose, another was already despatched to make \ncertain of the route the British would take. \n\nOf the person and the actions of this other \nfriend there has been much dispute. The \nweight of evidence seems to show that on \nmaking sure of the route of the British, he \nwent to the Old North Church, still standing \nin Salem Street, and from its steeple dis- \nplayed the signal. I make no positive asser- \ntion that he spent any time in watching the \nBritish ; Revere, knowing the route, may \nhave signalled in order to make sure that the \nnews crossed the river, even though he him- \nself might fail. The person who displayed the \nsignals seems to have been one Newman, the \nsexton of the church, rather than Captain \nPulling, a friend of Revere's. At any rate, \nthe signals were hung while Revere was \ncrossing the river to Charlestown. He passed \nunobserved not far from the Somerset man- \nof-war, and remarks that \"it was then young \nflood, the ship was winding, and the moon \nwas rising.\" On landing, his Charlestown \n\n\n1 82 The Siege of Boston \n\nfriends told him they had already seen the \nsignals. Revere (if we still suppose that he \nneeded to make sure of the route) himself \nmust have taken a look at the signal lanterns, \nas in Longfellow's poem. \"Two if by sea.\" \nThis poetical language means merely that the \ntroops were preparing to cross the river in \ntheir boats. This is the traditional account \nof Revere's action. A contemporary mem- \norandum states, however, that on landing \nRevere \"informed [us] that the T [troops] \nwere actually in the boats.\" \n\n\"I got a horse,\" says Revere, \"of Deacon \nLarkin,\" which horse the deacon never saw \nagain. Before Revere started he again re- \nceived warning that there were British officers \non the road, but he was quite cool enough to \ntake note of the beauty of the night, \"about \neleven o'clock and very pleasant.\" Crossing \nCharlestown Neck, he started on the road for \nCambridge, when he saw before him two \nhorsemen under a tree. As Revere drew near, \nthey pushed out into the moonlight, and he \nsaw their uniforms. One of them blocked \n\n\nMilitary Preparations 183 \n\nthe road, the other tried to take him, and \nRevere, turning back, galloped first for \nCharlestown and then \"pushed for the Med- \nford road.\" Revere made the turn success- \nfully; the officer who followed, ignorant of \nthe locality, mired himself in a clay pond. \nRevere's road was now clear. He reached \nMedford, and roused the captain of the minute \nmen ; then, hastening on through Menotomy, \nnow Arlington, and thence to Lexington, \nhe \" alarmed almost every house.\" He reached \nLexington about midnight, and went directly \nto the house of the Reverend Jonas Clark, \nwhere Hancock and Adams were sleeping under \na guard of the militia. Revere asked admit- \ntance, and the sergeant informed him that the \nfamily had requested that no noise be made. \n\"Noise!\" replied Revere in the phrase \nfamiliar to every schoolboy, \"you'll have \nnoise enough before long — the regulars are \ncoming out!\"1 The family was accordingly \nat once aroused. \n\n1 Most of these facts are from Frothingham's \" Siege,\" \n57-59, and from Revere's letter. \n\n\n184 The Siege of Boston \n\nMeanwhile the troops had actually started. \n\"Between 10 and n o'clock,\" says Lieutenant \nBarker, \"all the Grenadiers and Light In- \nfantry of the Army, making about 600 Men, \n(under command of Lt. Coll. Smith of \nthe loth and Major Pitcairn of the Marines,) \nembarked and were landed on the opposite \nshore of Cambridge Marsh.\" This phras- \ning is not immediately clear to one of to-day. \nIn those days every regiment had two special \ncompanies, the heavy-armed grenadiers, so \ncalled because they originally carried hand- \ngrenades, and the light-infantry company. \nThese were frequently detached for special \nduty, as the present, when the Light Infanty \nwould be used for flanking purposes. Thus \nevery regiment in Boston was represented \nin the expedition — and we may add in the \nlist of killed and wounded on the following \nday. The number is generally estimated at \neight hundred. They were commanded by \nthe colonel who had been longest on duty \nin New England. Smith was in character \ntoo much like Gage himself. The general \n\n\nMilitary Preparations 185 \n\nwould have done better to send one of his \nbrigadiers. \n\nOne at least of the brigadiers was reason- \nably alert. According to Stedman, Lord \nPercy was crossing the Common after learning \nfrom the general that a secret expedition had \njust started. Perceiving a group of men \ntalking together, the nobleman joined them \nin time to hear one say, \"The British troops \nhave marched, but have missed their aim.\" \n\n\"What aim ?\" asked Lord Percy. \n\nThe reply was, \"The cannon at Concord.\" \n\nPercy, in much perturbation, at once re- \nturned to the general and told him that his \nsecret was known. Poor Gage complained \nthat his confidence had been betrayed, \"for \nthat he had communicated his design to one \nperson only besides his lordship.\" \n\nThe student of the time sees in this story \na side-thrust at Mrs. Gage, on whom, as an \nAmerican, the officers were ready to blame \nthe knowledge of secrets which were gained \nby Yankee shrewdness alone. In this case \nwe have seen that it was Gage that betrayed \n\n\n1 86 The Siege of Boston \n\nhimself to the eyes of Revere's volunteer \nwatch. The general hastily sent to order \nthe guard at the Neck to let no one leave \nthe town. But he was too late : Dawes was \ngone, Revere was on the water, and the news \nwas out. \n\nThe expedition was bungled at the very \nstart. \"After getting over the Marsh, where \nwe were wet up to the knees,\" says Lieuten- \nant Barker, \"we were halted in a dirty road \nand stood there till two o'clock in the morn- \ning, waiting for provisions to be brought from \nthe boats and to be divided, and which most \nof the men threw away, having carried some \nwith 'em.\" As they waited there they might \nhave heard signal guns, and learned that in \na constantly widening circle of villages, \"the \nbells were rung backward, the drums they \nwere beat.\" The news had three hours' \nstart of them. At last, at two on the I9th, \nhaving \"waded through a very long ford \nup to our middles,\" wet, dirty, and loaded \nwith the heavy equipment of the period, they \nstarted on their march. \n\n\nCHAPTER VIII \n\nTHE NINETEENTH OF APRIL \n\nJOHN HANCOCK never showed better \nin his life than on the morning of the \nI9th of April. Many times the Tories \nhad tried to win him over. Hutchinson \nhimself had written: \"At present, Hancock \nand Adams are at variance. Some of my \nfriends blow the coals, and I hope to see a \ngood effect.\" Yet Adams and Hancock were \nstill enlisted in the same cause on this morn- \ning when blood was to be shed. And Han- \ncock, when roused from his sleep at midnight, \nwas hot with the desire to take his musket \nand fight on Lexington Green. \n\nAdams and his friends — among them his \nsweetheart — dissuaded him. The two Whig \nleaders finally took the road to Woburn, \nand in the succeeding days passed on to \nWorcester and Hartford, planned the taking \n\n187 \n\n\n1 88 The Siege of Boston \n\nof Ticonderoga, and, joining the other delegates \nfrom Boston, in May met with the second \nContinental Congress. If Gage had meant \nto seize Hancock and Adams, he had lost \nhis chance. The outcome lay in the hands \nof the fighting men. \n\nRevere waited at Mr. Clark's house for \nabout half an hour, when Dawes arrived. \nThe two then set out for Concord, and were \njoined on the way by \"a young Dr. Prescott, \nwhom we found to be a high son of liberty.\"1 \nThey began to rouse the farmers along the \nroad, and had already gone halfway when \nthey saw in the road horsemen whom Revere \nknew at once to be British officers. Revere \nand Prescott, blocked in front and rear, \nturned into a pasture; but this was a trap \nwhere other officers were waiting. Prescott, \nknowing the country, put his horse at a fence \nand got away ; Revere found himself sur- \nrounded by six horsemen who, with swords \nand pistols ready, ordered him to dismount. \nThere was nothing for him to do but comply. \n1 Revere's narrative. \n\n\nThe Nineteenth of April 189 \n\nDawes, who had been behind upon the road, \nturned to go back, and was pursued. He \nrode into a farmyard, shouted out as to friends \nin waiting, and frightened off his pursuers. \nBoth he and Prescott were useful in spreading \nthe alarm farther. \n\nBut Revere was caught. His chief captor \nexamined him, and got slight satisfaction. \n\"I told him, and added that their troops \nhad catched aground in passing the river \nand that there would be five hundred Ameri- \ncans there in a short time, for I had alarmed \nthe country all the way up.\" His anxious \ncaptors consulted together, and were con- \nducting him back toward Lexington, \"when \nthe militia fired a volley of guns, which \nseemed to alarm them very much.\" They \nasked if there were any other road to Cam- \nbridge, took Revere's horse, and left him. \nHe hurried back to Lexington, to give Han- \ncock and Adams the news that sent them \non their way. Revere himself remained long \nenough to save a trunk of papers belonging to \nHancock. \n\n\n190 The Siege of Boston \n\nMeanwhile the militia of the town, alarmed \nby Revere, assembled and waited for the \ntroops. They sent two messengers toward \nCambridge to bring certain news, but each of \nthese blundered into the advancing regulars, \nand were seized and held. The militia waited \nfor some hours, but on hearing no word they \nwere finally dismissed, with a warning to be \nready to come together again instantly. Some \nwent to their homes, some to the near-by \ntavern, to finish out the night. \n\nNews came at last to Captain Parker that \nthe British were scarcely a mile away, and \nin such numbers that his company could not \nhope to oppose them. He called his men \ntogether, nevertheless, \"but only with a view \nto determine what to do, when and where to \nmeet, and to dismiss and disperse.\" l The \nminute men were still standing in their ranks \nwhen the British suddenly appeared. \n\nThe succeeding events caused much con- \ntroversy at the time. Gage reported \"that \nthe troops were fired upon by the rebels out \n\n1 Clark's narrative. \n\n\nThe Nineteenth of April 191 \n\nof the meeting-house, and the neighboring \nhouses, as well as by those that were in the \nfield; and that the troops only returned the \nfire, and passed on their way to Concord.\" l \nBut in number the little company of minute \nmen were, according to Revere, who had just \npassed through them, \"about fifty\"; the Rev- \nerend Jonas Clark says \"fifty or sixty, or even \nseventy.\" Had there been even the two or \nthree hundred of the British reports, these \nmen, drawn up without protection on an open \ngreen, are scarcely likely to have attacked a \nforce of more than twice their number. The \nlogic of the situation seems against Gage. \n\nThere is one more factor to consider. It is \nwell enough known that both the British \nofficers, and the Americans as a whole, were \nunder instructions not to fire, and earnest to \nobey. But what of the British privates ? \nTheir eagerness for blood at the time of the \nMassacre was so great as to account for that \ntragedy; it was now not likely to be less. \nThere were even among the troops at Lex- \n\n1 Clark's narrative. \n\n\n192 The Siege of Boston \n\nington two companies from one of the \"Sam \nAdams regiments.\" When we learn from \nLieutenant Barker that after the skirmish \n\"the Men were so wild they cou'd hear no \norders,\" we may even suspect that, as at the \nMassacre, the men may have taken matters \ninto their own hands. \n\n\"For,\" says the minister of Lexington, \"no \nsooner did they come in sight of our com- \npany, but one of them, supposed to be an \nofficer of rank, was heard to say to the troops, \n* Damn them, we will have them ! ' — Upon \nthis the troops shouted aloud, huzza'd, and \nrushed furiously towards our men. — About \nthe same time, three officers (supposed to be \nCol. Smith, Major Pitcairn and another \nofficer) advanced, on horse back, to the front \nof the body, and coming within five or six \nrods of the militia, one of them cried out, 'ye \nvillains, ye Rebels, disperse ; Damn you, dis- \nperse !' or words to this effect. One of \nthem (whether the same, or not, is not easily \ndetermined) said, 'Lay down your arms, \nDamn you, why don't you lay down your \n\n\nThe Nineteenth of April 193 \n\narms ! ' — The second of these officers, about \nthis time, fired a pistol towards the militia, \nas they were dispersing. — The foremost, \nwho was within a few yards of our men, \nbrandishing his sword, and then pointing \ntowards them, said, with a loud voice, to the \ntroops, ' Fire ! — By God, fire ! ' — which \nwas instantly followed by a discharge of arms \nfrom the said troops, succeeded by a very \nheavy and close fire upon our party, dispers- \ning, so long as any of them were within reach. \n— Eight were left dead upon the ground ! \nTen were wounded.\" 1 \n\nThis is the best contemporary account \nwhich we have of the affair. It is evident \nfrom his careful language and semi-legal \nterms that the Reverend Mr. Clark, though \nnot on the ground until half an hour after- \nwards, took all possible pains to gather the \nfacts, and considered himself upon oath in \nreporting them. He was himself a witness of \nthe exultation of the troops at their victory, \nand expresses his indignation. \n1 Clark's narrative. \n\n\n194 The Siege of Boston \n\nTradition gives Major Pitcairn, of the Ma- \nrines, a prominent part in the affair. \"A \ngood man,\" says Stiles, \"in a bad cause,\" \nand adds that had Pitcairn ever been able to \nsay that he was sure the Americans fired \nfirst, he would have believed him. Honest \nMajor Pitcairn could only state his belief. \n\nSo the first blood in the Revolution was \nspilt. The death of one of the Americans, \nJonathan Harrington, was pitiful : shot within \nsight of his home, he crawled to the door, and \nexpired at his wife's feet. To the heavy \nvolleys they received, the Americans returned \nbut a scattering fire ; some of them did not \nfire at all.1 Two British privates were \nwounded, and Pitcairn's horse. \n\nThe troops, as soon as they could be \nmarshalled again, fired a volley and gave \nthree cheers, rested for a little while, and \nmarched on toward Concord. There, since \nearly morning, had gathered some of the \nmilitia from Bedford and Lincoln, and about \nsunrise the little company marched out of \n\n1 Clark's narrative. \n\n\nThe Nineteenth of April 195 \n\ntown. \"We thought,\" says Amos Barrett \nquaintly, \"we would go and meet the British. \nWe marched down towards Lexington about \na mile or mile and a half, and we saw them \ncoming.\" But on seeing their numbers the \nmilitia turned back, \"and marched before \nthem with our drums and fifes going, and \nalso the British. We had grand musick.\" \nThe provincials halted once or twice on the \nhill that ran along the high road, and came \nat last to the liberty pole, overlooking the \ntown. \" The Yankees,\" records Lieutenant \nBarker of the King's Own, \"had that hill but \nleft it to us ; we expected they wou'd have \nmade a stand there, but they did not chuse \nit.\" The militia, still withdrawing before \nsuperior numbers, retreated across the river, \nand the British occupied the town. \n\nIn place of the five bridges which to-day, \nwithin a mile of the meeting-house, encircle \nConcord, the town in 1775 had but two. \nThe first of these was the South Bridge, on \nthe present Main Street route to Marlborough \n\n1 Letter of Amos Barrett, privately printed. \n\n\n196 The Siege of Boston \n\nand South Acton. The other was the North \nBridge, on a highway now abandoned, which \nin those days led to Acton, Carlisle, and Bed- \nford. Colonel Smith took possession of both \nthese bridges, and while his men searched \nthe town for stores, he sent a detachment \nacross the North Bridge to the farm of \nColonel Barrett, where it was known that \nsupplies had been kept. Of our two British \ninformants of the events of the day, Ensign \nBerniere guided the troops that went to the \nBarrett farm, Lieutenant Barker remained \nwith a detachment that stayed to guard the \nbridge. Meanwhile, on a hillside beyond the \nriver, almost within gunshot of the bridge, \nthe militia watched the first detachment pass \non its errand, and counted the numbers of \nthe redcoats that held the nearer side of the \npassage. \n\nColonel Smith speedily learned that his \njourney had been nearly in vain. As we \nhave seen, already on the night before, with- \nout news from Boston, the removal of the \nstores had been begun. The alarm brought \n\n\nThe Nineteenth of April 197 \n\nin by Dr. Prescott hastened the work. Men \nand boys, and even women and girls, were \nbusy in hiding the stores or carrying them \naway. Some of them were skilfully secreted \nunder the very eyes of the British. The \ntroops found little. In the town some few \ngun-carriages, barrels of flour, wooden mess- \nbowls, and wooden spoons were found and \ndestroyed. At Colonel Barrett's, acknowl- \nedges Berniere, \"we did not find so much \nas we expected, but what there was we de- \nstroyed.\" He was unaware that the cannon \nhad been laid in a ploughed field, and concealed \nby turning a furrow over them, the work \ncontinuing even while the troops were in sight. \nOf proceedings in the town we get the best \npicture from the petition of Martha Moulton, \n\"widow- woman,\" who in her deposition \"hum- \nbly sheweth : That on the iQth day of April, \n1775, in the forenoon, the town of Concord, \nwherein I dwell, was beset with an army of \nregulars, who, in a hostile manner, entered \nthe town, and drawed up in form before the \nhouse in which I live ; and there they con- \n\n\n198 The Siege of Boston \n\ntinued on the green, feeding their horses \nwithin five feet of the door ; and about fifty \nor sixty of them was in and out of the house, \ncalling for water and what they wanted, for \nabout three hours.\" The neighbors had fled, \nand poor Mrs. Moulton was left with \"no \nperson near but an old man of eighty-five \nyears, and myself seventy-one years old, and \nboth very infirm. It may easily be imagined \nwhat a sad condition your petitioner must be \nin.\" But she committed herself to Provi- \ndence, \"and was very remarkably helpt with \nso much fortitude of mind, as to wait on \n\n* \n\nthem, as they called, with what we had, — \nchairs for Major Pitcairn and four or five \nmore officers, — who sat at the door viewing \ntheir men. At length your petitioner had, \nby degrees, cultivated so much favor as to \ntalk a little with them. When all on a sudden \nthey had set fire to the great gun-carriages \njust by the house, and while they were in \nflames your petitioner saw smoke arise out \nof the Town House higher than the ridge of \nthe house. Then your petitioner did put her \n\n\nThe Nineteenth of April 199 \n\nlife, as it were, in her hand, and ventured \nto beg of the officers to send some of their \nmen to put out the fire; but they took no \nnotice, only sneered. Your petitioner, seeing \nthe Town House on fire, and must in a few \nminutes be past recovery, did yet venture to \nexpostulate with the officers just by her, as \nshe stood with a pail of water in her hand, \nbegging them to send, &c. When they only \nsaid, ' O, mother, we won't do you any \nharm!' 'Don't be concerned, mother,' and \nsuch like talk.\" But the widow Moulton per- \nsisted, until \"at last, by one pail of water \nand another, they did send and extinguish \nthe fire.\" 1 It is pleasant to know that the \ncourageous old lady received three pounds for \nher services, and that the smoke which rose \nhigher than the Town House served only to \ngive the signal for Concord fight. \n\nAll this while the numbers of the militia \nhad been growing. They were stationed on \nthe slope of Punkatasset Hill, and from \nminute to minute squads and companies \n\n1 Frothingham's \"Siege,\" Appendix, 369-370. \n\n\n2OO The Siege of Boston \n\ncame in from the neighboring towns. It has \nbeen made a reproach to Concord that so \nfew of her men were there, but they were \nengaged in the far more important duty of \nsaving the stores. Nevertheless, one of her \nmilitia companies was on the ground, with \nthose individuals who were able to hurry \nback after putting the stores in safety. The \nCarlisle and Acton men had joined the wait- \ning provincials, whose numbers at last be- \ncame so threatening that the guard at the \nbridge, in full sight of them, became uneasy. \n\nThe militia became uneasy also. Beyond \nthe bridge, in the town, they saw more smoke \nthan seemed warranted by merely burning \ncannon wheels and spoons. The officers con- \nsulted, and Captain Smith, of Lincoln, urged \nthat the bridge be forced. Davis of Acton, \nspeaking of his company, said, \"I haven't a \nman that's afraid to go!\" The movement \nwas decided upon, and the militia, in double \nfile, marched down toward the bridge. The \nActon company had the lead, with Davis at \nits head; beside him marched Major John \n\n\nThe Nineteenth of April 201 \n\nButtrick, of Concord, in command, with \nLieutenant-Colonel Robinson, of Westford, \nas a volunteer aid. As the provincials drew \nnear, the British hastily retreated across the \nbridge, and their commander awkwardly mar- \nshalled his three companies one behind the \nother, so that only the first could fire. As \nsome of the soldiers began to take up the \nplanks of the bridge, the Americans hastened \ntheir march, and presently the British fired. \nThere is no question that they began the \nfight, with first a few scattering guns, \"up \nthe river,\" and then a volley at close range. \n\nThe whole was seen by the Concord min- \nister, William Emerson, from his study in the \nManse, close by. For a moment, he records, \nhe feared that the fire was not to be returned ; \nbut he need not have doubted. The British \nvolley killed the Acton captain, Davis, and \nHosmer, his adjutant. Then Major Buttrick, \nleaping into the air as he turned to his men, \ncried, \"Fire, fellow-soldiers; for God's sake, \nfire!\" \n\n\"We were then,\" records Amos Barrett, \n\n\n2O2 The Siege of Boston \n\nof the second company, \"all ordered to fire \nthat could fire and not kill our own men.\" \nThe return fire, though from the awkward \nposition of double file, was effective. Two \nof the British were killed outright, another \nfell wounded, and the whole, apparently \ndoubting their ability to hold the bridge, \nhastily retreated upon the main body. \"We \ndid not follow them,\" records Barrett. \n\" There were eight or ten that were wounded \nand a-running and a-hobbling about, looking \nback to see if we were after them.\" \n\nAs reminders of the fight, besides the \nbridge which Concord, many years after its \ndisappearance, rebuilt on the centenary of \nthe day, the town points to the graves of the \ntwo soldiers killed in the fight, who were \nburied close by. Another memorial is seen \nin the bullet-hole in the Elisha Jones house \nnear at hand, at whose door the proprietor \nshowed himself as the regulars hastily re- \ntreated. On being fired at, Jones speedily \nremoved himself from the scene, and from \nsubsequent history. \n\n\nThe Nineteenth of April 203 \n\nThere were no further immediate conse- \nquences. The Americans crossed the bridge, \nand stationed themselves behind the ridge \nthat overlooked the town ; the search-party \nthat had gone to Colonel Barrett's returned. \n\"They had taken up some planks of the \nbridge,\" says Berniere of the Americans, \nthough the work was done by the British. \n\"Had they destroyed it, we were most certainly \nall lost ; however, we joined the main body.\" \nColonel Smith now had his force together, \nand had done all that could be done, yet for \ntwo hours more he, by futile marchings and \ncountermarchings, \"discovered great Fickle- \nness 1 and Inconstancy of Mind.\" The de- \nlay was serious ; he had earlier sent to Gage \nfor reinforcements, and he ought now to have \nconsidered that every minute was bringing \nmore Americans to the line of his retreat. \nWhen, about noon, he started for Boston, \nthe situation was very grave. \n\nThe British left the town as they had come \n\n1 \"Feekelness,\" Emerson's letter, \"Source Book of \nthe American Revolution,\" 146. \n\n\n204 The Siege of Boston \n\nin, with the grenadiers on the highway, the \nlight infantry flanking them on the ridge. \nOn this elevation, above the house he later \ninhabited, Hawthorne laid the scene of the \nduel between Septimius Felton and the British \nofficer. At Merriam's Corner the ridge ends. \nHere the flankers joined the main body, and \ntogether noted the approach of the Americans, \nwho had dogged them. The regulars turned \nand fired, only to be driven onward by an \naccurate response. \" When I got there,\" says \nAmos Barrett, \"a great many lay dead, and \nthe road was bloody.\" From that time en- \nsued a scattering general engagement along \nthe line of the retreat. \n\nIn this kind of fighting the odds were \ngreatly with the Americans, as Gage, with \nhis memory of Braddock's defeat, might have \nforeseen. The British complained with exas- \nperation that the militia would not stand \nup to them. The provincials knew better \nthan to do so. Lightly armed, carrying lit- \ntle besides musket or rifle, powder horn and \nbullet-pouch, — and all these smaller and \n\n\nThe Nineteenth of April 205 \n\nlighter than the British equipment, — the \nfarmers were able with ease to keep up with \nthe troops, to fire from cover, to load, and \nthen again to regain the distance lost. Every \nfurlong saw their numbers increase. At Mer- \nriam's Corner came in the Reading company ; \nbefore long the survivors of the Lexington \ncompany joined the fight to take their revenge ; \nand from that time on, from north, from \nsouth, and from the east, the minute men and \nmilitia came hurrying up to join the chase. \n\nBefore five miles were passed, the retreat \nhad degenerated into a mere rout. \" We at \nfirst,\" says Berniere, \"kept our order and \nreturned their fire as hot as we received \nit, but when we arrived within a mile of \nLexington, our ammunition began to fail, and \nthe light companies were so fatigued with \nflanking they were scarce able to act, and a \ngreat number of wounded scarce able to get \nforward, made a great confusion; Col. Smith \n(our commanding officer) had received a wound \nthrough his leg, a number of officers were also \nwounded, so that we began to run rather \n\n\n206 The Siege of Boston \n\nthan retreat in order. ... At last, after \nwe got through Lexington, the officers got to \nthe front and presented their bayonets, and \ntold the men that if they advanced they \nshould die : Upon this they began to form \nunder a heavy fire.\" There was, however,\" no \nhope for them unless they should be reinforced. \nIn the nick of time the succor came. Early \nin the morning Gage had received word that \nthe country was alarmed, and started to send \nout reinforcements. There were the usual \ndelays ; among other mistakes, they waited for \nPitcairn, who was with the first detachment. \nThe relief party as finally made up com- \nprised about twelve hundred men, with two \nsix-pounder field-pieces, under Lord Percy. \nPercy went out through Roxbury with his \nband playing Yankee Doodle, and as he went \na quick-witted lad reminded him of Chevy \nChase. More than once before night Percy \nmust have thought of the Whig youngster. \nHe was momentarily delayed at the Cam- \nbridge bridge, where the Committee of Safety \nhad taken up the planks, but had frugally \n\n\nThe Nineteenth of April 207 \n\nstored them in full view of the road. Percy \nrelaid some of the planks and hurried on \nwith his guns, leaving behind his baggage \ntrain and hospital supplies, which were pres- \nently captured by a company headed by a \nwarlike minister. Percy was again delayed \non Cambridge Common for want of a guide ; \nwhen again he was able to push on he spared \nno time, and reached Lexington at the criti- \ncal moment. He formed his men into a hol- \nlow square, to protect Smith's exhausted \nmen, who threw themselves down on the \nground, \"their tongues hanging out of their \nmouths like those of dogs after a chase.\" 1 \nPercy turned on the militia his two field- \npieces, \"which our people,\" grimly remarks \nMr. Clark, writing after Bunker Hill, \"were \nnot so well acquainted with then, as they \nhave been since.\" Percy had the satisfaction, \nwhich both Berniere and Barker express, of \nsilencing the provincials. \n\n1 This quotation from Stedman, himself a British \nofficer, is perhaps as well known as Revere's midnight \nremark, already given. \n\n\n208 The Siege of Boston \n\nHe knew too well, however, that the Ameri- \ncans were willing to be quiet only because \nthey awaited their own reinforcements. Every \nminute of delay was dangerous, for now the \nAmerican military leaders were gathering. \nIf Hancock and Adams had left the field, \nWarren hastened to it. We know some of his \nsayings as he left Boston. uThey have be- \ngun it, — that either party can do ; and we'll \nend it, — that only one can do.\" To the \nremark, \"Well, they are gone out,\" he re- \nplied, \"Yes, and we will be up with them \nbefore night.\" Warren probably was present \nat a meeting of the Committee of Safety \nwhich was held that morning, but his biog- \nrapher says: \"I am unable to locate him \nuntil the afternoon, about the time Lord \nPercy's column rescued Colonel Smith's party \nfrom entire destruction, which was at two \no'clock.\" \n\nWarren was no mere adviser. With Gen- \neral Heath he had been planning for the work \nof the day, and when, after half an hour's \nrest, Percy's troops moved onward, the \n\n\nThe Nineteenth of April 209 \n\ntime came for the measures to be put into \neffect. Warren went with Heath to the \nscene of battle. Yet little could be done in \norganized form, at least in the open country, \nand the minute men continued to pick \noff the British. But when the troops were \namong houses, and in revenge for their losses \nbegan to plunder 1 and burn, the Americans \nfor the first time began to close in. Many \nof them fired from barricaded houses, and \nwere killed in consequence. The Danvers \ncompany, the only one that tried to fight as \na body, were caught between the main col- \numn of the regulars and a strong flanking \nparty, and many were killed in an improvised \nenclosure. But even without defences the \nAmericans became very bold, and the fight \nfiercer. Warren, rashly exposing himself, had \na pin shot out of his hair. Percy, on the other \nhand, lost a button from his waistcoat. \nNothing can explain the comparatively slight \n\n1 \"The plundering was shameful,\" says Lieutenant \nBarker indignantly. See also depositions in Froth- \ningham's \"Siege,\" Appendices. \n\n\n2io The Siege of Boston \n\nlosses of the British except the rapidity of \ntheir march to safety. As it was, the regulars \nwere almost worn out with their exertions \nwhen they saw ahead of them the hills of \nCharlestown, and looking across the Back Bay, \nmight perceive on the slopes of Beacon Hill \nhalf the population of Boston watching their \ndisgrace. \n\nBoston had been in suspense since early \nmorning. All the Whigs had suspected the \nmeaning of Gage's preparations, and the \ntown was no sooner astir than the news was \nabroad that the expedition had started. \nNext came word that an officer had come \nin haste with a message for Gage. At about \neight came news of the death of five men in \nLexington. Already Lord Percy's detach- \nment was parading, waiting for the Marines, \nwho in turn waited for their absent com- \nmander. Thousands of people were in the \nstreet, and even the schoolboys were running \nabout, for Master Lovell had dismissed his \nschool with the words, \"War's begun, and \nschool's done.\" Through the day came con- \n\n\nThe Nineteenth of April 211 \n\nflicting rumors. \"About twelve o'clock it was \ngave out by the General's Aide camps that \nno person was kilPd, and that a single gun \nhad not been fir'd, which report was variously \nbeliev'd.\" 1 Fairly correct accounts of the \nfight at Lexington began to come in, em- \nbellished with the addition that men had been \nkilled in the meeting-house. In the after- \nnoon people began to watch from the hills \nfor the return of the troops, and before sun- \nset the noise of firing was heard. \n\nOf the three British commanders, Lord \nPercy was the only one who displayed any \nmilitary ability. He showed it in the route \nwhich he chose for his retreat. From Cam- \nbridge Common, where at last he arrived, \nthe road to Boston was long, and was broken \nby the bridge whose difficult passage in \nthe morning he remembered. Therefore he \navoided it — and wisely, for the planks of \nthe bridge were up again, and this time in \nuse as barricades, while the militia were \nready for him. Instead, Percy shook off \n1 Andrews Letters. \n\n\n212 The Siege of Boston \n\nmany of his waylayers, and saved some miles \nof march, by taking the direct road to Charles- \ntown. Yet even this route was hard beset. \n\"I stood upon the hills in town,\" says An- \ndrews, \"and saw the engagement very plain.\" \nMany a Whig exulted as he watched, many \na Tory cursed, at the sight of the weary \nregulars struggling forward, and of red figures \nthat dropped and lay still. Percy was barely \nin time. Had the men of Essex, whose \nstrong regiment arrived just too late, been \nquick enough to intercept them, and reso- \nlute enough to throw themselves across the \nretreat, it is more than likely that Percy \nmust have surrendered, for his ammunition \nwas almost gone. The exasperation of the \nAmericans at losing their prey was later \nexpressed in a court-martial of the Essex \ncolonel. At any rate, Percy was not headed, \nand the regulars at last streamed across \nCharlestown Neck, to find protection under \nthe guns of the fleet. \n\n\" Thus,\" grumbles Lieutenant Barker, \n\"ended this expedition, which from begin- \n\n\nThe Nineteenth of April 213 \n\nning to end was as ill plan'd and ill executed \nas it was possible to be. . . . For a few \ntrifling Stores the Grenadiers and Light In- \nfantry had a march of about 50 miles (going \nand returning) and in all human probability \nmust every Man have been cut off if the \nBrigade had not fortunately come to their \nAssistance.\" \n\nSpeaking for the reinforcing brigade, Lord \nPercy confessed that he had learned some- \nthing. \"Whoever looks upon them [the \nAmericans] merely as an irregular mob will \nfind himself much mistaken. They have \nmen among them who know very well what \nthey are about, having been employed as \nrangers against the Indians and Arcadians. \n. . . Nor are several of their men void of a \nspirit of enthusiasm, ... for many of them \nconcealed themselves in houses, and advanced \nwithin ten yards to fire at me and other \nofficers, though they were morally certain of \nbeing put to death. . . . For my part I \nnever believed, I confess, that they would \nhave attacked the King's troops, or have had \n\n\n214 The Siege of Boston \n\nthe perseverance I found in them yester- \nday.\" 1 \n\nThis was the day which Massachusetts \nnow celebrates as Patriots' Day. Of her sons \nforty-nine were killed, thirty-nine were \nwounded, and five were taken prisoners. \nBerniere's figures of the British losses are 73 \nkilled, 174 wounded, and 26 missing. The \ntotals, for a day more important, as says \nBancroft, than Agincourt or Blenheim, are \nvery small. But the significance of the day \nwas indeed enormous. Previously, said War- \nren, not above fifty persons in the province \nhad expected bloodshed, and the ties to \nEngland were still strong. Within ten weeks \nWarren himself had written of England as \n\"home.\" After this day there was no turn- \ning back from bloodshed, and no American \never again spoke of Britain by the endearing \nname. \n\nAnd the military situation was entirely \nchanged. In the morning Gage was still \nthe nominal governor of the province, free \n\n1 \"Memorial History of Boston,\" iii, 102. \n\n\nThe Nineteenth of April 215 \n\nto come and go at will. At night he looked \nout upon a circle of hostile camp-fires. \" From \na plentiful town,\" says Berniere mournfully, \n\"we were reduced to the disagreeable neces- \nsity of living on salt provisions, and fairly \nblocked up in Boston.\" \n\n\nCHAPTER IX \n\nBOSTON BELEAGUERED \n\nGAGE and his army were at first sur- \nrounded by a mere collection of \nmilitia companies. As the pursuit \nceased on the evening of the iQth the baffled \nAmericans withdrew from the range of the \nguns of the fleet. As well as they could they \ngathered into their organizations and made \nsome kind of a camp, sleeping either out of \ndoors, or in convenient houses. A watch \nwas set at Charlestown Neck, and at Rox- \nbury Prescott of Pepperell and his men stood \non guard against a sortie. The circuit be- \ntween these points, comprising the whole \nsweep of the Charles River and the Back Bay, \nwas likewise occupied. Headquarters were at \nCambridge. On the following days men from \nthe more distant towns came in, until before \nlong the minute men and militia from the \n\n216 \n\n\nBoston Beleaguered 217 \n\nadjoining provinces, New Hampshire, Rhode \nIsland, and Connecticut, were upon the ground. \n\nSome of the records are striking. The men \nof Nottingham, New Hampshire, gathered by \nnoon of the 2Oth and, after being joined \nby men of the neighboring towns, set out \nat two o'clock. \"At dusk,\" says Bancroft, \n\"they reached Haverhill Ferry, a distance of \ntwenty-seven miles, having run rather than \nmarched ; they halted in Andover only for \nrefreshments, and, traversing fifty-five miles \nin less than twenty hours, by sunrise of the \ntwenty-first paraded on Cambridge common.\" l \n\nIsrael Putnam, working on his farm in \nBrooklyn, Connecticut, received the news the \nmorning after the fight at Concord. He \nleft his work at once, and, mounting a horse, \nstarted out to rouse the militia, who, upon \nmustering, chose him leader. As his idea of \na leader was one who went in front, he set \nout at once for Boston, ordering them to \nfollow. He arrived in Cambridge at the \ntime when the Nottingham men are reported \n\n1 Bancroft, iv, 535. \n\n\n21 8 The Siege of Boston \n\nas parading, \"having ridden the same horse \na hundred miles in eighteen hours.\" 1 \n\nOthers followed in similar haste. Among \nthem, Benedict Arnold first began to attract \nto himself public notice. Sabine says of him, \n\"I am inclined to believe, that he was a finished \nscoundrel from early manhood to his grave.\" \nNevertheless, his fiery nature kept him for a \ntime with the Americans, and at the very out- \nset he showed his independent spirit, having \ncharacteristically refused to \"wait for proper \norders.\" From New Hampshire came Stark, \nthe hero of the frontier wars. And from all the \ntowns came the militia leaders, who, gathering \ntheir companies into regiments, began the \nloose organization and crude subordination \nwhich should make of the crowd an army. \n\nIn all this convergence of the militia toward \nBoston, there was one side current. This set \ntoward Marshfield, where for some weeks had \nbeen a detachment of regulars. During this \ntime there had been peace in the town but \nstrong feeling on both sides — Marshfield had \n\n1 Bancroft, iv, 536. \n\n\nBoston Beleaguered 219 \n\nalready produced a general for the king, and \nnow was about to give one to the provincials. \nThere had been one or two threatening demon- \nstrations from neighboring towns, which now \nwere repeated in earnest. On hearing the \nnews from Lexington and Concord, the militia \nof the neighborhood gathered for an attack \non the regulars. But they came too late. \nThe British were embarking at Brant Rock, \nhastened by the signal guns of the Marsh- \nfield men from a neighboring hill. Yet \nthough the regulars got safely away, they \nleft behind them the three hundred muskets \nwith which the Tory militia had drilled, and \nwhich presently formed a part of the equip- \nment of the Whigs before Boston. That \nequipment, while most irregular, was not to \nbe despised. By the 22d a strong army cov- \nered all land approach to Gage, who began to \nconsider himself between two fires. \nj \"The regulars encamped,\" says one British \naccount of the Concord expedition, \"on a \nplace called Bunker's Hill.\" 1 There, under \n\n1 \"Memorial History of Boston,\" iii, 15. \n\n\n22O The Siege of Boston \n\nthe guns of the fleet, the tired troops found \nsafety ; and there, for all that any one can \nsee, it would have been wise of Gage to leave \nthem. With Bunker Hill at his command, \nand with Dorchester Heights once occupied \nby his forces, Boston would be safe from all \nattack by the Americans — and not till then. \n\nBut on the next morning Gage withdrew \nthe troops to Boston. As a matter of fact, \nhe doubted his own strength, and greatly \nexaggerated the power of the rebels, since his \nfirst sensation was a dread lest the town \nshould rise at his back, and his army be \ndestroyed. Of this there was no real chance at \nany time. Yet he drew in his men in order \nto make himself secure, and began with the \nselectmen negotiations looking to his safety. \n\nThere were many in the town who were \neager to leave it, and many outside anxious \nto come in. The governor made the rule \nthat for the purpose of taking out family \neffects but thirty wagons might enter the \ntown at a time. The ruling drew from War- \nren the following very characteristic letter. \n\n\nBoston Beleaguered 221 \n\nCAMBRIDGE, April 20, 1775. \n\nSIR : — The unhappy situation into which this \ncolony is thrown gives the greatest uneasiness to \nevery man who regards the welfare of the em- \npire, or feels for the distresses of his fellow-men : \nbut even now much may be done to alleviate \nthose misfortunes which cannot be entirely \nremedied ; and I think it of the utmost importance \nto us, that our conduct be such as that the con- \ntending parties may entirely rely upon the honor \nand integrity of each other for the punctual per- \nformance of any agreement that shall be made \nbetween them. Your Excellency, I believe, knows \nvery well the part I have taken in public affairs : \nI ever scorned disguise. I think I have done my \nduty : some will think otherwise ; but be assured, \nsir, as far as my influence goes, everything which \ncan reasonably be required of us to do shall be \ndone, and everything promised shall be religiously \nperformed. I should now be very glad to know \nfrom you, sir, how many days you desire may be \nallowed for such as desire to remove to Boston \nwith their effects, and what time you will allow \nthe people in Boston for their removal. When \nI have received that information, I will repair to \ncongress, and hasten, as far as I am able, the \nissuing a proclamation. I beg leave to suggest, \n\n\n222 The Siege of Boston \n\nthat the condition of admitting only thirty \nwagons at a time into the town appears to me to \nbe very inconvenient, and will prevent the good \neffects of a proclamation intended to be issued \nfor encouraging all wagoners to assist in removing \nthe effects from Boston with all possible speed. \nIf Your Excellency will be pleased to take the \nmatter into consideration, and favor me, as soon as \nmay be, with an answer, it will lay me under a great \nobligation, as it so nearly concerns the welfare of my \nfriends in Boston. I have many things which I \nwish to say to Your Excellency, and most sincerely \nwish that I had broken through the formalities \nwhich I thought due to your rank, and freely told \nyou all I knew or thought of public affairs ; and \nI must ever confess, whatever may be the event, \nthat you generously gave me such opening, as \nI now think I ought to have embraced : but \nthe true cause of my not doing it was the \nvileness and treachery of many persons around \nyou, who, I supposed, had gained your entire \nconfidence. \n\nI am, &c., \n\nJOSEPH WARREN. \n\nHis Excellency General Gage.1 \n\n1 Frothingham's \"Warren,\" 467. \n\n\nBoston Beleaguered 223 \n\nIn striking contrast to the manly regret \nexpressed by Warren in this letter is the \nscene enacted that afternoon at Cambridge, \nwhere the Committee of Safety met. Doctor \nBenjamin Church, one of the trusted leaders \nof the Whigs, an orator on the Massacre, and \na pamphleteer, was a member of the com- \nmittee, for which Warren had recently en- \ngaged Paul Revere as messenger. Revere \nwrites, in the letter already quoted : \"I was \nsitting with some, or near all that commit- \ntee, in their room ... in Cambridge. Dr. \nChurch, all at once, started up. 'Dr. War- \nren,' said he, 'I am determined to go \ninto Boston to-morrow.' (It set them all \na-staring.) Dr. Warren replied: 'Are you \nserious, Dr. Church ? They will hang you \nif they catch you in Boston.' He replied: \n'I am serious, and am determined to go \nat all adventures.' After a considerable \nconversation, Dr. Warren said: 'If you are \ndetermined, let us make some business for you.' \nThey agreed that he should go and get medicine \n\nfor their and our wounded officers.\" 1 \n1 Revere's narrative. \n\n\n224 The Siege of Boston \n\nChurch was the first American traitor. \nAlthough possessed of all the Whig secrets, \nhe had for some months, perhaps longer, \nbeen in communication with Gage. His jour- \nney to town was for the purpose of delivering \ninformation, and for some time yet he managed \nto carry on the double role. Nevertheless his \ninformation, put in the hands of Gage, did \nno harm. It throws but one more light upon \nthe incompetence of the general that, with \nsuch information as Church now gave him, he \nblundered so continually. \n\nWe learn from John Andrews' letters of \nthe agreement made between Gage and the \ntown. \"Yesterday,\" he writes on the 24th, \n\"we had town meetings all day, and finally \nconcluded to deliver up all our arms to the \nSelectmen, on condition that the Governor \nwould open the avenues to the town.\" In \nthis agreement the townspeople were advised \nby the Committee of Safety to join. Accord- \ningly, there were delivered to the Selectmen, \nand lodged in Faneuil Hall, \"1778 fire-arms, \n634 pistols, 978 bayonets, and 38 blunder- \n\n\nBoston Beleaguered 225 \n\nbusses.\" 1 These were marked with their \nowners' names, and were later to be restored. \nAs soon as this delivery of arms was effected, \nhundreds applied for passes to leave the \ntown. Andrews must have reflected the feel- \nings of many when he wrote, \"If I can escape \nwith the skin of my teeth, shall be glad.\" \n\nThere were for a few days much hurry \nand bustle, both of egress and of ingress. At \nfirst as many as wished were allowed to go \nout, and the chief difficulty was one of trans- \nportation. It is to be supposed that for a \nwhile the admiral kept to his agreement to \nlend boats to the refugees. There was a very \nconsiderable exodus. \"Near half the inhab- \nitants,\" wrote Andrews on May 6, \"have left \nthe town already, and another quarter, at \nleast, have been waiting for a week past.\" \nAndrews probably exaggerated, yet hundreds \nof the better class went out, and about five \nthousand of the poor. These latter were \nquartered among the different towns at pub- \nlic expense. \n\n. 1 Frothingham's \"Siege,\" 95. \n\n\n226 The Siege of Boston \n\nBut the outflow from Boston was speedily \nchecked. On the 6th Andrews was still in \nBoston, and making up his mind to stay \non account of his property, but still anxious \nto secure a pass for his wife, whose personal \nfears — she was an aesthetic person, an amateur \nartist whose landscapes Lord Percy had ad- \nmired — were greater than her interest in \nher husband's safety. She did safely get \naway, amid the miserable procession that her \nhusband describes. \"You'll see parents that \nare lucky enough to procure papers, with \nbundles in one hand and a string of children \nin another, wandering out of the town (with \nonly a sufferance of one day's permission) not \nknowing where they'll go.\" Andrews' wife \nwent out in a sailing vessel, but whether by \nland or by water she was one of the last to go. \n\nThis was because the Tories interfered in \nthe general removal. It alarmed them to see \nso many leave : these Whigs, and especially \nthose of good social position, were the best \nhostages for the safety of the town from \nassault. So they made vigorous expression of \n\n\nBoston Beleaguered 227 \n\ntheir discontent, and to them Gage yielded. \nThey had already formed military organiza- \ntions for his support, and when they threatened \nto quit the town and seek refuge in Canada \nor London, the threat was too much for him. \nRestrictions were at once put upon the issu- \ning of passes, and in a very short time the \nconditions imposed were so severe that it was \npractically impossible for people of the better \nclass to leave the town. \"There are but very \nfew,\" wrote Abigail Adams, \"who are per- \nmitted to come out in a day; they delay \ngiving passes, make them wait from hour to \nhour, and their counsels are not two hours \ntogether' alike. One day, they shall come \nout with their effects ; the next day, mer- \nchandise is not effects. One day, their house- \nhold furniture is to come out; the next, only \nwearing apparel ; the next, Pharaoh's heart is \nhardened, and he refuseth to hearken to them, \nand will not let the people go.\" 1 Neverthe- \nless the poor were still welcome to depart, \nand from time to time were even sent out in \n\n1 \"Familiar Letters of John and Abigail Adams,\" 54. \n\n\n228 The Siege of Boston \n\norder to relieve Gage of the necessity of feed- \ning them.1 \n\nDuring this period a number of Tories \ncame to Boston. These were the families of \nmen already in the town, or were others who \nfelt that, though until the present their \nhomes had been safe for them, the future was \ntoo doubtful. They hastened to put the \nBritish defences between them and the Whigs. \nAmong them the most notable was Lady \nFrankland of Hopkinton, who once had \nbeen Agnes Surriage, the barefooted serving- \nmaid of the tavern at Marblehead. She now \nwas a widow of nearly fifty, and came down \nfrom Hopkinton only to be detained before \nthe lines, and made the subject of memoranda \nand petitions. The lieutenant who detained \nher person was reprimanded, and by vote of \nthe provincial congress she was permitted to \nenter Boston with \" seven trunks ; all the \n\n1 Lieutenant Barker makes a suggestion that must \nhave been popular among the officers. \"I wonder the \n\nG 1 will allow any of their people to quit the Town \n\ntill they return the Prisoners ; one wou'd think he might \nget 'em if he'd try.\" \n\n\nBoston Beleaguered 229 \n\nbeds with the furniture to them; all the \nboxes and crates ; a basket of chickens, and \na bag of corn ; two barrels and a hamper ; \ntwo horses and two chaises, and all the articles \nin the chaise, excepting arms and ammuni- \ntion ; one phaeton ; some tongues, ham, and \nveal ; and sundry small bundles.\" 1 Evi- \ndently thinking that Lady Frankland's house- \nhold was well enough supplied, the congress \ndid not allow to pass her seven wethers and \ntwo pigs. \n\nThere were others who left their homes, \nthough not to go to Boston. Of these Judge \nCurwen of Salem is a type. He was con- \nsidered — unjustly, he protests — as a Tory, \nand finding his neighbors daily becoming \n\"more and more soured and malevolent \nagainst moderate men,\" he left Massachu- \nsetts. In this case it was the wife who re- \nmained behind, \"her apprehensions of danger \nfrom an incensed soldiery, a people licentious \nand enthusiastically mad and broken loose \nfrom all the restraints of law and religion, \n\n1 \"Memorial History of Boston,\" iii, 77. \n\n\n230 The Siege of Boston \n\nbeing less terrible to her than a short passage \non the ocean.\" 1 Curwen went to Philadel- \nphia, but finding the situation the same, \nproceeded to London and there lived out the \nwar. Many others, like him, repaired to the \ncapital, and formed a miserable colony, living \non hope, watching the news from home, \npensioned or grudgingly maintained by the \ngovernment, and sadly feeling themselves \nstrangers in a strange land. \n\nWithout doubt the times were very hard \nfor men who, like Judge Curwen, wished \nto take no side, but to live at peace with all \nmen. Of such men there was a very large \nclass, so large in fact that more than one \nTory sympathizer has claimed that the Revo- \nlution was fought by a minority of the people \nof the colonies, who were so virulent as to \nforce the moderates into their ranks from \ndread of personal consequences. Such a claim \nis weak upon its very face, and will not \nbear examination. Most of the moderates \nwere but waiting to see how the cat would \n\n1 Curwen's \"Journal,\" 25. \n\n\nBoston Beleaguered 231 \n\njump, and when once a preponderance of \nsentiment showed they speedily took sides. \nHad there been in the colonies a majority \ndesirous of a return to allegiance, the Whig \ncause surely could not have survived the dark \ndays of the war. We can safely conclude \nthe majority to have been in favor of the \nrights of the colonies, always understanding \nthat they desired nothing more than they \nhad always had since the accession of George \nthe Third. A man of such a type is clearly \nseen in John Andrews, with his occasional \nfits of depression and doubt, and his impatient \nexclamations against the radicals among the \nWhigs. Note, for instance, what he says \non the death of William Molineux, one of the \nprominent Boston Whigs, whose death was \na loss to the cause. \"If he was too rash,\" \nremarked Andrews, \"and drove matters to \nan imprudent pitch, it was owing to his \nnatural temper; as when he was in business, \nhe pursued it with the same impetuous zeal. \nHis loss is not much regretted by the more \nprudent and judicious part of the community.\" \n\n\n232 The Siege of Boston \n\nYet though Andrews could thus express \nhimself, he could again speak quite otherwise, \nas the remarks quoted in this book have \nalready shown. He doubted at times, and \nwas petulant against the fortune that brought \nhim discomfort and loss, but in the main he \nwas stanch. Andrews was, then, a type of \nthe moderate who threw in his lot with his \ncountry. Judge Curwen, on the other hand, \nwas one of the smaller class which, in doubt \nand despair, withdrew to the protection of \nthe crown. Many of them were too old to \nfight ; many had not the heart to lift their \nhands against their neighbors. Every country \nsees such men at every war. Often they \nmay live peaceably, anguished with doubt, \nand distressed for humanity. But in a civil \nwar there is seldom a refuge for them. It \nwas certainly so at the Revolution. A very \nfew among the Tories, venerated by their \nneighbors, might remain neutral ; the re- \nmainder must take sides, or go. The fight- \ning men felt that those who were not with \nthem were against them, and among the stay- \n\n\nBoston Beleaguered 233 \n\nat-home Whigs were plenty who were willing \nto express the feeling. Hence the reproaches \nand menaces which drove Judge Curwen \nfrom his home, and hence the doubtful looks \nin Philadelphia which made him \"fearful \nwhether, like Cain, I had not a discouraging \nmark upon me, or a strong feature of toryism.\" \nCurwen crossed the water, and other mod- \nerates slipped into Boston, to find themselves \nas unhappy within the town as they had \nbeen outside, in spite of the strength which \nGage was slowly gaining. \n\nThis strength was, so far, purely defensive. \nGage did not consider himself ready to take \nthe offensive. Those Tories who came to town \ninformed him of the numbers outside, and \nhe saw very plainly the result of sending an \nexpedition against a militia which would \nmelt before the head of his column, only to \nattack it in flank and rear. So no action \nwas considered, especially as the rebels offered, \nso far, nothing to strike at. Gage made him- \nself as strong as he could, and waited rein- \nforcements. \n\n\n234 The Siege of Boston \n\nHis strength was partly, as we have seen, \nin the organization of the Tories. Their \nmen began at once to form themselves in \ncompanies, under the general leadership of \nTimothy Ruggles, who had long been a politi- \ncal tower of strength, and was now assuming \nmilitary importance. The new volunteer com- \npanies were, as we have seen, of such value \nto Gage that they were able to make him \nbreak his promise to let the townspeople leave \nBoston. Yet so far as is known they did noth- \ning more in the siege than to parade and mount \nguard. \n\nGage's chief attention was directed to for- \ntifying. His situation was easily defensible \nat certain points, and of them he first made \nsure. At the south, across the passage to \nRoxbury, were the \"lines\" of which all con- \ntemporary accounts speak. These Gage \nstrengthened until by the 4th of May Lieu- \ntenant Barker records that the works were \nalmost ready for ten twenty-four-pounders. \nFrom the Neck the western line of the penin- \nsula of Boston ran in a general northerly \n\n\nBoston Beleaguered \n\n\n23S \n\n\nPLAN OF THE SIEGE \n\n\n236 The Siege of Boston \n\ndirection for about a mile and a half ; it then \nran east for nearly a mile ; then turning south, \nit finally swept inward to the Neck. The out- \nline had three projections, each caused by a \nhill : Barton's Point at the northwest ; Copp's \nHill at the northeast; and Fort Hill on the \nmiddle of the eastern side. Each of these was \nfortified as soon as possible. The four points \nwere Gage's main defences. \n\nWhen these forts were finished, the town \nwas by no means secure. The forts com- \nmanded most of the northerly and easterly \nsides, of which the war-ships commanded \nthe remainder ; but the whole western side \nof the town, along the Common and the foot \nof Beacon Hill, was open to attack. This \nwas, roughly speaking, along the line of the \npresent Charles Street, prolonged into Tre- \nmont Street. The Back Bay beyond this \nwater-line was so shallow that no war-ship \ncould anchor there ; a night attack, delivered \nin boats, might surprise the soldiers on the \nCommon in their barracks or their tents. \nIn order to command the western shore, \n\n\nBoston Beleaguered 237 \n\nand also to quell a possible rising in the town, \nGage erected a \"small work\" on Beacon Hill. \nLater in the siege every one of these points \nwas strengthened ; a low hill, near the present \nLouisburg Square, was protected; and re- \ndoubts were thrown up to defend the shore- \nline of the Common. But the four main \nworks, and the Beacon Hill fort, were all \nthat Gage was able to accomplish before \nBunker Hill battle. He managed, however, \nto put his army under strict military disci- \npline, which before the I9th of April he had \nnot imposed on them. \n\nFrom letters and diaries we get glimpses \nof the situation of the troops. They were \nshort of fresh provision, disgusted with their \nsituation, and at times not a little alarmed. \nWhat other unexpected qualities the Yankees \nmight show no one could predict. They \nwere still, however, regarded as low in the \nscale of humanity. On the fifth of May \nLieutenant Barker records the discovery of \na \"most shocking\" plot. \"It was a scheme \nto cut off all the officers of the Garrison. \n\n\n238 The Siege of Boston \n\nUpon the 24th, the day we were to keep St. \nGeorge's day, the Rebels were to make a \nfeint Attack at night upon the Lines : a num- \nber of men were to be posted at the Lodgings \nof all the Officers, and upon the Alarm Guns \nfiring they were to put the Officers to death \nas they were coming out of their houses to \ngo to their Barracks. What a set of Villains \nmust they be to think of such a thing ! but \nthere is nothing be it ever so bad that these \npeople will stick at to gain their ends.\" The \nhorrified lieutenant ascribes to this dis- \ncovery the fact that Gage ordered the officers \nto sleep at barracks. It is, however, more \nlikely that the general paid no attention to \nthe tale, but thought it time for officers and \nmen to be together. \n\nOnce more the army was shocked. A fire \nbroke out near property owned by Hancock, \nand in putting out the blaze there was dis- \ncovered a chest of bullets \"in Hancock's \nstore.\" The news spread rapidly, and was \nregarded as another proof of the desperate \nnature of the Whigs. \n\n\nBoston Beleaguered 239 \n\nSo the army, uncomfortable and uneasy, \nlooked for its reinforcements, which before \nlong began to come in. Troop-ships arrived, \nbut the most welcome was the Cerberus, with \nthe three major-generals. The relief of the \ngarrison found expression in waggery ; they \ncalled the generals the three bow-wows, and \ncirculated the doggerel : — \n\n\"Behold the Cerberus the Atlantic plow, \nHer precious cargo Burgoyne, Clinton, Howe, \nBow wow wow ! \" \n\nBurgoyne at this time made a special nick- \nname for himself. Hailing a ship as they \nentered the harbor, the generals learned that \nthe army was shut up by the provincials. \n\"What!\" cried Burgoyne. \"Ten thousand \npeasants keep five thousand king's troops shut \nup ! Well, let us get in, and we'll soon find \nelbow-room!\"1 And Elbow-room was Bur- \ngoyne's name for a long time thereafter. \n\nYet the three new generals for a while did \nnothing. Lieutenant Barker regretfully re- \n\n1 Current newspapers, quoted in Frothingham's \n\"Siege,\" 114. \n\n\n240 The Siege of Boston \n\ncords : \"Tho' we have new Generals come \nout, yet they have brought no more authority \nthan we had before, which was none at all.\" \nIt is safe to assume that on learning the \nquality of the \"peasants,\" Burgoyne was not \nanxious to attack them with an inferior force. \nThe British therefore continued to await \nreinforcements. \n\nFrom Burgoyne's voluminous correspond- \nence we learn his state of mind. He had come \nto the country unwillingly : \" I received your \nMajesty's commands for America with regret,\" \nhe wrote in his letter to the king, and else- \nwhere records that the event was one of the \nmost disagreeable in his life. Nevertheless, \nonce enlisted in the campaign, he had thrown \nhimself into it. Perceiving in advance how \nlittle, as junior major-general, he would have \nto do, he endeavored to have himself trans- \nferred to the post at New York, where he \nrightly perceived that there was much to be \ndone. He was in favor of attempting con- \nciliation. Had that post at this time been \noccupied by Burgoyne, his quick wit, true \n\n\nBoston Beleaguered 241 \n\nsympathies with the Americans, and real \nabilities might have made for him a different \nname in the history of America. But his \nattempt failed, and now, almost inactive in \nhis post at Boston, he was studying the situa- \ntion, probing the weakness of Gage and learn- \ning the difficulties of his position. Gage had \nlittle money for secret service, it is true, and \nthe provincials were stubborn foes whose true \nmeasure Burgoyne had not yet taken,1 but \nhe saw how poorly Gage had provided against \nthe calamities which had come upon him. \nBurgoyne doubted the outcome, and fretted \nat the situation. \n\nIn the meanwhile the rebels had been work- \ning to make that situation worse. Their \nfirst need was to get some semblance of order \namong the troops. At the head of the Massa- \nchusetts army was Artemas Ward, a veteran \nof the French wars, no longer vigorous, and \n\n1 \"There was hardly a leading man among the \nrebels, in council, or in the field, but at a proper \ntime, and by proper management, might have been \nbought.\" — BURGOYNE to Lord Rochfort, June, 1775. \nFonblanque's \" Burgoyne,\" 149-1 50. \n\n\n242 The Siege of Boston \n\nnever used to independent command. He \ndrew his authority from the Provincial Con- \ngress of Massachusetts, which now hastily \ncame together, and communicated with Ward \nchiefly through the Committee of Safety, of \none of whose meetings we have already had a \nglimpse. The active head of the committee \nwas Warren, who kept in close touch with \nWard. \n\nOrganization proceeded slowly, complicated \nby the fact that the other provinces main- \ntained separate armies. The names of some \nof the commanders are still familiar. Put- \nnam and Spencer were the heads of the Con- \nnecticut troops ; John Stark was prominent \namong the New Hampshire men ; while to \ncommand the Rhode Islanders came Na- \nthanael Greene. With praiseworthy suppres- \nsion of provincial jealousies the commanders \nspeedily agreed to subordinate themselves to \nWard, as the oldest among them, and the \nhead of the largest body of troops. He was \nregarded as commander-in-chief, and his \norders were to be observed by all. Yet the \n\n\nBoston Beleaguered 243 \n\nmeans to communicate orders and to receive \nreports were long lacking. The combined \narmies were far from being a unit, and if \nattacked could resist little better than on \nthe I9th, as scattered bands, and not as a \nwhole. \n\nThe very size of the army was uncertain. \nOn paper there were more than twenty thou- \nsand men ; as a matter of fact there can \nseldom have been more than four-fifths of \nthat number. Of the actual total Massa- \nchusetts provided 11,500, Connecticut 2300, \nNew Hampshire 1200, Rhode Island looo.1 \nFurther, in its variable size this was the very \ntype of a volunteer army, of which every \nman owned his equipment, clothed himself, \nand considered himself still, to a large ex- \ntent, his own master. Of the thousands living \nwithin twenty-five miles of Boston, who \nsprang to arms on the iQth, knowing that if \nthey were quick they might strike the Brit- \nish before night, few had the foresight to \nprepare themselves properly for the cam- \n\n1 Frothingham's \"Siege,\" 101. \n\n\n244 The Siege of Boston \n\npaign that was to follow. There were no com- \nmissary stores to supply them. Their affairs \nat home they left just where they stood. In \nthe next few days many of these men went \nhome, for the necessary arrangement of their \naffairs and for more clothing. The larger \nnumber of them returned to camp imme- \ndiately, some were slower, and yet others \nstayed for a longer time. Even those who \njoined the army after more preparation often \nhad business that called them home, in which \ncase they considered it a hardship to be \ndenied. The officers sympathized, especially \nwhen that business was haying. Cases oc- \ncurred in which the men on furlough were \nmaking their officers' hay, while at the same \ntime drawing the pay of the province. The \nposition of the general commanding such \ntroops was not to be envied. \n\nFurther, military supplies were very few. \nIn spite of the preparations of the provincial \ncongress, there were on hand only sixty- \neight half-barrels of powder, a scanty stock \nwith which to begin the siege of a military \n\n\nBoston Beleaguered H& Ontario \n\n\ngarrison. Of cannon a varying number is \nreported, few of them as yet of value, for \nlack of shot to fit them. It was doubtless a \ngreat relief to Ward that he was not called \nupon to use his cannon, since they would \nhave drawn too heavily upon his scanty \nsupply of ammunition, which could be re- \nplaced but slowly. \n\nAltogether, the position of senior major- \ngeneral was a difficult one. To knit into an \narmy such a mass of units, to create supplies \nout of nothing, to organize a commissary and \nmeans of communication, and maintain a firm \nfront over a line of ten miles, these were the \nneeds of the situation. We need scarcely \nmarvel that Ward, old and enfeebled, with \nhis hands tied by uncertain authority, could \nnot meet them. A genius was needed in his \nplace, and the good fortune was that the \ngenius eventually came. In the meanwhile \nWard, pottering at his task, depended much \non the initiative of his subordinates. The \npassage from the Neck to Roxbury was now \nguarded by Brigadier-General John Thomas \n\n\n246 The Siege of Boston \n\nof Marshfield,1 who to deceive the enemy as \nto his numbers occasionally marched his force \nof seven hundred round and round a hill. \nThe ruse was successful, for Lieutenant Bar- \nker wrote that \"at Roxbury there must be \nbetween 2 and 3000.\" Nevertheless, it is \nhard to believe that so important a post \nwas long left so slightly guarded. Thomas \nexercised his men with equal profit in cutting \ndown trees to obstruct the passage, and in \nthrowing up earthworks. Of other entrench- \nments, at this stage, we hear little. Putnam \nwanted to fortify Prospect Hill, commanding \nthe passage from Charlestown Neck, but could \nnot get permission. Yet the whole country \nabout Boston was dotted with low hills, on \nwhich might easily be made a chain of forti- \nfications. \n\nBesides such work as Thomas's, for a \n\n1 \"And yet to-day, if you should ask ten Boston men, \n'Who was Artemas Ward ?' nine would say he was an \namusing showman. If you asked 'Who was John \nThomas ?' nine would say he was a flunky commemo- \nrated by Thackeray.\" — E. E. HALE, \"Memorial History \nof Boston,\" iii, 100. \n\n\nBoston Beleaguered 247 \n\nmonth little was done. To be sure, early in \nMay a party of provincials, gathered in Con- \nnecticut and Vermont, and headed by Ethan \nAllen and Benedict Arnold, took Ticonderoga \nby surprise, and gained for America a fine \nsupply of cannon. We shall later see what \nwas done with this artillery, but there was no \npresent means of transporting it to Boston, \nand no powder for its use, and so there was \nno profit to the country save in encourage- \nment. Until the 2ist of May nothing hap- \npened near Boston save small skirmishes, and \nbrushes of outposts. Here and there a float- \ning battery of the British warped up near \nland and fired a few shots, and occasionally a \nsquad of riflemen did a little pot-hunting on \nits own account. These skirmishes, except \nas they accustomed the provincials to the \nsmell of powder, had no effect on the situa- \ntion, until at last the opposing sides found \nthat they had something worth contending \nfor. \n\nGage had in Boston no supply of fresh \nmeat, but plenty of horses needing hay. It \n\n\n248 The Siege of Boston \n\noccurred to him, finally, that the islands iri \nthe harbor were plentifully stocked with sheep \nand cattle, and besides grew plenty of grass. \nHe sent, therefore, on the 2ist of May, a \nparty to bring hay from Grape Island, near \nWeymouth. The Americans took the alarm, \nsoldiers were sent from the camp, the militia \nwho were at home turned out, and much \nlong-range shooting was indulged in. \"It \nwas impossible to reach them, for want of \nboats,\" wrote Abigail Adams, \"but the sight \nof so many persons, and the firing at them, \nprevented their getting more than three tons \nof hay, though they carted much more down \nto the water. At last a lighter was mustered, \nand a sloop from Hingham, which had six \nport holes. Our men eagerly jumped on \nboard, and put off for the island. As soon as \nthey perceived it, they decamped. Our people \nlanded upon the island, and in an instant set \nfire to the hay, which, with the barn, was soon \nconsumed, — about eighty tons, it is said.\" \n\nEmboldened by this success, the provin- \ncials began to take steps to remove from the \n\n\nBoston Beleaguered 249 \n\nislands the whole stock of cattle, sheep, and \nhay. Though, on the 25th of May, the gar- \nrison of Boston was largely reinforced and \nships were added to the squadron, the Ameri- \ncans began work boldly with the islands \nnearest at hand. Noddle's Island, now East \nBoston, stretched within easy cannon shot of \nthe town ; it was reached from Hog Island \nby means of a couple of fords, passable at \nlow tide. In broad day, on the 27th, the \nAmericans occupied the islands, and were \npromptly assailed by the British in a schooner \nand a sloop. The skirmish grew very obsti- \nnate, but the schooner was left by the fleet to \nfight it out by her own means and those of her \nsmaller consort. As a result, when she ran \naground she was seized, stripped, and burned. \nOn this day the Americans drove off the \nstock on Hog Island, which, with their cap- \nture of the schooner, was considered a great \nachievement. Three days later the stock \nwas driven from Noddle's Island : \"a trifling \nproperty,\" says Lieutenant Barker, \"which \nwe have no connexion with.\" This non- \n\n\n250 The Siege of Boston \n\nchalant dismissal of five hundred sheep and \nlambs 1 scarcely comes well from one who had \nrecently recorded that his mess had \"luckily \ngot a Sheep.\" Within a week other large \nislands, which the army and the fleet might \nnaturally have regarded as their own store- \nhouses, were stripped of livestock and hay. \nBy these means the Americans were made \nstill more used to war, and according to con- \ntemporary accounts acted boldly, running \nconsiderable risks. The total of stock saved \nby this means was about twenty-two hundred, \nand the loss of life trifling. \n\nBut the time was coming for more serious \nwork. Gage felt his courage rise with his \nstrength, and with his major-generals to back \nhim he planned action. But first he had to \nfulminate. Much irritation had been caused \nby mock proclamations mysteriously appear- \ning on the walls of the residences of the new \ngenerals, and Gage now determined to issue \none in earnest. He called Burgoyne to his \naid, and the literary general drafted a master- \n\n1 Frothingham's \"Siege,\" no. \n\n\nBoston Beleaguered 251 \n\npiece. It was published on the I2th of \nJune. \n\nBeginning \"Whereas the infatuated multi- \ntudes,\" it proceeded in pompous style to the \nstatement that the rebels were adding \"insult \nto outrage,\" for \"with a preposterous parade of \nmilitary arrangement, they affected to hold the \narmy besieged.\" Gage offered to pardon all \nwho would lay down their arms, except Samuel \nAdams and John Hancock, \"whose offences \nare of too flagitious a nature\" for forgiveness. \n\nThe bombastic proclamation delighted the \nTories, who hoped for results from it. But \nit deeply angered the Americans. \"All the \nrecords of time,\" wrote Abigail Adams,1 \n\"cannot produce a blacker page. Satan, \nwhen driven from the regions of bliss, ex- \nhibited not more malice. Surely the father \nof lies is superseded.\" The provincial con- \ngress prepared a counter proclamation, which \nsimilarly offered annesty to all on the other \nside, \"excepting only . . . Thomas Gage, \nSamuel Graves, those counsellors who were \n\n1 Adams Letters, p. 64. \n\n\n252 The Siege of Boston \n\nappointed by Mandamus and have not \nsignified their resignation, Jonathan Sewall, \nCharles Paxton, Benjamin Hallowell,1 and \nall the natives of America who went out with \nthe British troops on the I9th of April.\" \nWe get from this an interesting glimpse of \nthose who most excited American resentment, \nbut the proclamation was never issued. More \nexciting events occurred to prevent it. \n\nGage was planning to make himself secure \nin Boston. Even he could not fail to see \nthat the heights of Charlestown and of Dor- \nchester threatened his army. Now that his \nthree major-generals had come, and that \nhis reinforcements were arriving (the troop- \nships, said Lieutenant Barker, were \"con- \ntinually dropping in \"), he felt strong enough \nto take and hold the dangerous posts. His \nplan was first to seize Dorchester Heights, and \nfor the action was set a date — the night of \nthe eighteenth of June. But Gage's counsel \n\n1 Graves was the admiral, Sewall the attorney- \ngeneral, and Paxton and Hallowell were commissioners \nof customs. \n\n\nBoston Beleaguered 253 \n\nwas never well kept. While Burgoyne com- \nplained that the British \"are ignorant not \nonly of what passes in Congress, but want \nspies for the hill half a mile off,\" the Ameri- \ncans were in no such embarrassment. They \nhad spies at every corner, and — we may \nsuppose — listeners at many a door. Gage \nhad already arrested men supposed to have \nbeen signalling from steeples. We do not \nknow how the news got through on this \noccasion ; at any rate the Americans were \ninformed as early as the 13th.1 \n\nThe chiefs of the provincial army felt that \nthey were called upon to act. In the seven \nweeks of the siege they had to some degree \ntested the mettle of their men, and now be- \nlieved they could be depended on to keep \ntogether against an attack. The troops had, \non one occasion, made an expedition to \nCharlestown, which lay practically deserted on \nits peninsula, as if conscious of the fate which \nwas to overtake it. On the I3th of May, \nPutnam, to give his men confidence, marched \n\n1 Frothingham's \"Siege,\" 116. \n\n\n254 The Siege of Boston \n\nhis command, some twenty-two hundred men, \ninto the town, over Bunker and Breed's Hills, \nwhere some of them were soon to lay down \ntheir lives, along the water-front close by the \nBritish shipping, and out of the town once \nmore. \"It was,\" wrote Lieutenant Barker, \n\"expected the Body at Charles Town wou'd \nhave fired on the Somerset, at least it was \nwished for, as she had everything ready for \nAction, and must have destroyed great num- \nbers of them, besides putting the Town in \nAshes.\" But no powder was burned. \nI Now it was destined that Charlestown \nshould smell powder enough. On learning \nthe news of Gage's projected move, the \nCommittee of Safety called for an accounting \nof the condition and supplies of the various \nregiments, advised an increase in the army, \nrecommended that all persons go armed, \neven to church, and finally on the 1 5th of \nJune took the decisive step of advising the \nseizure of Bunker Hill. \"And as the par- \nticular situation of Dorchester Neck is un- \nknown to this Committee, they advise that \n\n\nBoston Beleaguered 255 \n\nthe council of war take and pursue such \nsteps respecting the same, as to them shall \nappear to be for the security of this colony.\" \nThus inadequate was still the American \nmilitary organization : Ward was too old and \ntoo weak to assume actual leadership, and \nwe find two consultative bodies advising each \nother, with no responsible head. Up to this \ntime the Massachusetts congress had hoped \nthat the second Continental Congress, now \nin session in Philadelphia, would adopt the \narmy as its own and send it a general ; but so \nfar no answer had come to their requests. \nNevertheless, even with this deficient or- \nganization something was effected. A de- \ntachment was made up, consisting on paper \nof fifteen hundred men, but in fact of about \ntwelve hundred. These were placed under \nthe command of Colonel William Prescott of \nPepperell, a veteran of Louisburg and an ex- \ncellent soldier. Assembling on Cambridge \nCommon on the night of the i6th, \"after \nprayer by President Langdon, they marched \nto Bunker Hill.\" 1 \n\n1 Inscription in Cambridge. \n\n\nCHAPTER X \n\nTHE BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL \n\nTHE strategy of Bunker Hill battle has \nbeen criticised as often as the battle \nhas been described. We have already \nseen that the choice of Charlestown instead \nof Dorchester was owing to ignorance, on \nthe part of the Committee of Safety, of the \nadvantages of the latter. From Dorchester \nHeights the town could equally well have \nbeen threatened, the shipping more effec- \ntively annoyed, reinforcements more safely \nsummoned, and retreat much better secured. \nNevertheless, since at this stage the British \nmight have taken any fortification, it is for- \ntunate that the Americans chose as they \ndid, and left Dorchester for a later attempt. \nPrescott's party of twelve hundred marched \nin silence to Charlestown, and on the lower \nslope of Bunker Hill the men rested for some \n\n256 \n\n\nThe Battle of Bunker Hill 257 \n\ntime while the officers discussed the situation. \nOn the ground were Prescott, Putnam, and \n\"another general,\"1 with Colonel Richard \nGridley, the chief engineer. Their discussion \nwas as to the proper point to fortify. \n\nThe peninsula of Charlestown, as has al- \nready been said, stretched toward Boston \nfrom the northwest. The approach to it \nwas by a narrow neck of land, on one side of \nwhich, the northeast, ran the Mystic River; \nwhile on the southwesterly side was an inlet \nfrom the Charles. The town, a settlement \nof several houses, was on the bulge of the \npeninsula nearest Boston ; but along the \nMystic rose a series of three hills, from the \nlowest at Morton's or Moulton's Point, to \nthe highest at Bunker Hill. Morton's Hill \nwas 35 feet high, Breed's, in the centre, was 75 \nfeet, and Bunker's was no. The question \narose, should Bunker Hill be fortified, as in \nthe orders, or Breed's, which was nearer \nBoston and the shipping ? \n\nMuch time was spent in the discussion. \n\n1 Frothingham's \" Siege,\" 123. \n\n\n258 The Siege of Boston \n\nBunker Hill was higher and the safer, and com- \nmanded most landing points ; but Breed's Hill \nseemed better suited to the eager spirits of the \nofficers. When at last Gridley reminded that \ntime was passing, the question seems to have \nbeen decided by the urgency of the unknown \ngeneral, and a redoubt was laid out by the \nengineer on the summit of Breed's Hill. \nIn the bright moonlight Prescott at once \nset his men at work digging, endeavoring to \nraise a good protection before morning. \n\nIn this he was successful. His men were \nall farmers, used to the shovel and pick; \nthe earth was soft and scarcely stony; and \nthere was no interruption. Cheered from \ntime to time by the cry of the sentry on the \nnearer ship, \" All's Well ! \" they pushed on \nthe work. When at daybreak the redoubt was \nseen, the British could scarcely believe their \neyes, for a completed fort seemed to stand \nthere. \n\nAnd now was a chance for a display of \nmilitary science on the part of Gage and \nhis three major-generals. There stood the \n\n\nThe Battle of Bunker Hill 259 \n\nlittle low redoubt, unflanked and unsupported \nby any other fortifications, easily cut off \nfrom its own line of relief or retreat. If \nnow Gage had promptly seized the isthmus, \ndrawn his ships up close, and dragged a bat- \ntery to the top of Bunker Hill, the Ameri- \ncan force could very soon have been driven \nto surrender. Ruggles, the Tory brigadier, is \nknown to have advised this, and there were \nsome among the British leaders who urged \nit. The general feeling, however, seems to \nhave been that it would be unmanly to \ncatch the Americans in the trap which they \nhad laid for themselves. In a hasty council \nof war it was decided to assault the redoubt \nin the good old British fashion of marching \nup to its face. Gage was in no hurry even \nfor this. Contenting himself with ordering \nthe shipping and the Boston batteries to fire \nupon the little fort, he gave the Americans \nevery chance to complete their defences, \nwhile leaving the way open for reinforce- \nments. In a leisurely way he set about \npreparing an expedition to cross Charlestown \n\n\n260 The Siege of Boston \n\nferry. The men were mustered, and equipped \nas for a march. \n\nHowe was to take charge of the assault, \nand Burgoyne and Clinton to direct the Bos- \nton batteries. The fleet joined in the fire. \nFrom Copp's Hill, from Barton's Point, \nfrom five ships of war, and from a couple of \nfloating batteries, such a storm of round- \nshot was poured upon the redoubt that its \ndefenders were amazed, and on the death \nof a comrade were ready to stop work. But \nPrescott, coolly insisting — against the pro- \ntest of a horrified chaplain — that the body be \nimmediately buried, took his stand upon the \nparapet, and from there directed the finish- \ning of the redoubt. \n\nIn this position he was seen from Boston. \nGage, handing his field-glasses to a Tory who \nstood near him, asked if he recognized the rebel. \nThe Tory was Willard of Lancaster, a man- \ndamus councillor, who well knew Prescott's \ndeclared intention never to be taken alive. \n\n\"He is my brother-in-law,\" he replied. \n\n\"Will he fight?\" asked Gage. \n\n\nThe Battle of Bunker Hill 261 \n\n\"I cannot answer for his men,\" said Wil- \nlard; \" but Prescott will fight you to the gates \nof hell!\"1 \n\nAt the redoubt one of Prescott's aids fol- \nlowed his example, and walking back and \nforth on the parapet the two gave courage \nto their men. These fell to and completed \nthe work. The rampart was raised to a con- \nsiderable height, platforms of earth or wood \nwere made inside for the defenders, and at \nabout eleven o'clock the men stacked their \ntools and were ready. \n\nThe redoubt, when thus finished, was \nroughly square, about \"eight rods on the \nlongest side,\" which had a single angle pro- \njecting toward the south. Running north- \nwards from the northeast corner Prescott had \nmade a breastwork of perhaps two hundred \nfeet,2 to prevent flanking. It stretched toward \nthe Mystic River, but fell short by more than \na hundred yards. \n\n1 Frothingham's \"Siege,\" 126, and Sabine's \"Loyal- \nists,\" 707. \n\n2 Reports vary from eighty to three hundred feet. \n\n\n262 The Siege of Boston \n\nCooped up in this little fort, inadequately \nprotected against flanking, with shot con- \ntinually striking on the sides of the redoubt, \nPrescott's men waited. They had worked all \nnight and most of the morning, had little food \nand water, saw as yet nothing of the relief \nthat had been promised them, and could tell \nby the fever of activity visible in Boston's \nstreets that the red coats soon would come \nagainst them. There is no wonder that \nwhen Putnam rode up and asked for the en- \ntrenching tools (proposing, with the best of \nmilitary good sense, to make a supporting \nredoubt on Bunker Hill), many of Prescott's \nmen were glad of the excuse to remove them- \nselves from so dangerous a neighborhood. Of \nthose who carried back the tools, few returned. \n\nBut Prescott's remainder was stanch. The \nmen were already veterans, having endured \nthe work and the cannonade. Waiting in the \nfort, some of them could appreciate the marvel \nof the scene : a great stretch of intermingled \nland and water, the shipping spread below, \nclose at hand the town of Charlestown, and \n\n\nThe Battle of Bunker Hill 263 \n\nacross the narrow river the larger town of \nBoston, with its heights and house-tops \nalready crowded by non-combatants, viewing \nthe field that was prepared for the slaughter. \nIt was all in bright and warm weather, under \na cloudless sky. Since the world began, there \nhad been few battle-fields so spectacularly \nlaid out. \n\nAt last the bustle in Boston's streets pro- \nduced results. From the wharves pushed \nout into the placid water the boats of the \nfleet, loaded to the gunwales with soldiers in \nfull equipment. As they neared the Charles- \ntown shore, the fire upon the redoubt was \ndoubled, and under its cover the troops \nlanded upon Moulton's Point. There Howe \nat first deployed them, but after inspecting \nthe ground sent back for reinforcements. \nFor the men in the redoubt there were two \nmore hours of waiting. \n\nThose two hours very nearly decided the \nfate of the struggle, for had Howe moved \nimmediately to the assault there could have \nbeen no such resistance offered him as later \n\n\n264 The Siege of Boston \n\nhe met. Prescott decided to send to Cam- \nbridge for reinforcements ; but such was the \nconfusion that the messenger could get no \nhorse, and had to walk the six miles to \nheadquarters. There he was ill received, for \nWard, who during the whole day did not \nleave his house, feared an attack on Cam- \nbridge, dreaded to deplete his supply of pow- \nder, and only upon repeated representations \nordered a couple of regiments in support of \nPrescott. These regiments had to draw their \npowder and make up their cartridges, and \narrived when the battle was just about to \nbegin. \n\nThe student of this day finds it difficult to \ndisentangle the varied accounts. Who was \non the field and who was not, what part was \ntaken by each, who was in command at this \npoint and who there, and the total of men \nengaged, all either were or still are disputed \npoints. It seems to be beyond doubt, how- \never, that Prescott from the first was in com- \nmand at the redoubt, and that Putnam as- \nsumed, and tried to execute, general oversight \n\n\nThe Battle of Bunker Hill 265 \n\nof the field of contest outside the redoubt and \nbeyond the breastwork. \n\nWhile Howe's troops lunched quietly at \nMoulton's Point, the aspect of affairs for the \nAmericans became brighter. Prescott, seeing \nthat he must have better protection toward \nthe Mystic River, ordered a detachment of \nConnecticut troops, under Captain Knowlton, \nand with them six field-pieces — which seem \nto have figured not at all in the result — to \n\"go and oppose\" the enemy. Avoiding a \nmarshy spot of ground, Knowlton chose a \nposition some two hundred yards to the rear \nof the redoubt and its breastwork. Here \nwas a fence, the lower part of stone, the \nupper of rails. The men brought forward \nfrom the rear another rail fence, leaned it \nagainst the first, and wove in between the \nrails hay which they found recently cut upon \nthe ground. This, the \"rail fence\" men- \ntioned in all accounts of the battle, was their \nsole protection. \n\nNow began slowly to come across the \nisthmus the first of the reinforcements that \n\n\n266 The Siege of Boston \n\nstrengthened the hands of the provincials. \nThey came partly as individuals, of whom \nthe most noted was Warren, who but the \nday before had been appointed general by the \nprovincial congress. He came as a volun- \nteer, knew his risk, and was prepared to die. \n[ Curiously James Otis, it is said, was also \namong the defenders of the redoubt, coming, \nlike Warren, as a volunteer. It was a strange \nfate which sent him safely home, to live, still \nwrecked in intellect and useless to his coun- \ntry, while Warren was to fall. \n\nBy this time a lively hail of shot and shell \nwas falling on Charlestown Neck, and to \ncross it was a test of courage. Seth Pomeroy, \nbrigadier-general, veteran of Louisburg, came \non a borrowed horse, and, sending back the \nanimal, crossed on foot. Others, alone, in \ngroups, or in semi-military formation, fol- \nlowed him, to be directed by Putnam to the \nrail fence, which needed defenders. At last \ncame one who needed no directions — Stark, \nat the head of his New Hampshire regiment. \nAlthough requested to hurry his men across \n\n\nThe Battle of Bunker Hill 267 \n\nthe Neek, Stark replied, \"One fresh man in \naction is worth ten fatigued ones,\" * and \nwould not change his step. Marching down \nthe slope of Bunker Hill, he quickly noted \nthat between the rail fence and the water the \nbeach was unguarded. \"I saw there,\" he \nsaid afterward, \"the way so plain that the \nenemy could not miss it.\" 2 Before the \nattack could begin, Stark's men threw up a \nrude breastwork of cobbles behind which \nthey could find a little shelter. — And now \nat last the American defences were completed, \njust as the troops were in motion to attack \nthem. \n\nAt this point Howe neglected a method of \nattack which would have made his victory \nimmediate. The rail fence, and Stark's de- \nfence upon the beach, were open to attack \nfrom the river. We have seen that two float- \ning batteries (\"large flat boats,\" says Lieu- \ntenant Barker, \"sides raised and musquet \n\n1 Dearborn's account of the battle, Historical Maga- \nzine for 1864. \n\n2 Bancroft, v, 612. \n\n\n268 The Siege of Boston \n\nproof\") were used to bombard the redoubt. \nThese, like the shipping and the Boston bat- \nteries, did no good whatever. But placed \nin the Mystic in the proper position, they \ncould have raked the rail fence. \"Had these \nboats been with us,\" says our lieutenant, \n\". . . they would have taken a part of the \nRebels entrenchment in flank, and in their \nretreat wou'd have cut off numbers.\" But \nHowe was only a soldier, such an aid ap- \nparently never occurred to him, and the float- \ning batteries — gondolas, as they were called \n— remained on the southern side of the penin- \nsula. He ordered the attack. \n\nThe attack was triple, but the artillery fire, \non which Howe had counted, was at first \nvalueless, because for the six-pounders had \nbeen sent over mostly nine-pound shot, thanks \nto the chief of artillery, who was afterward \nsupposed to be making love to the school- \nmaster's daughter. The cannon, further, got \ninto the marshy ground, and could not find \nan effective position. So the real assault was \nfirst delivered by the troops alone, one de- \n\n\nThe Battle of Bunker Hill 269 \n\ntachment marching against the redoubt, and \none against the rail fence. \n\nThe troops moved with great confidence. \nAccording to the habit of the time, they were \ncompletely equipped as for an expedition, \nwith blankets and three-days' rations. It \nhas been computed that each soldier carried \nabout a hundred and twenty pounds.1 They \nwere, therefore, greatly burdened at best; \nand on so hot a day, with the grass to their \nknees, and many fences to cross, their task \nwas the worse. But they advanced with \ngreat composure, and apparently forgetting \nthe 1 9th of April they were deployed in open \norder, as if to present each marksman with \na separate target. Howe led those who \nmarched at the rail fence, and General Pigot \nled the assault upon the redoubt. Both \nbodies of the regulars advanced with occa- \nsional ineffective volleys. \n\nAt first, says tradition, a few Americans \nfired when the troops came in range, but \n\n1 Ross's \" Life of Cornwallis,\" quoted in Fonblanque's \n\"Burgoyne,\" 159. \n\n\n270 The Siege of Boston \n\nPrescott and his officers, leaping upon the \nparapet of the redoubt, kicked up the muzzles \nof the guns. If the men would but obey \nhim, Prescott told them, not a British soldier \nwould get within the redoubt. At the rail \nfence the men were likewise prevented from \nfiring, Putnam threatening to cut down any \nwho disobeyed. They were ordered not to \nshoot until the regulars passed a stake which \nStark set up for a mark. Many familiar say- \nings were passed among the provincials : \n\"Wait till you see the whites of their eyes! \nAim at the crossing of the belts ! Pick out \nthe handsome coats!\" \n\nAs if to add to the impressiveness of the \nscene, it was about this time that Charles- \ntown, set on fire a little while before, that it \nshould not give cover to the Americans, and \nthat the smoke should confuse the rebels, \nburst into general conflagration. The town \nhad been for weeks almost deserted, in dread \nof this fate ; now at the command of Howe \nred-hot shot were thrown in among the houses, \nand marines landed from the ships and fired \n\n\nThe Battle of Bunker Hill 271 \n\nthe wharves and waterside buildings. The \nact was, however, a wanton one, for no ad- \nvantage was gained or lost to either side by \nthe fire.1 \nAt last the troops were near enough. \n\n1 The picturesqueness of this scene has been remarked \nby many writers. The best contemporary description \nis, of course, Burgoyne's. \"To consider this action as a \nsoldier, it comprised, though in a small compass, almost \nevery branch of military duty and curiosity. Troops \nlanded in the face of an enemy; a fine disposition; a \nmarch sustained by a powerful cannonade by moving \nfield artillery, fixed batteries, floating batteries, and \nbroadsides of ships at anchor, all operating separately \nand well disposed; a deployment from the march to \nform for the attack of the entrenchments and redoubt ; \na vigorous defence ; a storm with bayonets ; a large and \nfine town set on fire by shells. Whole streets of houses, \nships upon the stocks, a number of churches, all sending \nup volumes of smoke and flame, or falling together in \nruins, were capital objects. A prospect of the neigh- \nboring hills, the steeples of Boston, and the masts of \nsuch ships as were unemployed in the harbor, all crowded \nwith spectators, friends and foes alike in anxious sus- \npense, made a background to the piece ; and the whole \ntogether composed a representation of war that I think \nthe imagination of Lebrun never reached.\" — FON- \nBLANQUE, \"Burgoyne,\" 156. \n\n\n272 The Siege of Boston \n\nThey had themselves been firing for some \ntime, volleying as they advanced, but firing \ntoo high. Now, as they reached a line some \neight or ten rods from the redoubt, Prescott \ngave the word to fire, and to continue firing. \nThe discharge from the redoubt was close, \ndeadly, and incessant, while at the rail fence \nthe reception of the British was even more \nfatal. For a few minutes the regulars held \ntheir ground, returning the fire as best they \nmight, yet decimated by the American bul- \nlets, and seeing their officers falling all about \nthem. There was no hope to advance, and \nsullenly they withdrew. \n\nIf ever there was a moment that marked \nthe fate of our nation, it was that one. It \nforecast Bennington, Saratoga, and York- \ntown, Gettysburg and the Wilderness. Well \nmight the provincials exult as they saw the \nretreat of the regulars ; and well might Wash- \nington exclaim, when he learned that the \nfarmers had driven the British, \"Then the \nliberties of the country are safe!\"1 \n\n1 Lodge's \"Washington,\" i, 133. \n\n\nThe Battle of Bunker Hill 273 \n\nBut the battle was not yet won. The \nslaughter among the officers was frightful, \nyet the leaders were uninjured. Howe gave \nthe order, the troops formed again, and again \nadvanced to the attack. The Americans \nadmired them as they approached, preserving \nunbroken order, and stepping over the bodies \nof the slain as if they had been logs of wood. \nThis time the troops were allowed to come \nnearer yet, but when the provincials fired \nat the word the carnage was greater than \nbefore. In the smoke the officers were seen \nurging their men, striking them with their \nsword hilts, and even pricking them with the \npoints. But it was in vain. The officers \nthemselves were shot down in unheard-of \nproportion, and at the rail fence those who \nsurvived out of full companies of thirty- \nnine were in some cases only three, or four, \nor five. Nothing could be done under such \na fire. Leaving their dead within a few \nyards of the American lines, for a second time \nthe British retreated. \n\nAt last Howe had learned his lesson. While \n\n\n274 The Siege of Boston \n\nhis officers, for the sake of the men, implored \nhim to find some other way to conquer the \nredoubt, he determined on a third assault. \nHe ordered that the knapsacks be left behind, \nand that the troops be formed in column. \nIn the work of rallying the disheartened \nmen he was ably helped by Clinton, who, \nobserving a detachment in disorder near \ntheir boats, impetuously hurried across the \nriver, reformed their ranks, and put himself \nat their head. Some four hundred marines \ncame over as reinforcements ; according to \nLieutenant Barker, the 47th regiment came \nalso. Howe disposed his forces in three \ncolumns, to attack the three faces of the \nredoubt. \n\nBetween the first and second assaults \nthere had been less than half an hour's in- \nterval. This time the wait was longer, and \nthe Americans ineffectually sought to take \nadvantage of it. Messengers were again sent \nto Ward; the general, learning at last that \nso many of the British forces were occupied \nin the battle that Cambridge was safe from \n\n\nThe Battle of Bunker Hill 275 \n\nan attack, gave orders that more regiments \nshould go to Prescott's assistance. To save \nthe day there was yet time, but of the regi- \nments thus ordered, few companies reached \nthe ground, and fewer still took part in the \naction. And in this the weakness of the \nAmerican organization was sadly evident. \nFrom first to last Ward seems to have sent \nto Bunker Hill sufficient force to have won \nthe battle; but as he never left his house \nhe could take no pains to make sure that \nhis orders were obeyed. As a matter of fact, \nof the regiments despatched, one went to \nLechmere's Point, where it must have secured \nan excellent view of the battle, but was com- \npletely useless. Being next ordered \"to the \nhill,\" it was conducted by its colonel, James \nScammans, to Cobble Hill ; thence he sent \nto Bunker Hill to learn if he was wanted. \nReceiving a vigorous reply from Putnam, \nScammans at last marched his men to Bunker \nHill, reaching the top in time to witness \nthe end of the battle. In similar fashion \nyoung Major Gridley of the artillery battalion, \n\n\n276 The Siege of Boston \n\nwhom \"parental partiality\" had given too \nmuch responsibility, took post at a distance, \nand fired at the shipping. Both Scammans \nand Gridley were later court-martialled. \nOther officers lost their way, or, like Colonel \nMansfield, who stayed with his regiment to \n\"support\" Gridley. in his position of safety, \ndisobeyed orders. \n\nThese facts serve to show not only the con- \nfusion of the day, but also the bad judgment, \nto use no stronger phrase, of unseasoned \nsoldiers. It is fair to say that the hesitancy \nof some was offset by the heroism of others. \nWhen Colonel Gerrish, who was later cash- \niered, could bring his men no further for- \nward than Bunker Hill, his adjutant, Chris- \ntian Febiger, a Dane, led a part of the com- \nmand to the rail fence, and fought bravely \nthere. One of the captains of artillery, dis- \nregarding Gridley's commands, took his two \nguns to Charlestown, and served one of \nthem at the rail fence. Other individuals \nnamed and unnamed, with or without orders, \nwent to the field, took post where they could, \n\n\nThe Battle of Bunker Hill 277 \n\nand fought for their own hand. Yet these \nare scattered instances in the midst of too \nmany failures to obey. Those who did march \ndown to the field of carnage, with \"no more \nthought,\" as one of them confessed, \"of \never rising the hill again than I had of as- \ncending to Heaven, as Elijah did, soul and \nbody together,\" — those who thus devoted \nthemselves left many behind on the safe \nside of Bunker Hill, or posted ineffectively \nbehind distant fences or trees. Of the thou- \nsand Americans who during this last pause \nin the battle might have reached the post \nof danger, not enough arrived to affect the \nresult. \n\nAt last, while aides were still beating up \nfor more support, and Putnam himself was \nreturning from a similar errand, Howe put \nhis troops in motion. This time the move- \nment against the rail fence was but a feint; \nand now for the first time the artillery of \neither side did effective service in the battle. \nAgainst the protest of the artillery officers \nthat the ground was too soft to take better \n\n\n278 The Siege of Boston \n\nposition, Howe ordered them forward, and \nthey loyally obeyed. They found a post \nfrom which they could enfilade the breast- \nwork, and at their first discharge of grape \nsent its defenders into the redoubt for safety. \nIt was the beginning of the end. Prescott, \nas he saw the breastwork abandoned, and \nmarked the three advancing columns, saw \nthat the redoubt was doomed. \n\nAnd yet the day ought not to have been \nlost. Had Ward but sent a hundred pounds \nof powder, the fight might have been won. \nBut Prescott looked for it in vain. Or had \nthose men, whom he saw shooting at long \nrange from positions of safety, come for- \nward to reinforce the defenders of the redoubt, \nthe scales might have been turned. But \nthe fight was to end as it had begun, with \nPrescott's small detachment still unsupported, \nleft all day without food or water, and now \nat the end without powder. As the troops \nclimbed the hill a few artillery cartridges \nwere opened and their powder distributed \namong the provincials. Some of the men \n\n\nThe Battle of Bunker Hill 279 \n\nthus had three or four charges to their guns, \nsome had only one ; besides this, there were \nfew bayonets among them. The wonder is \nthat the men awaited the assault. \n\nThis time the regulars came within twenty \nyards of the redoubt before the word was \ngiven to fire. The heads of the columns \nwere swept away, but the rest came on, and \nmounted the parapet. The first who topped \nit were shot down, among them Pitcairn. \nBut then the American powder was spent, and \nfrom three sides the British swarmed into \nthe redoubt. Reluctantly Prescott gave his \nmen the word to retreat. \n\nFor a few moments the fighting was fierce. \nSome of the provincials were unwilling to run, \nand fought till they were killed. Some used \nstones, and some their clubbed muskets, re- \ntiring unwillingly. It might be supposed that \nthe slaughter was great. But the British, \nfor the very reason that they had entered from \nthree sides, were afraid to fire on the farmers \nfor the sake of their own men ; the dust rose \nup in clouds, and so in the confusion most \n\n\n280 The Siege of Boston \n\nof the defenders escaped, like Peter Brown, \nwho wrote his mother : \" I was not suffered \nto be touched, although I was in the front \nwhen the enemy came in, and jumped over \nthe walls, and ran half a mile, where balls \nflew like hailstones, and cannon roared like \nthunder.\"1 \n\nPrescott came off unhurt. Those who saw \nhim said that he \"stepped long, with his \nsword up.\" He saved his life by parrying \nthe bayonets which were thrust at him, al- \nthough some of them pierced his clothes. \n\nThat more were not killed in the pursuit \nwas due to two factors. The first was the \nexhaustion of the soldiers, who, tired with \ncarrying heavy loads in the unwonted heat \n(and an American summer is like the trop- \nics to an Englishman), were winded with \ntheir last charge up the hill. They were \ntherefore in no good condition to follow up \ntheir victory, and the fugitives were soon \naway beyond Bunker Hill. Yet that the \npursuit was so poor was due partly to the \n\n1 Appendix to Frothingham's \"Siege,\" 393. \n\n\nThe Battle of Bunker Hill 281 \n\ndefenders of the rail fence. These men, \nmore like veteran regiments than fragments \nof many commands, withdrew in a body, \ncontinually threatening those who offered \nto close in from behind. The end of the \nfight was as honorable to them as its be- \nginning. \n\nBut there was much loss. A number \nwere killed in the redoubt, and the slopes of \nBunker Hill were dotted with slain, killed by \nbullets and cannon shot. At the Neck some \nfew more were killed. The total of dead, \naccording to Ward's record, was 115, of the \nwounded 305, of the captured 30. Slightly \nvarying totals are reported.1 \n\nThe great personal loss on the part of the \nAmericans was in the death of Warren. \nThere had been no need of his coming, and \nhis value for higher services — he was presi- \ndent of the provincial congress and had \njust been appointed a major-general — was \ngreater than at the post of actual conflict. \n\n1 Washington reported later 139 killed, 36 missing, \n278 wounded. \n\n\n282 The Siege of Boston \n\nBut his fiery spirit, of which we have seen \nso much, would not be denied. That day \nhe waked with a headache, but on learning \nof the expected battle he declared himself \nwell. Friends tried to detain him, but he \nreplied with the Latin phrase, \"It is sweet \nand becoming to die for one's country.\" \nOn reaching the field he met Putnam, who \noffered to take his orders. But Warren had \ncome as a volunteer, and asked where he \nshould go. Putnam showed him the redoubt, \nsaying, \"There you will be covered.\" \n\n\"Don't think,\" said Warren, \"that I come \nto seek a place of safety; but tell me where \nthe onset will be most furious.\" \n\nPutnam still sent him to the redoubt. \n\"That is the enemy's object.\" \n\nWarren went to the redoubt, where the men \nreceived him with cheers, and Prescott of- \nfered him command. But Warren still de- \nclined, took a musket, and fought with the \nmen. There is no doubt that part of the \ncredit of the stout defence belongs to him. \nWhen the retreat was ordered he withdrew \n\n\nThe Battle of Bunker Hill 283 \n\nunwillingly, and was among the last to leave \nthe redoubt. After he had gone but a little \nway in the open field he was shot in the head, \nand died instantly. Once, when the British \nquestioned the courage of the Americans, \nhe had said, \"By Heavens, I hope I shall die \nup to my knees in blood ! \" He had had his \nwish. \n\nWarren's death at the time was not cer- \ntainly known to either friend or foe ; his body \nwas buried on the field, and was disinterred \nand identified only after the evacuation. \nOf the Boston leaders, he was the only one \nwho gave his life for the cause. He was \nsadly missed, a man of keen intellect and \nexcellent political sense, of deep sympathies, \nand high honor. A magnetic leader, he \ncould ill be spared. \n\nThe last figure on the battle-field was \nPutnam's. At the unfinished fortification on \nBunker Hill he implored the fugitives to rally \nand \"give them one shot more.\" The pro- \nfanity which he used on this occasion he after- \nwards penitently acknowledged in church. \n\n\n284 The Siege of Boston \n\nHe retired only when the pursuers were close \nbehind, but went no further than Prospect \nHill. There, seizing on the chance which so \nlong had been denied him, without orders he \ncollected men and commenced another re- \ndoubt. The next day he was found there, \nunwashed, still digging, and ready for another \nbattle. \n\nPrescott returned to Cambridge, reported \nat headquarters, and offered if given sufficient \ntroops to retake the hill. But Ward was \nafraid of his own position, and would not \nsanction the attempt. \n\nThe British loss was very heavy, about \none thousand and fifty, of whom a quarter \nwere killed, while ninety-two among the \ndead were officers. Pitcairn was carried to \nBoston, and died there. Colonel Abercrom- \nbie was killed, and many others of lesser \nnote. As soon as it was possible the wounded \nofficers were conveyed to Boston for medical \nattendance, and we have in Major Clarke's \nnarrative a dismal picture of one sad proces- \nsion. \"In the first carriage was Major Will- \n\n\nThe Battle of Bunker Hill 285 \n\niams, bleeding and dying, and three dead \ncaptains of the fifty-second regiment. In the \nsecond, four dead officers ; then another with \nwounded officers.\" \n\nThe Americans, at first discouraged by \ntheir defeat, in the course of time came to \nregard it as a victory. This it certainly was \nnot, yet it had all the moral effect of a British \ndefeat. The regulars learned that the pro- \nvincials would stand up to them. \"Damn \nthe rebels,\" was the current phrase; \"they \nwould not flinch.\" x Many of the officers felt \ncalled upon to explain, in letters home, the \nreason for the defeat. The American rifles, \nargued one, were \"peculiarly adapted to take \noff the officers of a whole line as it advances \nto an attack.\" They reasoned that the re- \ndoubt, whose perfection when examined was \nastonishing, must have been the work of \ndays. As to the comparative uselessness of \nthe British cannon, it was explained by the \nnine-pound shot (some say twelve) sent for \nthe six-pounders. Said one newspaper: \"It \n\n1 Moore's \"Diary of the Revolution,\" no. \n\n\n286 The Siege of Boston \n\nnaturally required a great while to ram down \nsuch disproportioned shot ; nor did they, \nwhen discharged, fly with that velocity and \ntrue direction they would have done, had \nthey been better suited to the size of the \n\n\ncannon.\" l \n\n\nBut aside from a few such absurdities, the \nbody of the army and the British public \nrecognized at last that they had formidable \nantagonists. This was no such fight as that \non the 1 9th of April, when the shifting pro- \nvincials gave the regulars nothing to strike \nat. This was a pitched battle, and the \nfarmers had all but won it. The British \nwere amazed by the stubborn defence, and \nthe rapidity and accuracy of the American \nfire. The proportion of killed among the \nofficers was greater than any before known, \nand veterans admitted that the slaughter was \nworse than at Minden, the deadliest of recent \nEuropean battles. It is with reason, then, \nthat Boston still celebrates Bunker Hill. It \n\n1 These two quotations are from Frothingham's \n\"Siege.\" \n\n\nThe Battle of Bunker Hill 287 \n\nwas the first signal proof of American cour- \nage, and forecast the success of the siege. In- \ndeed, it is not too much to say that Bunker \nHill battle had influence in deciding the out- \ncome of the war. Howe, destined to be the \nleader of the British forces, never forgot the \nlesson of the redoubt on Breed's Hill, or of \nthe flimsy fence of rails and hay. It was \nseldom that he could resolve to send his men \nagainst a rebel entrenchment. \n\n\nCHAPTER XI \n\nWASHINGTON TAKES COMMAND \n\nTHE immediate effect of the battle of \nBunker Hill upon the American army \n— or rather armies — was one of dis- \nmay. The result was confusion. In fact, no \nstudy of the battle can fail to impress the \nexaminer with the belief that outside the re- \ndoubt the whole conduct of the Americans \nwas haphazard. Except for Stark's regiment, \nwhich itself came on in detachments, the re- \ninforcements dribbled to the field in com- \npanies, platoons, or squads. They placed \nthemselves where the hasty judgment of \nPutnam directed them, or if he was absent \nto beat up for more troops, chose their own \npositions and fought under their own officers. \nPutnam gave orders, yet was not always \nobeyed ; and sent urgently for reinforcements, \nbut, though his demands were received by \n\n288 \n\n\nWashington takes Command 289 \n\nofficers from other colonies, got no response.1 \nIn this individual character of the fighting the \nday was much like that of the iQth of April. \nAnd after the battle conditions were much \nthe same. Putnam commenced independ- \nently to fortify Prospect Hill. On Winter \nHill the New Hampshire troops made a re- \ndoubt, and at Roxbury General Thomas \nhastily strengthened his position. Even at \nCambridge Ward began to fortify. Word \nhad been sent out to summon the militia, \nand as on the I9th of April these responded \nwith alacrity and in great numbers. It was \nhourly expected that the British would sally \nfrom Boston, and the provincials kept them- \nselves in a confused readiness. In the mean- \ntime the British cannon played steadily on \nthe American fortifications, and the thunder \nof the artillery spread apprehension in the \n\n1 One Massachusetts colonel, who had urgently \napplied to Ward for permission to go to the Hill, \nbut was refused, three times ignored the order of \nPutnam to come to his assistance — Putnam being \nfrom Connecticut. See Frothingham's \"Siege,\" 1 68, \nnote. \n\nu \n\n\n290 The Siege of Boston \n\nneighboring country. Abigail Adams wrote \nfrom Braintree : \"The battle began upon our \nintrenchments upon Bunker's Hill, Saturday \nmorning about three o'clock, and has not \nceased yet, and it is now three o'clock Sab- \nbath afternoon. It is expected they will \ncome out over the Neck to-night, and a \ndreadful battle must ensue.\" 1 Yet the \nBritish did not come out, quiet gradually \nfell on the two armies, the militia returned to \ntheir homes, and the conduct of the siege \nentered on a new phase. \n\nNow more than ever the Americans recog- \nnized that conditions were precarious, and \nthat the greatest need was for a better organi- \nzation. Zeal was not wanting. Whenever \nthe British cannonade recommenced, when- \never there were rumors of an attack, the \ntroops were ready for a fight. But means of \ncommunication, and prompt and efficient \nsubordination, still were lacking. Nor does \nit appear that those on the ground were able, \nhandicapped as they were by orders from the \n\n1 Adams Letters, 67. \n\n\nWashington takes Command 291 \n\ndifferent provincial assemblies, to produce \nthe necessary system. Higher political and \nmilitary authority both were needed before \nthe army could be efficient. Very fortunately \nevents had been preparing to supply them. \n\nSince the middle of May the second Con- \ntinental Congress had been sitting in Phila- \ndelphia. Among the Massachusetts delegates \nwere Hancock and the two Adamses. Gage \non the 1 2th of June had consigned Samuel \nAdams and Hancock to the gallows, but \nHancock was serving as president of the \nCongress, while the Adamses were important \nmembers of committees. They watched and \nwaited for the growth of a sentiment which \nshould support New England in its resistance. \n\nThe position of the Congress was without \nprecedent. An illegal body, its delegates \nwere elected by conventions improperly con- \nstituted. It had no authority to raise money, \nto purchase arms, or to direct the actions of \nthe provinces. Though in New England war \nwas in progress, many of the delegates loved \nthe old order of things, and were not yet \n\n\n292 The Siege of Boston \n\nready to move toward independence. The \nfirst actions of the Congress were for concilia- \ntion. \n\nThere were those who saw that this was \nimpossible. Of the New England delegates, \nvery few ever again hoped for what was called \n\"an accommodation.\" Washington, on his \npart, saw clearly that the end of the old \norder had come. Franklin knew that inde- \npendence would be the result of the changes \nthen in progress. Yet these men, and others \nlike them, knew also that they could not \nhurry the Congress into radical action, and \nwaited the effect of time. For weeks the \nCongress discussed and argued, and finally \npassed a resolve that \"an humble and dutiful \npetition be presented to his majesty.\" 1 This \nwould give a chance for feelings to cool, and \nfor the supporters of the king to work for his \ninterest. \n\nBut events would not stand still. In Eng- \nland the news of Concord had not moved the \nking to lenity ; he saw no lesson in the tragedy, \n\n1 Bancroft, iv, 583. \n\n\nWashington takes Command 293 \n\nand insisted on pressing his policy. Lord \nNorth's feeble endeavor to resign was checked, \nsupplies were sent to Virginia to support the \ngovernor in his project of a rising of the \nslaves, a scheme was pressed to raise in Caro- \nlina a regiment of veteran Highlanders, and \norders were sent to rouse the Iroquois against \nthe rebels. Further, the king planned to \nstrengthen his forces by hiring troops from \nthe continent of Europe. \n\nNews of all this, coming across the Atlantic, \nby degrees changed the aspect of affairs, and \nmade the members of the Congress doubtful \nof reconciliation. They began to look to \ntheir own positions, and to feel that, as Frank- \nlin said, unless they hung together they \nwould all hang separately. To remind them \nwhat they could do in self-defence the needs \nof the army around Boston were frequently \nbrought to their attention. Its discipline, \nequipment, and leadership were poor. At \nlast came a petition from Massachusetts, \nbegging that Congress should \"take com- \nmand of the army by appointing a generalis- \n\n\n294 The Siege of Boston \n\nsimo.\" * Such a step was open and complete \nrebellion, and the Congress hesitated. By \nprivate letters to Samuel Adams the desired \nleader was pointed out : Washington. \n\nThe choice was doubly wise. To the \nAdamses it had been plain that, though \nHancock was desirous of the post, it should \nnot be given to a New Englander. The New \nEngland army would be knit together, and \nits provincial jealousies appeased, by the \nappointment of a general from another sec- \ntion. Further, in all the continent there \nwas not another man of Washington's ex- \nperience, ability, and steadfastness. \n\nWashington was then in the prime of life, \nforty-three years of age, and of such physique \nas was needed for the bearer of the greatest \nburden that had ever been put upon an \nAmerican. He was tall, finely built, majestic \nin carriage and impressive of feature, and \naccustomed from his youth to exposure, \nhardship, and constant exertion. He had \nlong been used to depending upon himself, \n\n1 Bancroft, iv, 590. \n\n\nWashington takes Command 295 \n\nand had acquired an independent judgment \nthat was almost unerring. Further, that \njudgment had been exercised on military \nmatters. While Hancock had been at best \nthe captain of a militia company in time of \npeace, Washington had from his nineteenth \nyear been commissioned with higher com- \nmands, and had seen much active service. \nMore than one campaign owed its success \nagainst the Indians largely to him, and it was \nhe and his Virginians who saved the remnant \nat Braddock's defeat. He had a strong \ntemper under almost perfect control, patience \nand persistence in equal amounts, and, with \na wonderful reserve, the quality of winning \nthe confidence of all honest men. \n\nBesides all this, he was heart and soul in \nthe cause. While others had discussed and \nhesitated, he had long ago made up his mind, \nnot only that the quarrel with the king would \ncome to violence, but that all Americans \nshould resist to the utmost. \"Shall we,\" he \nasked in a letter to a friend, after enumerat- \ning Gage's despotic acts, \"shall we after this \n\n\n296 The Siege of Boston \n\nwhine and cry for relief, when we have already \ntried it in vain ? Or shall we supinely sit \nand see one province after another fall a \nsacrifice to despotism ?\" In a letter to a \nBritish officer at Boston, he says, \"Permit \nme with the freedom of a friend (for you \nknow I always esteemed you), to express my \nsorrow that fortune should place you in a \nservice that must fix curses to the latest \nposterity upon the contrivers, and, if success \n(which, by the by, is impossible) accompanies \nit, execrations upon all those who have been \ninstrumental in the execution. . . . Give me \nleave to add as my opinion that more blood \nwill be spilled on this occasion, if the minis- \ntry are determined to push matters to ex- \ntremity, than history has ever yet furnished \ninstances of in the annals of North America, \nand such a vital wound will be given to the \npeace of this great country, as time itself \ncannot cure or eradicate the remembrance \nof.\" Few in those days had such certainty \nof the result of an outbreak, and few were \nso ready to participate in one. In the Vir- \n\n\nWashington takes Command 297 \n\nginia convention he said, \"I will raise a thou- \nsand men, subsist them at my own expense, \nand march them to the relief of Boston.\" No \nwonder this was designated \"the most elo- \nquent speech that ever was made.\" He was \nnot called on to make good his promise, but \nwas sent to the two continental congresses. \nAt the second it was noticed that he attended \nthe sittings in his uniform of a Virginia colonel. \nThough he took no part in the debates, he \nmade himself felt. Patrick Henry said of \nhim at this time: \"If you speak of solid in- \nformation and sound judgment, Colonel Wash- \nington is unquestionably the greatest man on \nthe floor.\" 1 \n\nTo make the Congress \"adopt\" the army \nat Boston, and to have Washington appointed \ngeneralissimo, became the task of John Adams, \nwho at this time did the country perhaps his \ngreatest service. There were objections to \nputting a Virginian at the head of New Eng- \nlanders, for colonial jealousies, and even \ncolonial lack of mutual understanding, might \n\n1 These quotations are from Lodge's \"Washington,\" i. \n\n\n298 The Siege of Boston \n\nbring about a fatal sullenness in the men. \nAdams discussed the matter in private with \nmany delegates, and could not succeed even \nin making the Massachusetts and Virginia \nrepresentatives agree. At last, determined \nto force action, one morning he announced to \nSamuel Adams that something must be done. \n\"I am determined this morning to make a \ndirect motion that Congress should adopt \nthe army before Boston, and appoint Colonel \nWashington commander of it. Mr. Adams,\" \nhe added in his diary, \"seemed to think very \nseriously of it, but said nothing.\" \n\nAlone, then, but determinedly following \nhis inspiration, John Adams laid before the \nCongress his proposal. First he spoke in \nfavor of accepting the New England army \nas the army of the continent; then he began \na eulogy of Washington. Hancock's eyes \nflashed with resentment, and Washington \nhimself slipped from the room. There were \na few days of delay and debate, but the \nenergy of Adams carried his proposals. The \nCongress adopted the army, appointed four \n\n\nWashington takes Command 299 \n\nmajor-generals and eight brigadiers, and \nfinally, on the I5th of June, chose the com- \nmander-in-chief. On the iyth of June, the \nday of Bunker Hill, Adams wrote joyfully \nto his wife : \" I can now inform you that the \nCongress have made choice of the modest \nand virtuous, the amiable, generous, and \nbrave George Washington, Esquire, to be \nGeneral of the American Army.\"1 \n\nThis was a step which the Congress could \nnot retrace. The colonies were now in re- \nbellion, and the members, as they realized \nthat the noose was preparing for their necks, \nvoted the meagre sum of twenty-five thousand \ndollars to supply with powder the army \nwhich alone stood between them and a sud- \nden taking off. Yet the significance of the act \nwas not yet understood by the colonies at \nlarge, for a few days later the assembly of \nNew York voted military escorts both to \nWashington and to the royalist governor, \nwho happened to arrive on the same day. \n\nWashington himself, however, knew better \n\n1 Adams Letters, 65. \n\n\n300 The Siege of Boston \n\nthan any man the consequence of the momen- \ntous step. He foresaw that the labor would \nbe difficult and the struggle long. On the \n1 6th of June he accepted his commission, but \nadded: \"Lest some unlucky event should \nhappen, unfavorable to my reputation, I \nbeg it to be remembered by every gentleman \nin the room, that I, this day, declare with \nthe utmost sincerity, I do not think myself \nequal to the command I am honored with. \n\n\"As to pay, Sir, I beg leave to assure the \nCongress, that, as no pecuniary consideration \ncould have tempted me to accept this ar- \nduous employment, at the expense of my \ndomestic ease and happiness, I do not wish \nto make any profit from it. I will keep an \nexact account of my expenses. These, I \ndoubt not, they will discharge ; and that is \nall I desire.\" 1 \n\nAs soon as he could settle his affairs, Wash- \nington started for Boston. In New York \nhe heard the news of Bunker Hill, and was \ncheered by it. He arrived on July 2 in \n\n1 Sparks, \"Writings of Washington,\" iii, I. \n\n\nWashington takes Command 301 \n\nWatertown, where the Massachusetts con- \ngress was sitting, and received a congratu- \nlatory address. He then pressed on to Cam- \nbridge, which he reached on the same day. \nOn the 3d, a year and a day before the Dec- \nlaration of Independence, and according to \ntradition under the great elm still standing \nnear Cambridge Common, he took command \nof the army. \n\nThe occasion was momentous, and was so \nappreciated by a few at the time. Would \nthe critical volunteer army approve of its new \nchief ? There was not a murmur against \nhim. From the first Washington's magnifi- \ncent bearing and kingly self-confidence won \nthe admiration of his men. He brought \nwith him to the camp at Cambridge two who \nwere ambitious to displace him, yet of Lee and \nGates, both retired English officers, the first \nnever won a personal following, and the second \nachieved but the meagre dignity of leadership \nof a cabal. From the moment when he took \ncommand of the army, Washington was, in- \ndeed, \"first in the hearts of his countrymen.\" \n\n\n302 The Siege of Boston \n\nAnd the student of our history cannot \nhelp remarking how providential it was that, \nalmost at the outset of this struggle, Wash- \nington should come to the front. Eighty- \nsix years later, at the beginning of the Re- \nbellion, there was no accepted chief. Lincoln \nwas doubted by the North, and the army \nhad no true leader. By a slow process Lin- \ncoln's commanding strength became known ; \nby an equally tedious sifting of the generals \nthe qualities of Grant, Sherman, Thomas, \nand Meade were discovered. Only the tre- \nmendous resources of the North could have \nwithstood the strain of such a delay. Had \nthe same process been necessary at the out- \nset of the Revolution, the colonies could \nscarcely have maintained the struggle. Had \nnot Washington been at hand, accepted by \nthe Congress and admired by the army, the \nvirtual leader of both, the chances of success \nwould have been slight. But he was Lincoln \nand Grant in one. Time and again, through \nthe long years, it was Washington alone who \nbrought victory from defeat. Without him \n\n\nWashington takes Command 303 \n\nthe colonies might have won their independ- \nence as the result of an almost interminable \nguerilla warfare ; but with him the fight was \ndefinite, decisive, glorious, and — for the in- \nfant republic — mercifully short. \n\nThe army was now in the hands of a sol- \ndier, one who knew, if any man did, what \nwas needed to make the raw militiaman \ninto a professional. Washington fell at once \nto work. \"There is great overturning in \ncamp,\" wrote the Reverend William Emerson, \nhe who had watched Concord Fight from \nthe window of his study. \"New lords, new \nlaws. The Generals Washington and Lee \nare upon the lines every day. New orders \nfrom his Excellency are read to the respective \nregiments every morning after prayers. The \nstrictest government is taking place, and \ngreat distinction is made between officers \nand soldiers. Every one is made to know \nhis place and keep in' it. ... Thousands \nare at work every day from four till eleven \no'clock in the morning.\" 1 \n\n1 \" Writings of Washington,\" iii, 491. \n\n\n304 The Siege of Boston \n\nThis simple statement shows, in the wonder \nof the clergyman, not merely how much was \nnow being done, but how little had been done \nbefore. As on the day of Bunker Hill, Ward \nhad been a headquarters general, but Wash- \nington was \"upon the lines.\" Many times \nlater we find him exposing himself recklessly ; \nnow we see him constantly on active patrol \nof his outposts, supervising the new forti- \nfications or the carrying out of the new regu- \nlations. \n\nApart from fortifying, which he drove \nearly and late, his immediate difficulties were \nwith the army organization, and these diffi- \nculties began immediately. He brought with \nhim commissions for his major-generals- and \nbrigadiers, and the commissions of the former \nhe bestowed at once. The fourth major- \ngeneral was Putnam of Connecticut, who \nhad had as his colleague Joseph Spencer, of \nthe same colony. \"General Spencer's dis- \ngust,\" wrote Washington on the loth of \nJuly, \"was so great at General Putnam's \npromotion, that he left the army without \n\n\nWashington takes Command 305 \n\nvisiting me, or making known his intention \nin any respect.\"1 \n\nUpon this, Washington prudently with- \nheld the other commissions, and proceeded \ncautiously, with regard to jealousies among \nthe officers. By careful diplomacy he suc- \nceeded in retaining for the new establishment \nthe services of most of the colonial brigadiers, \nfor Spencer returned, and Thomas, who saw \nhis juniors promoted over his head, agreed \nto take rank beneath them. Only one among \nthe new appointees, Pomeroy, the veteran \nof Louisburg who had fought at the rail \nfence at Bunker Hill, declined his commission. \nHe had marvelled that in the battle Warren \nshould be taken and he, \"old and useless,\" \nbe left unhurt. Now he withdrew from \nfurther service on account of his age ; yet, \ngoing later upon a volunteer expedition, he \ndied of exposure. \n\nBefore the jealousies of the higher officers \nwere settled, Washington turned to the smaller \nfry. He now had to meet the nature of the \n\n1 \"Writings of Washington,\" iii, 23. \n\n\n306 The Siege of Boston \n\nNew England volunteer. \"There is no such \nthing,\" he wrote before very long, \"as getting \nofficers of this stamp to carry orders into \nexecution. ... I have made a pretty good \nslam among such kind of officers as the Mas- \nsachusetts government abounds in, having \nbroke one colonel and two captains for cow- \nardly behaviour in the action on Bunker \nHill, two captains for drawing more pay and \nprovision than they had men in their com- \npany, and one for being absent from his post \nwhen the enemy appeared and burnt a house \nclose by it. ... In short, I spare none, \nand yet fear it will not all do, as these people \nseem to be attentive to everything but their \nown interest.\"1 \n\nWashington was experiencing the difficulties \nwhich Lincoln was later to know, in dealing \nwith the host of fair-weather soldiers and \njobbing self-seekers who come to the front \nat the outset of a war. There was every \nreason why for some time he should estimate \nthe New England character from what he \n\n1 Lodge's \"Washington,\" i, 138. \n\n\nWashington takes Command 307 \n\nsaw of its worst side. Yet before the seven \nyears of war were over he knew its better \naspect. Massachusetts sent to the war nearly \ntwice as many men as any other colony, and \nConnecticut was second. Measured by this \nstandard, Washington's own colony came \nthird in devotion to the cause.1 \n\nWe know that later he acknowledged his \nappreciation of the devotion of New England \nto the cause and to his person. It is par- \nticularly interesting to learn that he reversed \nhis judgment in one of the cases mentioned \nabove. Among those cashiered for disobe- \ndience of orders and alleged cowardice at \nBunker Hill was John Callender, captain \nof an artillery company. The trial went \nagainst him, and Washington dismissed him \n\"from all further service in the continental \nservice as an officer.\" Callender, determined \nto wipe off the stain on his honor, remained \nas a private in the artillery service, and found \nhis opportunity at the battle of Long Island, \nwhere the captain and lieutenant of his \n\n^revelyan's \"Revolution,\" Part I, 378, footnote. \n\n\n308 The Siege of Boston \n\nbattery were shot. \"He assumed the com- \nmand, and, refusing to retreat, fought his \npieces to the last. The bayonets of the \nsoldiers were just upon him, when a British \nofficer, admiring his chivalrous and desperate \ncourage, interfered and saved him.\" 1 Wash- \nington ordered the record of Calender's sen- \ntence to be expunged from the orderly book, \neffected his exchange, and restored him his \ncommission. \n\nYet in too many of the cases the sen- \ntence of incompetence or cowardice was just. \nEven when simple laxity of discipline was at \nthe bottom of trouble, the effect was exas- \nperating. Washington had much to teach \nthe minor members of his army. That it \nwas in all outward aspects a truly volunteer \nassemblage, we have the testimony of an \neye witness. \"It is very diverting,\" wrote the \nReverend William Emerson, \"to walk among \nthe camps. They are as different in their \n\n1 See Frothingham's \"Siege,\" and Appendix III of \nVol. 3 of the \"Writings of Washington.\" Both of these \nbooks quote Swett's \"History of Bunker Hill Battle.\" \n\n\nWashington takes Command 309 \n\nform as the owners are in their dress ; and \nevery tent is a portraiture of the temper and \ntaste of the persons who encamp in it. Some \nare made of boards, and some of sailcloth. \nSome partly of one and partly of another. \nAgain others are made of stone and turf, \nbrick or brush. Some are thrown up in a \nhurry, others curiously wrought with doors \nand windows, done in wreaths and withes in \nthe manner of a basket. Some are your \nproper tents and marquees, looking like the \nregular camp of the enemy. . . . However, \nI think this great variety is rather a beauty \nthan a blemish in the army.\" 1 \n\nWhen we consider, however, that the men \nwere dressed as variously as they were housed, \nand armed as from a museum of historical \ncuriosities, we can easily see that the com- \nmander would not agree with the clergyman \nthat such variety was to be admired. We \nfind him advocating the purchase of uniforms. \nIf nothing better can be had, he will be con- \ntent with hunting-shirts, since a common \n\n1 \"Writings of Washington,\" iii, 491. \n\n\n3io The Siege of Boston \n\ncostume would have a \"happy tendency to \nunite the men, and abolish those provincial \ndistinctions, that lead to jealousy and dis- \nsatisfaction.\" 1 Washington strove also, but by \nthe end of the siege was still unable, to provide \nfor his men some form of regulation firearm. \n\nHe found, further, that the number of the \ntroops had been overestimated. After wait- \ning eight days for returns which he expected \nin an hour after his requisition, he found \nthat, instead of the twenty thousand troops \nhe had been led to hope for, he had but six- \nteen thousand effective men. With these \nhe had to maintain a front of eight miles, \nagainst an enemy who could at will strike \nat any point. \n\nIn such a situation the only safeguard \nwas fortification. Before Washington's ar- \nrival the redoubts on Prospect and Winter \nHills had been completed, with scattered \nminor works. Washington at once began \nby strengthening these, and by finishing all \nuncompleted works. Then, in a manner char- \n\n1 \" Writings of Washington,\" iii, 22. \n\n\nWashington takes Command 311 \n\nacteristic of the whole siege, and which never \nfailed to take the British by surprise, one \nAugust evening he sent a party to Plowed Hill, \n\"within point blank shot of the enemy on \nCharlestown Neck. We worked the whole \nnight incessantly one thousand two hun- \ndred men, and, before morning, got an in- \ntrenchment in such forwardness, as to bid \ndefiance to their cannon.\" 1 \n\nThe British cannonaded for two days, but \nthe Americans, finding to their disappoint- \nment that no assault was intended, finished \nthe work at their ease. Similarly, as we \nshall see, Washington later took Lechmere's \nPoint, commanding the river and the Back \nBay. Before many weeks the works at \nRoxbury were made \"amazing strong,\" and \nthe rebels were in position to welcome an \nencounter. But there was no assault, and \nWashington had instead to meet the vexa- \ntions of his office. \n\nThese were often trivial enough. A com- \npany would protest against the appointment \n\n1 Ibid., iii, 71. \n\n\n312 The Siege of Boston \n\nof an officer unknown to them, a town would \napply for special guard, a prisoner would \ndemand the privilege of wearing his sword.1 \nWashington met such requests with un- \nvarying courtesy, but with firmness ; even to \nthe governor of Connecticut he refused troops \nfor sea-coast protection. \n\nOne little correspondence throws a gleam \nof unconscious humor on the dull routine \nof Washington's correspondence. Hearing of \nhardships suffered, in Boston by prisoners \ntaken at Bunker Hill, Washington wrote to \nremonstrate. Gage returned answer two days \nlater; its original is found in Burgoyne's \nletter book, \"as wrote by me.\" It begins \nin the usual style of the literary general : \n\"Sir, To the glory of civilized nations, hu- \nmanity and war have been made almost \ncompatible, and compassion to the subdued \nis become almost a general system. Britons, \never pre-eminent in mercy, have outgone \n\n1 Washington's correspondence with Major Christo- \npher French is an interesting instance of the patience of \na great man with the impatience of a small one. \n\n\nWashington takes Command 313 \n\ncommon examples, and overlooked the crimi- \nnal in the captive.\" Entering a general \ndenial of Washington's charges, the letter \ngoes on to bring counter-accusations, and \nfinally, after giving valuable advice, the \nwriters exhort Washington — of all men ! \n-to \"give free operation to truth.\" \nTruly, as Burgoyne's biographer admits, \nthere is something irresistibly ludicrous in \nthe spectacle of such generals lecturing such \na man. The sequel was honorable to the \nAmerican chief. At first determined to re- \ntaliate upon some prisoners in his hands, \nhe changed his mind, apparently because \nthey, having been captured off Machias as \ntheir vessel neared land, had \"committed \nno hostility against the people of this \ncountry.\" 1 The general therefore gave them \n\n1 The letters that passed between Washington and \nGage, and later between him and Howe, are to be found \nin the volumes of his \"Writings,\" and make interesting \nreading. Washington had at this time no prisoners in \nhis hands other than those taken as described, because \nthe prisoners of the I9th of April had been exchanged on \nthe 6th of June. \n\n\n314 The Siege of Boston \n\nthe practical freedom of the town of Northamp- \nton. \n\nOne other correspondence caused about \nthis time a flutter of excitement. Charles \nLee was one of Washington's four major- \ngenerals, a man who had seen military service \nin many parts of Europe and America. He \nhad served in the British army from 1747 \nuntil 1763, when, his regiment being dis- \nbanded, he served in Poland and Turkey, \nand finally, in 1772, came to America. Here \nhe took up, almost violently, the cause of \nfreedom, perhaps because of disappointment \nin the English service, perhaps because he \nforesaw opportunity. At any rate, he made \nhimself conspicuous, and was generally re- \ngarded as the foremost military man in \nAmerica, Washington alone excepted. Events \nproved that Lee acknowledged no superior, \nand impatiently desired to be rid of his \nchief. Washington was always on formal \nterms with his subordinate, no doubt because \nhe read in his character, besides a certain \nability, an unstable temperament and a \n\n\nWashington takes Command 315 \n\nhasty judgment. When once Lee was at \nCambridge he immediately rushed into a \ncorrespondence with Burgoyne, under whom he \nhad served in Portugal thirteen years before. \nThe tone of his letter was highly literary. \nLee reminded Burgoyne of their old friend- \nship, and then, with many flourishes, went \nat his business. He lamented the infatuation \nof the times, when men of the stamp of Bur- \ngoyne and Howe could be seduced into an \nimpious and nefarious service, and remind- \ning Burgoyne of various bygone incidents, \ncalled to his mind his experience with the \nwickedness and treachery of the present \ncourt and cabinet. He spread himself at \nlarge on the principles of the present struggle, \nrejoiced that Burgoyne came by command \nof the king rather than his own desire, and \nwarned him of the miscreants who had in- \nfatuated Gage. Then, explaining how his \nthree years in America had acquainted him \nwith facts, Lee begged Burgoyne to com- \nmunicate the substance of the letter to Howe, \nwho to his horror seemed to be becoming the \n\n\n316 The Siege of Boston \n\nsatrap of an Eastern despot. Protesting his \ndevotion to America as the last asylum of \nliberty, Lee signed himself with the greatest \nsincerity and affection. \n\nThe letter was written before Bunker Hill, \nbut not answered until the 8th of July. In \nhis reply, Burgoyne hinted, with references \nto Locke, Charles the First, and James the \nSecond, that he was equally well grounded \nin the principles of liberty. He urged Lee to \nlay his hand upon his heart, and say whether \nthe Americans wanted freedom from taxation \nor independency. He, Burgoyne, with the \narmy and fleet, and the king himself, was \nactuated only by the desire to maintain the \nlaws. Then, having letters from England \nwhich were to be delivered into Lee's own \nhands, Burgoyne proposed a personal inter- \nview at the lines on Boston Neck, and sent \nthe compliments of Howe, Clinton, and Percy. \n\nIt must be admitted that Burgoyne's pur- \npose in this proposal was quite other than \nto deliver letters, or even to argue upon \npolitical differences. In a letter to Lord \n\n\nWashington takes Command 317 \n\nNorth Burgoyne explained his real purpose \nin entering into correspondence with a rebel. \nIn the proposed interview he would have cut \nLee short in his paltry jargon, and pressed \nupon him the real facts in the case. Next \nhe would have shown him the glory accruing \nto a successful mediator, and then, playing \nupon his pride, his interest, and his am- \nbition, would have suggested a return to \nhis allegiance. Burgoyne supposed that the \nreference to a mediator would have brought \nto Lee the memory of General Monk, and \nwould have flattered him with the same in- \ntention to restore the state. \n\nThere is upon this plan of Burgoyne's but \none comment to be made, and that has been \nclearly stated by his own biographer. \" If an \nAmerican General could have been found base \nenough to purchase his restoration to the favour \nof his late Sovereign by gross treachery to his \nadopted country, an English General should \nsurely not have thought it worthy of his charac- \nter and position to bribe him to such an act.\" 1 \n\n1 Fonblanque's \" Burgoyne.\" \n\n\n318 The Siege of Boston \n\nLee was not caught in the trap, though \nperhaps not owing to his own caution. Bur- \ngoyne's letter was laid before the Provincial \nCongress, which forbade the meeting. In \na brief letter Lee explained that it was feared \nthat the interview might create jealousies and \nsuspicions. Burgoyne caught at this state- \nment as showing, in the American staff, \ndissensions fruitful of future results ; but the \nhope was never justified. Lee's future share \nin the siege faded into insignificance, and \nhis damage to the American cause was not \nto come until later. \n\nWashington may have supervised the cor- \nrespondence and influenced its result. It \naffected him not at all, but in the midst of \nmany such little affairs he found opportunity \nfor really aggressive work. Once he was well \nfortified, the next step was to vex and disturb \nthe enemy by cutting off supplies by sea, \nand making the approach to Boston difficult. \nFor the latter purpose a detachment went \nboldly in broad daylight and burned the \nlighthouse at the harbor's mouth. Since \n\n\nWashington takes Command 319 \n\nthe first attempt was not satisfactory, the \nsame men went again, and finished the job. \nOther little expeditions, carried on against \neither the harbor islands or the shipping \nnear the town, were successfully undertaken. \nThe men for such purposes were the fisher- \nmen of the sea-coast towns, thrown out of \nwork by the fisheries bill, and burning with \npatriotic feeling. \n\nWashington turned them to still better \naccount in beginning a navy. To be sure, \nthe little fleet which presently was busily \nat work was at first a spontaneous growth, \nfor whenever a store-ship or king's sloop ran \naground or made land at the wrong harbor, \ndories and fishing- vessels swarmed out to board \nit. Even before Washington's coming pri- \nvateers were acting for the country, but with \nno better standing than pirates, for they \nsailed under no flag and bore neither com- \nmission nor letters of marque. The prov- \ninces of Connecticut and Rhode Island legal- \nized the achievements of those who were busy \nin their waters, but for the adventurous spirits \n\n\n320 The Siege of Boston \n\nwho dared the men of war in Massachusetts \nBay nothing was done until Washington \nfound the way. Since, even though the \nneed was imperative, he could not properly \nauthorize the existence of a navy, we find him, \non the second of September, wording a com- \nmission in the following manner : \"You being \nappointed a captain in the army of the United \nColonies of North America, are hereby di- \nrected to take command of a detachment of \nsaid army, and proceed on board the schooner \nHannah, at Beverly.\" And thus the Ameri- \ncan Navy began its existence. Its vessels \nwere few and small, being chiefly \"converted\" \nfishermen ; its purpose was to intercept stores \nand gain information ; and it was especially \nforbidden to engage with armed vessels, \n\"though you may be equal in strength, or may \nhave some small advantage.\" Before the \nend of the siege this little company of vessels \nwas invaluable to Washington. \n\nBut in Washington's army lay his chief \nhopes — and also his chief difficulties. That \nwhenever there was a chance for a fight the \n\n\nWashington takes Command 321 \n\nmen were very ardent, he was glad to ac- \nknowledge. But that when there was noth- \ning to relieve the monotony of the camp \nthey were indifferent to all discipline, he \nknew only too well. They were incorrig- \nible traders of uniforms and equipment, \nsticklers for seniority upon but a few months' \nservice, insistent for furloughs for return \nto labor on their own affairs, and trouble- \nsome even in demanding pay by lunar instead \nof calendar months. In order that their \nYankee ingenuity might find less time to in- \nvent more trouble for him and for themselves, \nWashington very sensibly worked them hard \nat his fortifying, \" Sundays not excepted.\" 1 \n\nThere were, however, difficulties which \ncould be got over neither by work, nor by \nthought, nor by gradually licking an army \ninto shape. Powder and arms both were \nlacking. \n\nPowder was scarcely- to be had anywhere. \nIt was little made in the colonies, especially \nnot in the neighborhood of Boston. Again \n\n1 \"Writings of Washington,\" iii. \n\n\n322 The Siege of Boston \n\nand again we find Washington writing for it, \nand occasionally reporting his exact situation. \nMore than once the army had but nine rounds \nto a man. On the twenty-fourth of August \nWashington writes : \"We have been in a ter- \nrible situation, occasioned by a mistake in a \nreturn ; we reckoned upon three hundred \nquarter casks, and had but thirty-two \nbarrels.\" 1 A few days later the situation \nwas better, but still was bad enough, for he \nwrites : \"We have only one hundred and \neighty-four barrels of powder in all (including \nthe late supply from Philadelphia), which is \nnot sufficient to give twenty-five musket \ncartridges to each man, and scarcely to serve \nthe artillery in any brisk action one single \nday.\" He sent to Bermuda to seize a sup- \nply, but his vessels arrived too late. Supplies \ndid slowly dribble in, and sometimes came \nin encouraging quantities when a store-ship \nwas captured. But there never was plenty \non hand, and too often not enough, for the \npowder would deteriorate in bad weather, as \n\n1 \" Writings of Washington,\" iii. \n\n\nWashington takes Command 323 \n\nwas shown at a skirmish at Lechmere's Point. \nAs the troops formed for duty, cartridge \nboxes were examined, \"when the melancholy \ntruth appeared.\" 1 Further, the men, from \nwhom the lack of powder was concealed, were \nfond of amusing themselves by indiscriminate \nshooting. We find General Greene, in an \norder to his troops, threatening severe punish- \nment to those who shot at geese passing over \nthe camp. And so, with little acquisitions of \npowder, and steady depletion, Washington \nwas never for a day properly supplied. \n\nHis difficulty in finding muskets, though \nnever so great, was always considerable. \nThe gunsmiths of Philadelphia, who had been \nexpected speedily to equip his army, were not \nable to supply a satisfactory portion of the \narms required, so that Washington was re- \nduced to sending agents through the neigh- \nboring towns to buy guns. Their success was \nsmall. He tried also to buy the muskets of \nthose men who, on the expiration of their \nterm of service, went home. Here again the \n\n1 Ibid. \n\n\n324 The Siege of Boston \n\nresult was poor, for the men, mindful of the \npossibility of militia service, were very un- \nwilling to part with their arms. \n\nYet the men had an ineradicable propensity \nto dicker among themselves. Arms and equip- \nment changed hands in true Yankee fashion ; \neven clothing was traded in, and the camp, \nwhen the men were off duty, must at times \nhave been as busy as a market. Nothing \nbetter shows this than the diary of David \nHow, whose brief entries prove him to be a \ntrue New Englander. Months later than \nWashington's first attempts to buy arms \nfrom the men, we find entries as follows. \n\n\"13 (January, 1776) I Bought a gun & \nBayonet & Cateridge Box of Joseph Jackson \nand gave 42/6 Lawfull Money for the Whole. \nI have been Makeing Cateridges this Day. . . . \n\n\"20 I Bought a frock & Trouses of Parley \nMacingtyre and give 6 / Law. \n\n\"22 Peter Gage Staid Hear Last Night and \nI bought 3 Pare of Shoes of him @ 5 / 6 per \npare , \n\n\"23 I sold a pare of Shoes for 6/8. \n\n\nWashington takes Command 325 \n\n\" 26 I Sold my Cateridge box For 4/6 Law- \nfull Money. \n\n\" 1 6 March I sold my gun to Timothy \nJackson for Three pound Lawfull Money.\" \n\nWe see in David How, even when soldier- \ning, the qualities which later made him one \nof the richest men in Haverhill. The diary \nshows, also, what appears to be the visit to \nthe camp of a shoe pedler. Modern dis- \nciplinarians would scarcely condone this, nor \nwould they permit How's opportunity of \nmaking money when cooking for his company. \nFor he writes : — \n\n\"24 day (January, 1776) I Cook this day \n& Bought 3 Barrels of Cyder for 9 / per Barrel. \n\n\"25 day I Bought 7 Bushels of Chesnuts \n& give 4 pisterens per bushel. \n\n\"30 We have Sold Nuts and Cyder Every \nDay This Week.\" \n\nIt was in the face of this well-nigh incor- \nrigible tendency to make money out of the \nsituation that Washington struggled to turn \nhis militiamen into soldiers. We gather from \nhis orderly books that he had difficulties with \n\n\n326 The Siege of Boston \n\ndisorders of many kinds, not the least of \nwhich were caused by the visits of \"pretended \nsuttlers\"1 who sold bad rum. To check \ndrunkenness he licensed the sutlers and \nlimited their activities, and for general dis- \ncipline he worked steadily to show officers \nand men alike what was expected of them. \nAnd all the time he diligently tried to pur- \nchase weapons, though with so little success \nthat at last he even took up the question of \nimplements more primitive than muskets. \nThere was in camp a company of Stockbridge \nIndians, who were so successful as to way- \nlay a British sentry or two and kill them with \narrows. Franklin, perhaps taking the hint \nfrom this, wrote to prove that the long-bow \nmight be revived, but Washington would \nhave none of it. Pikes, however, whose use \nin European warfare was fairly recent, he \nwould consider. A number were ordered, \nand after them a second set of stronger make, \nthe first being \"ridiculously short and light.\" 2 \nIn October came to light the treason of \n\n1 Henshaw's \" Orderly Book.\" 2 Ibid. \n\n\nWashington takes Command 327 \n\nDr. Benjamin Church. As already shown, \nhe had for some time before the I9th of April \nbeen in communication with Gage. On the \n22d, when he went into Boston with the \nknowledge of the Committee of Safety, he \ndoubtless saw the general in person. An \noccurrence now showed that he was writing \nto the British commander, though his agency \nwas not at first suspected. From Newport \ncame a letter, brought by an American \npatriot to whom it had been given by a \nwoman from Cambridge, who had requested \nto have it delivered to some officer of the \nBritish vessel stationed in the harbor. The \nAmerican kept the letter, and, suspecting its \npurport, opened it. It was in cipher. This \nin itself was suspicious, and the letter was \nbrought to Washington, who caused the \nwoman to be arrested and questioned. At \nfirst she was obstinate, but finally she named \nChurch as the writer of the letter. He in his \nturn was put under guard, but had had time \nto destroy any papers that might betray \nhim. The letter when deciphered proved to \n\n\n328 The Siege of Boston \n\ngive little information besides the numbers \nof the American forces. From first to last \nChurch had been of little value to Gage. \n\nBut the army and country, as Washington \nwrote, were \"exceedingly irritated.\" Church \nwas a man of pleasing address and ready \nlanguage, and had stood high in Boston for \nyears. He had written Whig pamphlets, had \nbeen an orator on the Massacre, and had \nserved on many committees, notably the \nCommittee of Safety. In consequence he \nhad been given the highest office that a phy- \nsician could look for, that of surgeon-general \nto the army. Resentment at his betrayal \nwas extreme, and Abigail Adams was prob- \nably right when she wrote, \"If he is set at \nliberty, even after he has received a severe \npunishment, I do not think he will be safe.\" \n\nChurch was not set free. As a member of \nthe Massachusetts Congress he was brought \nbefore the House, and allowed to make his \ndefence, which was elaborate and able. \nChurch claimed that he was writing to his \nbrother, and that his intentions were harm- \n\n\nWashington takes Command 329 \n\nless ; but he was not believed, and was ex- \npelled from the House. Later the Continen- \ntal Congress adjudged him guilty, and ordered \nhim confined in jail. Released later on ac- \ncount of his health, he was allowed to sail \nfor the West Indies. His vessel was never \nagain heard from. \n\nThis was Washington's foretaste of the \ntreason of Arnold. It may have disturbed \nhim deeply, but of that he gave no sign. So \nfar as we can see, he dismissed the matter \nfrom his mind and went on with his work of \nproviding a way for assaulting the town. \nCongress desired this, the country looked for \nit, and his own fiery nature urged him to the \nrisk. \n\nOn the nth of September, having pre- \nviously notified his generals that he would \nlay the question before them, he had called a \ncouncil of war, and proposed an attack upon \nBoston. They were unanimously against it. \nNow, in October, he again laid the matter \nbefore his council of war, and reached prac- \ntically the same result, General Greene alone \n\n\n330 The Siege of Boston \n\nthinking the scheme practical, \"if ten thou- \nsand men could be landed at Boston.\" 1 If it \nis true that councils of war do not fight, the \nresult was natural ; but the situation was a \nvery difficult one. The British had made \nCharlestown practically impregnable against \nanything except surprise, by a powerful re- \ndoubt on Bunker Hill. As for Boston itself, \nit was fortified at all prominent points, and \nwas very strongly garrisoned by veteran \ntroops. The Neck could not be forced, and \nto cross in boats over the Back Bay was \na hazardous undertaking. It was common \nsense, therefore, to wait until ice should make \nit possible to assault the town at several \npoints. With his wonderful patience Wash- \nington accepted the situation, and contented \nhimself with wishing that the British would \nattack him. There were continual rumors \nthat the British plan was laid, and deserters \nfrequently came from Boston prophesying a \nsally; but still the regulars lay in their fast- \nness, and did not move. \n\n1 Trevelyan's \"Revolution,\" Part I. \n\n\nCHAPTER XII \n\nEVENTS IN BOSTON FROM JUNE TO DECEMBER, \n\nI77S \n\nTHE history of events in Boston after \nthe battle of Bunker Hill is of a quite \ndifferent tenor from that which we have \njust been considering. From the time when \nthe wounded, and the more distinguished of \nthe dead, were carried over from Charles town \non the evening of the seventeenth of June, the \nsober truth struck home, not yet to the \nTories and the common run of officers, but \nto the generals. They were in a tight place, \nfrom which it would be difficult to escape with \ncredit. \n\nThey might — and some of them did — \nreckon it out by common arithmetic. If it \ncost a thousand men to take a hill, and re- \nquired another thousand to garrison it when \ntaken, how much could the British army \n\n331 \n\n\n33 2 The Siege of Boston \n\nmaster of the rolling country that lay before \nits eyes ? Beyond the exit from either pen- \ninsula the next hill was already fortified, and \nthe Americans prepared to \"sell it at the \nsame price.\" l \n\nThe British generals wrote very plainly in \nexplaining the situation to their superiors at \nhome. To be sure, Gage was a trifle disin- \ngenuous in reviewing the past. While ad- \nmitting that the recent trials at arms proved \nthe rebels \"not the despicable rabble too \nmany have supposed them to be,\" he ignored \nhis original boast concerning lions and \nlambs. In stating that in all previous wars \nthe Americans had never showed so much \n\"conduct, attention, and perseverance,\" he \nadmitted his ignorance of colonial history. \nBut Gage was endeavoring to salve his smart \nand conceal his own shame. \n\nBurgoyne, with nothing to palliate, wrote \nvery frankly. \"Look, my Lord,\" he said to \nthe Secretary of State for the Colonies, \n\n1 This expression is ascribed to General Nathanael \nGreene. \n\n\nJune to December in Boston 3^3 \n\n(ftittario \n\n\"upon the country near Boston. It is ailfr \nfortification.\" His mathematics has been al- \nready quoted; he adds that the army had \nnothing for transport in an active campaign of \nany duration. Proceeding, he delicately points \nout that Gage was not the man for the situation, \nand laments again that the general had no \nmeans of knowing what passed in the American \ncouncils, or even within the American lines. \nThis is but another proof, if one were needed, \nof the poor use to which Church had put his \nopportunities. Surely he, as Arnold later, \nsold his soul to little purpose. Few things in \nthis campaign are more honorable to America \nthan the fact that Washington's most pre- \ncious secret, his lack of powder, though \nknown to many, never came to the ears of \nthe British generals. One may question if \nthe truth, if told, would have been believed, \nfor men of Gage and Howe's training could \nscarcely suppose a man capable of such dar- \ning and dogged obstinacy as to hold his post \nbefore them without powder, or guns, or, as \nit finally turned out, almost without men. \n\n\n334 The Siege of Boston \n\nBut no statement has been made that the \ncommanders heard even rumors of Washing- \nton's difficulties. \n\nAfter Bunker Hill, then, the British gen- \nerals plainly saw that they could never cam- \npaign successfully with Boston as a base. \nAs to what should best be done, Gage had no \nidea ; Burgoyne, however, was ready with a \nplan. He proposed to keep in Boston as \nsmall a garrison, supported by as small a \nfleet, as could safely be left, and to send the \nrest of the troops and ships to harry the \ncoast. This proposition, if by the vague \nterm of chastisement he meant the burning of \ndefenceless towns, was unworthy of Burgoyne ; \nbut when later he proposed with this de- \ntached force to occupy Rhode Island, doubt- \nless using Newport as a base, he outlined a \nplan which, if followed, would have seriously \nembarrassed the Americans. But the advice \nwas not taken, and for months the British \ngenerals contented themselves with wishing \nthey were at New York, without taking any \nsteps toward going there. \n\n\nJune to December in Boston 335 \n\nOne thing at least they should have done. \nIt will be remembered that the American \noccupancy of Bunker Hill had been pre- \ncipitated by knowledge of a British plan to \ntake Dorchester Heights. This plan of Gage's \nwas not abandoned after the battle. It is \nspoken of in a letter of Burgoyne's, and is \nlaid down as a part of his scheme to make \nBoston secure while his marauding fleet \nmenaced southern New England. We are \neven able to suppose that feeble moves toward \nseizing the Heights were twice made. Once \na couple of regiments, on transports, dropped \ndown the channel ; and once two regiments \nwere withdrawn from Charlestown to Boston, \nwith various companies from the castle. \nLieutenant Barker gives the reason why in \nthe latter case nothing was done: \"the \nGenl. hearing that they had got intelligence \nand reinforced that place with 4000 men.\" \nBut this is mere rumor; the Americans had \nnot yet sent any troops into Dorchester. \nThis leaves us very much in the dark as to \nwhy the Heights were not occupied ; but \n\n\n336 The Siege of Boston \n\noccupied they were not ; the plan receives no \nfurther mention, and though from month to \nmonth the British watched Washington seiz- \ning posts ever nearer to Boston, they behaved \nin all respects as if he were under pledge to \navoid Dorchester. \n\nGage's chief activity was in fortifying. He \nstrengthened his existing works, and en- \ntrenched himself particularly well at Bunker \nHill. As the American redoubt was of little \nvalue to the British, they made their main \ndefence upon the top of the higher hill, and \nmounted guns to sweep Charlestown Neck \nand the country beyond. Little by little \nboth Gage and his successor strengthened this \npost, cutting down trees for abatis, and \nmaking advanced posts similar to those at \nBoston Neck. Before the end of the siege \nit was the strongest British post, and Wash- \nington knew better than to molest it, es- \npecially when he had a better move to make. \n\nActual military operations were trifling. \nIn retaliation for an American attack, on the \n3Oth of July the regulars made a sally from \n\n\nJune to December in Boston 337 \n\nBoston toward Roxbury, drove in the Ameri- \ncan advance guard, and burnt a house or \ntwo. The undertaking appears to have been \nwithout object, and resulted in nothing except \nsome harmless cannonading. At other times \narmed boats ventured along the Cambridge \nshore, or tried the rivers, always to be sent \nback by the bullets of Yankee sharpshooters. \nWhen the Virginia riflemen appeared, however, \nthere was less of this diversion. These men, \nfinding themselves debarred from the larger \nfield operations, resolved at least to get \nsomething in return for their long march. \nSo they set themselves to watch for the \nappearance of British exploring parties, and \neven stalked the sentries. The officers in- \ndignantly complained that this was not war \naccording to rule, but both they and their \nsentries took care not to expose themselves. \nThe largest operation undertaken by the \nBritish was at the approach of winter, when \nearly in November they sent a small force \nto Lechmere's Point, at a time when a very \nhigh tide had converted the place into an \n\n\n338 The Siege of Boston \n\nisland. They took a few cows, and lost a \ncouple of men ; on retiring they pointed to \nthe American unwillingness to attack them, \nbut this, as we have already learned, was on \naccount of the spoiled cartridges. \n\nAll these operations, it will be seen, took \nplace practically within the limits of the \nBack Bay and its adjacent waters, into \nwhich flowed the Charles River and a few \ncreeks. Once or twice British boats tried to \nexplore the Mystic, but with the coming of \nthe riflemen that diversion stopped. When \nfinally the Yankees dragged whale-boats to \nthe Mystic and Charles, and began building \nfloating batteries on their own account, British \ncuriosity as to the American shore-line lapsed \nentirely. \n\nDown the harbor Gage did nothing, except \nto send, tardily, to repel American expedi- \ntions. We have seen that the British could \nnot save the lighthouse. The Yankee fisher- \nmen now took occasion to remove from the \nislands the hay and live stock which they \nhad not taken before Bunker Hill. Their \n\n\nJune to December in Boston 339 \n\nactivities drew from Burgoyne an indignant \nletter. \n\n\"It may be asked in England, 'What is \nthe Admiral doing ? ' \n\n\"I wish I were able to answer that ques- \ntion satisfactorily, but I can only say what \nhe is not doing. \n\n\"That he is not supplying us with sheep \nand oxen, the dinners of the best of us bear \nmeagre testimony; the state of our hospitals \nbears a more melancholy one. \n\n\"He is not defending his own flocks and \nherds, for the enemy have repeatedly plun- \ndered his own islands. \n\n\"He is not defending the other islands in \nthe harbour, for the enemy in force landed \nfrom a great number of boats, and burned \nthe lighthouse at noonday (having first killed \nor taken the party of marines which was \nposted there) almost under the guns of two \nor three men-of-war. \n\n\"He is not employing his ships to keep \nup communication and intelligence with the \nKing's servants and friends at different parts \n\n\n340 The Siege of Boston \n\nof the continent, for I do not believe that \nGeneral Gage has received a letter from \nany correspondent out of Boston these six \nweeks. \n\n\"He is intent upon greater objects, you \nwill think, — supporting in the great points \nthe dignity of the British flag, — and where \na number of boats have been built for the \nenemy ; privateers fitted out ; prizes carried \nin ; the King's armed vessels sunk ; the crews \nmade prisoners ; the officers killed, — he is \ndoubtless enforcing instant restitution and \nreparation by the voice of his cannon and \nlaying the towns in ashes that refuse his \nterms ? Alas ! he is not.\" 1 \n\nBurgoyne finishes his indictment by lump- \ning with the admiral's inefficiencies the \nweaknesses of quartermaster-generals, adju- \ntant-generals, secretaries, and commissaries. \nIn all this we catch a glimpse of one \nresult of the king's policy, which was to \nreward his friends and rebuke his enemies. \nSince he classed with his enemies the Whigs \n\n1 Fonblanque's \"Burgoyne,\" 197-198. \n\n\nJune to December in Boston 341 \n\nwho were at home, he had only Tories to \ndraw from. From them came Admiral Graves, \nand the crowd of incompetents who filled \noffices in America. The royal service was \nnow paying the piper. \n\nOne result Burgoyne has noted very \nplainly, in the lack of fresh provision. The \nadmiral could have protected the stock on \nthe harbor islands, and without unnecessary \nviolence could have seized provisions from \nthe shore towns. This, however, he did not \ndo, and we soon find the army complaining \nof its fare. It was not that the commissary \nwas negligent ; even the moneyed officers \nwere at times unable to satisfy their desire \nfor fresh meat, the supply of which was un- \ncertain. For lack of hay, the milk supply \nsoon disappeared, since cows could not be \nfed and had to be killed. Cheerful news \ncame to the American camp that the vener- \nable town bull had been sold for beef. The \narmy even tired of its supply of fish, which, \nto be sure, never was great, though then as \nnow Boston lay close to good fishing grounds. \n\n\n342 The Siege of Boston \n\nSalt pork was the main reliance, and before \nthe middle of the summer the army had had \naltogether too much of that. \n\nIn consequence of this restricted diet the \nwounded from Bunker Hill died in great \nnumbers. Of the wounded American prison- \ners very few survived. Some, as Washington \nheard, were operated on in the common jail, \nin which most of them were confined, and \nwhere the chances of their recovery were \nslight. They fared \"very hard,\" said John \nLeach, who had opportunity to know; not \none of them survived amputation. As to the \nrest, there can be no question that they were \nbadly treated. Theii; doctor complained that \nthey had had no bread for two days ; the \nProvost replied \"they might eat the Nail \nHeads, and knaw the plank and be damn'd.\" l \nTheir more fortunate fellow-prisoners, who \nwere not taken in arms and who received food \nfrom their families in Boston, sent the Bun- \nker Hill prisoners what comforts they could \nbribe the soldiers to take to them ; but, says \n\nReach's \"Journal.\" \n\n\nJune to December in Boston 343 \n\nLeach's diary, \"they have no Wood for days \ntogether, to Warm their Drink, and dying \nmen drink them cold.\" By the 2ist of Sep- \ntember eighteen out of twenty-nine prisoners \nhad died in the jail. \n\nYet even the British wounded showed a \nhigh mortality. This was largely on account \nof the food, which, although it was the best \nthat was to be had, was none too good for \nsuifering men. The high death rate was in \npart due to the American marksmanship, \nwhich caused many body wounds. What \nwith such wounds, and such food, and the \nunaccustomed heat, there were so many \ndeaths among the wounded that it was se- \nriously stated that the American bullets were \npoisoned. \n\nThere was, then, considerable discontent \namong the British soldiery. Of it at one \ntime the Americans took ingenious advantage. \nWhen the wind was setting toward the British \nlines at Charlestown, the Americans at the \nMedford lines scattered handbills that were \ndriven to the British sentries. On the bills \n\n\n344 The Siege of Boston \n\nwas to be read a comparison intended to in- \ncrease British discontent. It ran : — \n\nPROSPECT HILL BUNKERS HILL \n\nI. Seven dollars a I. Three pence a \n\nmonth. day. \n\nII. Fresh provisions II. Rotten salt pork, \nand in plenty. \n\nIII. Health. III. The scurvy. \n\nIV. Freedom, ease, IV. Slavery, beggary, \n\naffluence, and and want, \n\na good farm. \n\nThese handbills thus coming into the hands \nof the privates were passed about secretly, \nuntil the officers got wind of the device, and \ncomplained to the Americans. The retort \nwas that the British themselves had already \nbeen tempting sentries to desert. This de- \nserting did go on throughout the siege, from \neither side, though it would seem as if more \nof the British fled from their service. Into \nwhichever lines they went, the deserters \nalways brought highly colored tales to buy \ntheir welcome. The leaders very soon learned \nhow little reliance could be placed upon such \n\n\nJune to December in Boston 345 \n\ninformation. \"We ought not to catch at \nsuch shadows as that. We have nothing \nunder God to depend upon, but our own \nstrength.\" 1 \n\nIf the British private was discontented, \nthat was his habit; and though the officers \ngrumbled as well, they had comparatively \nlittle to complain of. To be sure, the food \nwas coarse, but it was plentiful. Even the \nunaccustomed heat would seem comfortable \nto a Bostonian of to-day. The marine officers \nhad more pleasant conditions, with their open \nports and harbor breezes, and decks frequently \nsluiced with water. But the town itself had \nno tall buildings or confined spaces ; gener- \nally speaking, it was open from water to \nwater, with plentiful shade. Boston in 1775 \nmust have been as cool as its own summer \nresorts of the twentieth century. \n\nThe Tories, at least, found it bearable. \nThey were accustomed to the summer heat, \nand knew themselves much better off than \n\n1 William T. Miller, of Newport, R.I., to his wife \nLydia. Mass. Hist, and Gen. Register, 1855. \n\n\n346 The Siege of Boston \n\nthe unfortunate members of their party who \nhad been unable to escape to the British \nlines. Many of the country Tories were con- \nfined to their estates, and forbidden to com- \nmunicate with each other. \"I wish to God,\" \nwrote Samuel Paine, \"all our friends were \nhere out of the hands of such Villains.\" Com- \npared with such treatment, serenades by \nthirteen-inch mortars and twenty-four pound- \ners were apparently trifling — though the \nladies did not think so. One, writing of the \nskirmish on the night of July 30, spoke of \nthe umost dreadful cannonading,\" and \"the \napprehensions that naturally seize every one, \neither of the enemy breaking in, or the town \nbeing set on fire.\" 1 Even Samuel Paine saw \nthe serious side of the situation. \"These,\" he \nasks, \"are Governor Hutchinson's countrymen \nthat would not fight, are they ?\" \n\nIt was because he realized that fight they \nwould, \"and like the devil,\" that he and \nothers considered enlisting in the various \ncorps which were organized in the town. \n\n1 Frothingham's \"Siege,\" 230. \n\n\nJune to December in Boston 347 \n\nAccording to Frothingham, who could find \nno statistics of the numbers of Tory volun- \nteers, there were at least three corps formed : \nthe Loyal American Associators under Tim- \nothy Ruggles, the Loyal Irish Volunteers \nunder James Forrest, and the Royal Fenci- \nble Americans under Colonel Graham.1 Ac- \ncording to Samuel Paine, there was a fourth \ncorps, but it is not named. A commis- \nsion in one of these organizations was par- \nticularly attractive, as the service was ex- \npected to be short, and at its expiration the \nofficers were to go upon half pay. Further, \nthe duties were very light, being confined \nto drilling and patrolling the town. In the \nmilitary events of the siege these corps took \nno part whatever. \n\nIt must be remembered, however, that out \nof this situation England did gain some \nvaluable soldiers. The mettle of a few \nof the Tories was shown at Bunker Hill, \nwhere they went as individual volunteers, \nand served with the troops. Others, dis- \n\n1 Ibid., 279. \n\n\n348 The Siege of Boston \n\ndaining the toy-soldiering of their friends, \nseized the chance to join the regular army, \nand fought in it throughout the war, or until \ntheir deaths. Such men were John Coffin, \nLeverett Saltonstall, and the two Thomas \nGilberts. \n\nYet men of this quality were few, and at \nleast at this stage of the war the Tories were \nof little service to their king. Most of them \nwere content to wait until the time when \nthe regulars should scatter the besiegers and \nconduct the loyalists to their homes. Mean- \nwhile they enjoyed the society into which \nthey were thrown. \"We have here,\" wrote \nSamuel Paine, \"Earls, Lords, and Baronets, \nI assure you Names that Sound grand.\" \nThese names did bring to the Tories a \nfair amount of social gayety. Mrs. Gage \nwas at the head of her own little circle, not \nalways enjoyed by those who could not for- \nget her American birth. There were other \ngroups of ladies who, whether English or \nTory, contrived to make the time pass pleas- \nantly for themselves and for the men. With \n\n\nJune to December in Boston 349 \n\nfew responsibilities, and with confidence in the \nfuture, the loyalists had a pleasant enough \nsummer, and saw ahead of them a comfort- \nable winter. \n\nThe situation of the Whigs was not so en- \njoyable. Before Bunker Hill, every one of \nthem who could leave Boston had done so. \nBut there were many of them left, and among \nthem were a number of the more respectable \nand prominent of the Whigs. None of them \nwrote letters, and few indeed kept diaries ; there \nis, therefore, a notable lack of information con- \ncerning their doings. We do know, however, \nthat they were at a great disadvantage as \nagainst their Tory acquaintances. No priv- \nileges of the commissary were theirs, and no \nfavors were to be had from the military \nauthorities. When there was fresh meat in \nthe town the Whigs could get little of it \nwithout repudiating their political creed ; \nwhen the supply was scant, the Whigs went \nwithout. \"They even denied us,\" wrote \nJohn Andrews, looking back upon this period, \n\"the privilege of buying the surplusage of \n\n\n350 The Siege of Boston \n\nthe soldiers' rations.\" Even before Bunker \nHill he had written, \" It's hard to stay cooped \nup here and feed upon salt provisions, more \nespecially without one's wife. . . . Pork \nand beans one day, and beans and pork \nanother, and fish when we can catch it.\" \nThroughout the summer the situation was \nlittle bettered. \"A loaf of bread the size we \nformerly gave three pence for, thought our- \nselves well off to get for a shilling. Butter \nat two shillings. Milk, for months without \ntasting any.\" \n\nThere were certain Whigs whose experiences \nwere more grim. To Gage, always in fear of \nbetrayal to the enemy, there came rumors \npointing to men whose known sentiments, \nor whose actions, subjected them to suspicion. \nAmong these were one Carpenter, a barber, \nwho had swum to Cambridge and back ; \none \"Dorrington, his son and maid, for blow- \ning up flies\" 1 ; but particularly John Leach \nand James Lovell, schoolmasters, with Peter \n\n1 This obscure diversion caused the Dorringtons to \nbe suspected of signalling at night to the rebels. \n\n\nJune to December in Boston 351 \n\nEdes, printer, and his father's partner, John \nGill. All of these four were obnoxious to the \nTories, being outspoken Whigs and teachers \nof sedition, whether in their schools or their \npublications. One by one they were im- \nprisoned in the common jail, and held there \nduring various terms. Their treatment was \nharsh and ungenerous, held in close neighbor- \nhood with felons and loose livers, and not in- \nformed of what they were accused. Leach and \nEdes kept diaries when in prison. \"From \nthe 2d July to the I7th,\" writes Leach, \"a \nComplicated scene of Oaths, Curses, De- \nbauchery, and the most horrid Blasphemy, \ncommitted by the Provost Marshal, his \nDeputy and Soldiers, who were our guard, \nSoldier prisoners, and sundry soldier women, \nconfined for Thefts, &c. . . . When our \nWives, Children, and Friends came to see us, \n(which was seldom they were permitted) we \nseemed to want them gone, notwithstanding \nwe were desirous of their Company, as they \nwere exposed to hear the most abandon'd \nlanguage, as was grating to the ears of all \n\n\n352 The Siege of Boston \n\nsober persons.\" This Leach suspected to \nbe intentional, but the offensive actions and \nwords were incessant, especially on Sundays. \nOn the i yth Leach's son died, \"whom I \nleft well in my house\" ; but he was not allowed \nto attend the funeral, nor to be tried, nor \ndismissed. Three weeks after he and Lovell \nhad been put in jail they first learned of what \nthey were accused: Lovell of \"being a Spy, \nand giving intelligence to the rebels,\" and \nLeach of \"being a spy, and suspected of \ntaking plans.\" Their examination was a \nfarce, the witness against them not knowing \nthem apart. They were remanded to jail, \nand lay there until October. Lovell fell sick, \nand got a little better food, but no attention \nfrom his jailers — \"no Compassion toward him \nany more than a Dog.\" On the same day \nLeach noted that the Provost \"Cursed and \nDamned my little Child, for a Damn'd Rebel ; \nhe even Trembles at bringing my Diet.\" \nLovell grew better, and the vexatious treat- \nment continued with petty tyrannies. At \nlast, although no trial had yet been held, Edes, \n\n\nJune to December in Boston 353 \n\nGill, and Leach were released upon sureties \nof two inhabitants that they would not leave \nthe town. \n\nLovell was kept in jail. He was son of \nMaster John Lovell of the Latin School, in \nwhich he was usher until the opening of the \nwar. His frank utterances had so incensed \nthe authorities that they kept him in prison \nuntil the end of the siege, and then carried \nhim with them to Halifax. His father was a \nTory, and, so far as the diaries of the prison \nmates show, made no attempt to visit his son \nin prison. James Lovell was exchanged in \nthe summer of 1776. \n\nThrough Edes' prison diary, and the brief \njottings which pass for the journal of Timothy \nNewell, selectman, we get a glimpse of a turn- \ncoat. The incident in which he figures is \nthe only one that caused Newell, who gave \na scant hundred and twenty-five words to \nBunker Hill battle, to write at any length. \nOne John Morrison, formerly minister at \nPeterborough, New Hampshire, had been \n\"obliged,\" says Edes, \"to quit his people \n\n2A \n\n\n354 The Siege of Boston \n\non account of his scandalous behaviour.\" \nHe joined the provincial army, and is said \nto have fought at Bunker Hill ; but a week \nlater he joined the British with the usual mis- \nstatements of the American intentions. In the \nmiddle of September, Morrison moved for \npermission to use for his services the Brattle \nStreet Church, \"Dr. Cooper's Meetinghouse,\" \nof which Timothy Newell was a member of \nthe parish committee. Newell, \"with an \nemotion of resentment,\" roundly refused to \ndeliver the key to Morrison and his friends, \nand made his way into the presence of the \ngovernor, where he stated that Morrison was \na man of infamous character. But the turn- \ncoat had respectable backers. Gage required \nthe key of Newell, and got it ; and Morrison \nheld at least one service in the church. It \nwas to this service, on the iyth of September, \nthat Edes was conducted, doubtless as a \nprivilege, and heard a political sermon on \nthe ingratitude of the provincials. Edes re- \nmarked that the Tories present affected to \ngrin, but it was horribly, with a ghastly \n\n\nJune to December in Boston 355 \n\nsmile. The newspapers, however, called it an \nexcellent discourse to a genteel audience, and \nannounced regular services. Morrison, still \ncontemptuously styled the deserter, figures \nagain in Newell's diary in November, when \nhe informed against an old Dutch woman \nfor trying to carry out of town more money \nthan her permit allowed. His profit on this \nwas ten dollars. When winter approached, the \nBrattle Street Church was taken for use as a \nbarracks, and Morrison got himself a place \nin the commissary department, which per- \nhaps was more to his liking than sermonizing.1 \nThe interview with Newell gives us a \nglimpse of Gage in almost the last of his \ntroubles with the stiff-necked Bostonians. \nLess than a fortnight later2 he received word \nfrom London that the king desired his pres- \nence, in order to consult upon future opera- \ntions. Probably the unlucky commander saw \n\n1 Leach's and Edes' \"Journals,\" N. E. Hist and Gen. \nRegister, 1865; Newell's \"Journal,\" Mass. Hist. Soc. \nCollections, i, series iv; Frothingham's \"Siege,\" 239; \nSabine's \"Loyalists.\" 2 September 26. \n\n\n356 The Siege of Boston \n\nin the message the end of his commission, \nbut he went as one expecting to return. As \nwas customary, he was presented with adula- \ntory addresses, and on October 10 departed \nin state. His welcome in England was not \nso stately. The king did give him an inter- \nview, and listened attentively to his explana- \ntions, but it was popularly suggested that \nthe unsuccessful general be created Lord Lex- \nington, Baron of Bunker Hill. Gage's com- \nmand was not restored to him, and he never \nagain went on active service. \n\nOne legacy indeed he left, perhaps the \nworst act of his administration and the \nmost far-reaching, although the personal \nblame does not lie with Gage himself. On the \n4th of October he sent out a small fleet of \nvessels which accomplished more harm than \ngood. It skirmished with privateers, and \neventually, reaching Falmouth, now Portland \nin Maine, but then in Massachusetts ter- \nritory, attempted to levy upon the town. \nCaptain Mowatt, the commander, picked a \nquarrel with the inhabitants, and finding \n\n\nJune to December in Boston 357 \n\nthem unyielding, burnt their village. The \nblame lies between Mowatt and Admiral \nGraves, both of whom had grudges against \nthe town on account of a previous incident. \nThe ministry repudiated the act, but the fact \nis undeniable that it was within the spirit \nof the instructions given to a later expedition, \nto \"destroy any towns\" that would not \nsubmit.1 The effect on the Americans, how- \never, was very far from teaching submission. \nThe news of the burning of Falmouth did \nas much as any other event to impress the \nprovincials with the impossibility of an agree- \nment with the king. \n\nIn Gage's place now stood Howe, on whom \nthe British hopes centred. According to \nthe Tory Samuel Paine, Howe united the \nspirit of a Wolfe with the genius of a Marl- \nborough. Without prizing him quite so highly, \nboth the army and the administration looked \nto Howe for action and results. It seemed to \nthem that now at last something must happen. \n\n1 Instructions for Clinton's expedition to the south- \nward. Frothingham's \"Siege,\" 292. \n\n\n358 The Siege of Boston \n\nBut Howe, though with a willing army \nat his back, disciplined and well equipped, \ndid nothing. He strengthened the Charles- \ntown lines and the fort on Bunker Hill, he \nimproved the defences at Boston Neck, and \nhe began various batteries on Beacon Hill and \nthe shores of the Common. He demolished \na number of buildings in the north end of the \ntown, in order to make communication be- \ntween his posts more direct. But except \nfor the little expedition across the Back \nBay to Lechmere's Point, which netted a \nfew cows, Howe attempted no offensive op- \nerations. As already shown, the regulars \nreturned from Lechmere's Point as soon \nas the provincials assembled in numbers, and \nno attempt was made to hold the little hill. \nOther skirmishes there were from time to time, \nbut these were insignificant, and they were \nall. \n\nThe fact is that Howe's opinion coincided \nexactly with those of Gage and Burgoyne. \nThe country was too strong to be forced, \nespecially since the Americans had spent a \n\n\nJune to December in Boston 359 \n\nsummer on their entrenchments. There was \nno profit in taking a rebel fort if the army and \nits situation were to be weakened thereby. \nHowe looked with longing eyes toward New \nYork, took up Burgoyne's idea of a post in \nRhode Island, and believed that if he had \ntwenty thousand men holding all three posi- \ntions the rebels would be beaten. But such \nan army was not forthcoming, and the ques- \ntion arose whether he had best stay in Bos- \nton or go to New York. In reply to ques- \ntions from the ministry, Howe pointed out \nthat he had not a large enough fleet to con- \nvey himself, his stores, and the Tories, from \nthe place. It was therefore understood that \nmore ships and men should be supplied him \nin the spring, and that meanwhile he should \ngo into winter quarters. \n\nThis was done. Buildings in the town \nwere arranged to accommodate the troops, \ntwo of the churches being fitted up for this \npurpose. The tents were struck, and the \narmy made itself snug. Howe busied him- \nself with routine matters of the camp, and \n\n\n360 The Siege of Boston \n\nrefused to budge. Though Washington first \nfortified Cobble Hill in Somerville, the nearest \nhe had yet come to the British posts, and \nthough after that he came a step nearer, \nseizing Lechmere's Point, Howe simply fired \nfrom cannon, but made no attempt to storm \nthe works. The cannonading merely inured \nthe Americans to danger, and seeing that it \ndid them good rather than harm, Howe \npresently stopped it. Washington, perhaps \nnot aware of the strength of his own position, \ndeclared himself \"unable, upon any principle \nwhatever,\" to account for Howe's inaction. \nHe suspected it might be intended to lull \nhim into a false sense of security, but resolved \nto be more vigilant than ever. \n\n\nCHAPTER XIII \n\n\nWASHINGTON'S DIFFICULTIES \n\n\nTHE situation at Boston in the fall of \n1775 presents an interesting compari- \nson : two generals of opposing armies, \neach ready to welcome an attack, but each un- \nable to deliver one. The difference between the \ntwo, and the fact which determined the outcome, \nwas in the natures of the two men. Howe, \nfrom a certain sluggishness of disposition, was \ncontent to sit tight, and wait until the govern- \nment at home should send him his relief. \nThough at each move his enemy came nearer, \nHowe still appeared to believe that Dorchester \nwas safe from seizure, and was content so \nto believe. But Washington was not satisfied \nto be still. His nature urged him to action, \nand though he knew himself too weak for an \nassault, he constantly schemed and worked to \nput his army into condition to strike. \n\n361 \n\n\n362 The Siege of Boston \n\nIn some ways his organization was already \ncomplete. He had under him many of the \nmen who were to serve him through the war. \nTo be sure, he had Charles Lee, \"the worst \npresent that could be made to any army ; \" \nbut Lee's part in the siege was slight, for \nWashington frequently employed him for dis- \ntant undertakings. Gates was still present \nalso, but in a subordinate capacity. And an- \nother of those who, before the war was over, \ndid their best to wreck the American cause, \nwas present for a while in the person of Bene- \ndict Arnold, already distinguished by his \nshare in the taking of Ticonderoga. Early in \nSeptember, however, Arnold was sent on his \nfruitless mission against Quebec. \n\nBut besides these men, not one of whom had \nas yet proved his weakness, Washington had \nalready at his back some of the best soldiers \nwhom the war produced. Among the higher \nofficers were Putnam, Thomas, Sullivan, \nHeath, and more particularly Greene. Of \nlower grade were Stark, Morgan, Prescott, \nand, not yet well known, Knox, the Boston \n\n\nWashington's Difficulties 363 \n\nbookseller whom we have seen endeavoring \nto prevent the Massacre, who had studied \ntactics in his own volumes and at the manoeu- \nvres of the regulars, and who had escaped \nfrom Boston just before the iyth of June. \nThere were yet others who were destined to \ndistinguish themselves, and Washington knew \nthat he had, among his officers, as courageous \nand intelligent soldiers as were to be found \nanywhere. \n\nYet they were but a nucleus, while his \nsupplies remained few and poor, and the \norganization of the army unsatisfactory. As \nthe winter approached, Washington looked \nforward uneasily to the expiration of the \nterms of enlistment of his troops. Some \nwould lapse in December, the rest at the \nfirst of January. His regiments were not \nuniform in size, and they retained too much \nof the provincial jealousy which had already \ntroubled him, and which had perhaps lost \nBunker Hill. It was very evident to him \nthat an entirely new army should be organ- \nized. \n\n\n364 The Siege of Boston \n\nIt was therefore welcome to him that \nCongress should send a committee to help \nhim in the matter of reorganization. On \nOctober 18 the committee, with Franklin at \nits head, met with Washington, his staff, and \ndelegates from the four colonies which until \nnow had, practically alone, been prosecuting \nthe siege. The subject had been already \ndiscussed by the council of war, and the little \nconvention was made acquainted with the \ndiscrepancies in the organizations of the \ndifferent regiments, and the needs of the \narmy. It was decided to reduce the num- \nber of regiments from thirty-eight to twenty- \nsix. This meant not so much to reduce the \nnumber of men as the number of officers. \nThe term of reenlistment was to be one year, \nand the delegates assured Washington that he \ncould count on twenty thousand men from \nMassachusetts, eight thousand from Con- \nnecticut, three thousand from New Hamp- \nshire, and fifteen hundred from Rhode Island. \nThe regiments were to be uniform in size, \nconsisting of eight companies each ; besides \n\n\nWashington's Difficulties 365 \n\nregular infantry, there were to be riflemen \nand artillery. A system for clothing and sup- \nplying the army was agreed upon. When the \nlittle convention had broken up, the Com- \nmittee from Congress remained for a few days, \nrevising the articles of war, considering the \ndisposition of naval prizes, and discussing a \nnumber of minor topics. Upon the com- \nmitteq's return to Philadelphia, its actions \nwere ratified by Congress.1 \n\nWashington then set himself with new \nassurance to his task. Thanks to the con- \nvention, he felt that he had a united country \nat his back, and that much had been done \nto dissipate colonial jealousies. These are \nsurprising to us of to-day : one is astonished \nto find Greene seriously assuring \"the gentle- \nmen from the southward\" that the four New \nEngland colonies, as soon as they had con- \nquered King George, would not turn their \narms against the South. Yet had there been \nany such intention, the New Englanders \n\n1 See the \"Writings of Washington,\" iii, 123-124, \nnote. \n\n\n366 The Siege of Boston \n\nalready had their hands full with the British, \nand Washington was by no means out of the \nwoods. On paper he had an excellent organi- \nzation ; but in fact, everything was still to be \ndone. \n\nWith the approach of winter, the first task \nwas to house his army. This was gradually \naccomplished, and the regiments went into \ntheir winter quarters. For a time, however, \nthere was a scarcity of food and fuel. This \nwas due, not to a lack of either, but to the \nweakness in the system of providing for \nthem. For some weeks there was distress \nand discontent ; at times we are told that \nthe troops ate their provision raw, and most \nof the orchards and shade trees within the \ncamp were cut down for fuel. Washington \nvigorously represented the state of the case \nto the Massachusetts congress ; he gave per- \nmission to cut wood in private wood-lots, \npromising payment ; and finally the need was \nmet. The towns sent generous supplies of \nwood to the camp, rations were provided in \nplenty, and the only period of hardship which \n\n\nWashington's Difficulties 367 \n\nthe Americans endured was safely passed \nbefore the winter set in. \n\nThere was not much for the army to do \nwhen once the barracks were built and new \nquarters taken. The work of fortifying Lech- \nmere's Point went on slowly, on account of the \nfrost; it was not until the end of February \nthat the redoubt was completed, and its guns \nmounted. But the troops were drilled, and \nwere kept busy in perfecting the fortifications. \nWashington seized every chance to improve \nhis defences, as we see him when planning \nnew redoubts to guard against the possi- \nbility of a sortie from the Neck.1 \n\nThe news of the burning of Falmouth \nreached Washington on the 24th of October, \nand greatly roused his indignation. As it \nwas expected that the British fleet might \nnext descend upon Portsmouth, he sent Gen- \neral Sullivan thither, with orders to put the \nharbor in a state of defence, and at all events \nto save the small store of powder which had \nbeen brought into that place. This was a \n\n1 See letter to Ward, \"Writings,\" iii, 161. \n\n\n368 The Siege of Boston \n\ncapture by the little navy. Mowatt's fleet, \nhowever, made no attempt upon Portsmouth, \nand presently returned to Boston. Feeling \ntemporarily secure against further depredations \nupon the coast, Washington put his whole \nenergy into the reorganization of his army. \nThe period from the end of November until \nthe early part of February was one of the \nhardest in Washington's career. His diffi- \nculties were those which we have seen already, \nwant of powder and want of arms, but to \nthem was added the great fear of a lack of \nmen. As to powder, its supply still fluc- \ntuated, small quantities coming in irregularly, \nand being steadily used in equally niggardly \namounts, or slowly spoiling in the soldiers' \npouches. Muskets were still scanty, and \nWashington saw no hope except in buying \nthose of his soldiers whose terms were about \nto expire, or in sending agents through the \nneighboring towns to secure what they could \nfind. There was a corresponding lack of \ncannon, bayonets, flints, and small appur- \ntenances. \n\n\nWashington's Difficulties 369 \n\nBut weaknesses of this kind were nothing \nas compared with the threatened weakness in \nmen. Washington was deeply disappointed \nat his failure to recruit his newly planned \narmy. Although the delegates of the prov- \ninces had promised him full regiments, the \nnew recruiting system seemed to fail almost \nentirely. The general presently perceived \nseveral distinct factors that were working \nagainst its success. \n\nIn the first place, the new plan provided \nfor fewer officers in the new army. Many of \nthe provincial regiments, especially those of \nMassachusetts, had been over-officered, and \nnow, when the number of regiments was less \nby twelve, it was evident that scores of officers \nmust either accept lower rank or leave the \narmy entirely. It was found that most of \nthose who could not obtain equal rank were \nunwilling to remain, and that they were in- \nfluencing their men to leave the army with \nthem. \n\nBesides this, provincial jealousies worked \nstrongly in this matter of officers. Massa- \n\n\n2B \n\n\n370 The Siege of Boston \n\nchusetts officers who had been forced out of \nservice might have found places in the Con- \nnecticut regiments, but the soldiers of the \nother colony would have none of them. For \neach company and each platoon held firmly \nto the old idea that it must be consulted con- \ncerning its officers, and no private would con- \nsent to be commanded by a man from another \ncolony. This alone made plentiful trouble. \n\nFinally the men themselves had ideas of \ntheir own as to whether they cared to enlist. \nTo begin with, the shrewd among them \nreckoned that if they only held out long \nenough they might secure bounties for ree'n- \nlisting. Some were finicky as to their officers, \nand waited until they should be satisfied. \nAnd most of them perceived that as a reward \nfor patriotism they might at least receive \nfurloughs, and stood out for them. \n\nThe details of the work of enlisting were \nvery obscure and complicated. It was found \nthat officers were endeavoring to recruit their \nown companies, and in their zeal had enrolled \nmen who were already registered elsewhere. \n\n\nWashington's Difficulties 371 \n\nOutsiders, anxious for commissions, were simi- \nlarly forming companies, and presenting them \nfor acceptance. Washington steadily refused \nto receive such unauthorized organizations. \nAnd finally it was suspected that many men \nwho had given in their names had no inten- \ntion of serving. \n\nWhat would make their defection more \ncertain was the irregularity of pay. Congress \nhad appropriated sums of money, but the \ncurrency reached Washington slowly. It was \nvery singular, he complained, that the signers \nof the scrip could not keep pace with his \nneeds. Further, Congress had a very im- \nperfect idea of the magnitude of his legitimate \nneeds ; the appropriations were niggardly. \nAs the new year approached, when it was \nimportant that the men should be paid, and \nreceive assurance of further pay, Washington \nwrote to urge more remittances, that the sol- \ndiers might be satisfied. \n\nEven the crews of the little navy gave \nWashington no peace. His \"plague, trouble, \nand vexation\" with them he was unable to \n\n\n372 The Siege of Boston \n\nexpress ; he believed that there was not on \nearth a more disorderly set. One crew de- \nserted, and its vessel was docked. \n\nTo be sure, there were moments of satis- \nfaction in these dreary weeks of trial. Cer- \ntain of the rejected officers rose above their \ndisappointments. One of these was Colonel \nWhitcomb, who was not given a regiment in \nthe new establishment. At this his men \nbecame so dissatisfied that they decided not \nto enlist at all. Colonel Whitcomb, in order \nto persuade them to remain, announced his \nwillingness to enlist as a private. The situa- \ntion was saved by Colonel Jonathan Brewer, \nwho offered his command to Colonel Whit- \ncomb. Washington, in a general order, \nthanked both of the officers. Brewer was \nmade Barrack-Master, \"until something \nbetter worth his acceptance can be pro- \nvided.\" l \n\n1 See the \"Writings of Washington,\" iii, 161, note. \nThe facts concerning Washington's difficulties with \nenlisting are taken chiefly from this volume, where \nthey can best be studied. \n\n\nWashington's Difficulties 373 \n\nOther relief was provided by captures of \nBritish vessels. Of great importance to both \narmies was the capture of the Nancy, an \nordnance brig with a complete cargo of \nmilitary supplies — saving only powder. So \nvaluable did Washington consider the capture \nthat he at once sent four companies to the \nspot where the stores were landed, impressed \nteams for transportation, and called out the \nneighboring militia lest Howe should make \nan effort to recover the royal property. The \nBritish were on their part greatly disgusted at \nthe loss of the brig, not merely as weakening \nthem, but also as strengthening the enemy. \nThe chief prize on the ship was a thirteen- \ninch brass mortar, which on its arrival in \ncamp was greeted with acclamation, and \nby means of a bottle of rum was solemnly \nchristened the Congress. \n\nIt was about this time that Washington \nhad the satisfaction of being joined by his \nwife. There had been a suggestion that her \nresidence on the Potomac was not safe, but \neven before the naval raids Washington had \n\n\n374 The Siege of Boston \n\nbegun to suggest her joining him. She ar- \nrived on the nth of December, and resided \nuntil the end of the siege with him at his \nheadquarters in the old house still stand- \ning on Brattle Street, Cambridge. The house \nhas had an interesting history, having been \nbuilt by the Tory Vassalls, occupied by the \nMarblehead regiment, by Washington, by Dr. \nAndrew Craigie, surgeon at Bunker Hill, by \nJared Sparks, Edward Everett, Noah Webster, \nand by the poet Longfellow, whose family \nstill owns it. The quarters were for Wash- \nington central and pleasant ; they gave him \nhis last taste of home life for years. \n\nYet we are not to imagine him at any time \nfree of difficulties. With December began \nhis troubles with the Connecticut troops, \nwhose enlistment had expired. In spite of \nprevious promises to remain until their places \nwere filled, and against orders to leave their \nweapons, many of the Connecticut men \ntried to slip away, guns and all. Washing- \nton frequently speaks of them in his letters \nof the first half of December. In securing \n\n\nWashington's Difficulties 375 \n\ntheir return he was well aided by the officers, \nand by the aged but still energetic Governor \nTrumbull, who heard of the actions of his \nmen with \"grief, surprise, and indignation.\" \nTrumbull called the assembly of Connecticut \ntogether to consider the situation, but action \nwas forestalled by the people of the different \ntowns. The hint that the soldiers had best \nreturn voluntarily, lest they be sent back \nwith a feathered adornment that nature had \nnot provided, was sufficient to hurry most of \nthem back to their service. \n\nNo sooner had this matter been smoothed \nover, than Washington had to meet the gen- \neral situation, when on the first of January \nmost of the enlistments would expire. For \nsome weeks he had been anxiously watching \nthe returns of the enlistments, and the figures \nfrequently plunged him into depression. On \nthe 28th of November, finding that but \nthirty-five hundred men had enlisted, he \nwrote : \" Such a dearth of public spirit, such \nstock-jobbing, and such fertility in all the \nlow arts to obtain advantages of one kind \n\n\n376 The Siege of Boston \n\nor another, in this great change of military \narrangement, I never saw before, and pray \nGod's mercy I may never be witness to again.\" \nA week later he found himself under obliga- \ntions to give furlough to fifteen hundred \nmen a week, in order to satisfy them. To \nfill their places and those of the Connecticut \ntroops, he called on Massachusetts and New \nHampshire for five thousand militia. By \nthe middle of December scarcely six thousand \nmen had enlisted, and on Christmas Day \nonly eight thousand five hundred. On New \nYear's Day his army, which was to have been \nat least twenty thousand men, was not quite \nhalf that number. \n\nUnder such circumstances many a weaker \nman would have thrown up his office or aban- \ndoned his post. Washington stuck to his task. \nIf Howe would but remain inactive, the lag- \ngard country would in time retrieve itself. \nAs a matter of fact, many of the soldiers, after \na brief period of liberty, returned of their \nown accord to the standard. We find at \nleast one case in the diary of David How, \n\n\nWashington's Difficulties 377 \n\nwhich, in addition to revealing his actions, \ngives a glimpse of the camp at the end of the \nyear, when many of the men were going \naway, and the others were joining their new \nregiments. \n\n\"This Day,\" writes How on the 3Oth of \nDecember, \"we paraded and had our guns \ntook from us By the Major to prise them. \n\n\"31. This Day we have been In an uprore \nabout packun our Things up In order to go \nhome a Monday morning as Soon as we Can. \n\n\"Jan i. We have ben all Day a pecking \nup our Things For to go home. \n\n\"2d we all Left Cambridg this morning I \nwent to mr. Granger and staid all night. \n\n\"3d I went to methuen. \n\n\" $d I went to Haver hill to by some Leather \nfor B retches. \n\n\" 6 day I come to Andover and Staid at Mr. \nos goods. \n\n\"7 day I come to Cambridge about Six a \nClock at Night. \n\n\"Jany the 8 1776 This Day I Began with \nMr. Watson. \n\n\n378 The Siege of Boston \n\n\"Jan I4.1 This Day I wint to Cobble \nHill & to Litchmor point and to prospeck hill \n& So Home again. Nothing new. \n\n\"22. I listed with Leut David Chandler \nin Coin Sergant Regment.\" \n\nAnd so David How, veteran of Bunker \nHill, and doubtless many other young men, \nfound the lure of the camp, and let us say \nthe chance to serve the country, too much \nto withstand. Freedom to earn their own \nwages, and to stroll about the fortifications \non Sundays, were not to be measured against \nthe romance of soldiering and the hope of \nbattle. \n\nThis same New Year's Day, 1776, occurred \nan event of importance in the hoisting of the \nflag with the thirteen stripes. Previously \nthe colonies had used different devices, in the \nSouth a rattlesnake flag with the motto, \n\"Don't tread on me,\" and for the Connecticut \ntroops the colony arms and the motto Qui \ntranstulit sustinet, \"which we construe thus: \n' God, who transplanted us hither, will sup- \n\n1 This was a Sunday. \n\n\nWashington's Difficulties 379 \n\nport us.'\"1 Massachusetts had used the pine- \ntree flag and the motto \"Appeal to Heaven,\" \nand the little navy had a sign by which its \nships were known to each other, \"the ensign \nup to the main topping-lift.\" Now for the \nfirst time the thirteen stripes with the British \ncrosses in the corner were raised, amid much \nenthusiasm. \n\nCuriously, this coincided with the coming \nof the king's recent speech in Parliament, \nand a strange interpretation was put upon the \nappearance of the new flag. The British \nhad caused to be sent to the American lines \nmany copies of the speech, expecting that \nits expression of the king's determination \nto prosecute the war, even by the use of for- \neign troops, would bring the rebels to their \nknees. The cheering in the American camp, \nall the louder on account of the sentiments \nof his gracious majesty, and the appearance of \nthe new flag, combined to make the British \nsuppose that the provincials were weakening. \n\"By this time,\" wrote Washington grimly on \n\n1 Frothingham's \"Siege,\" 104. \n\n\n380 The Siege of Boston \n\nthe 4th, \"I presume they begin to think it \nstrange, that we have not made a formal \nsurrender of our lines.\" \n\nIt was well that he could jest, however \nsternly, for his situation was newly compli- \ncated by the permission of Congress to attack \nBoston whenever he might think expedient, \n\"notwithstanding the town and property \nin it may be destroyed.\" Such permission \nwas equivalent to a broad hint, and there \nwere not lacking suggestions from many \nobscure quarters that the country would be \nmore content if its general should relieve it \nof the presence of the British army. Of \n\"chimney corner heroes\" Washington had \na genuine contempt, but the resolve of Con- \ngress was another matter, especially when \nit came through the hands of John Hancock. \nHe was the largest property-owner in the \ntown, and prospectively the greatest sufferer \nby its destruction, yet he cheerfully wrote, \n\"May God crown your attempt with success !\" \n\nLong before now, had Washington been \nable, he would have attempted to storm the \n\n\nWashington's Difficulties 381 \n\ntown. But as often as he called a council of \nwar to consider the matter, so often did \nhis generals advise against the attempt. The \nAmericans were doubtful, and Lee, affecting to \nmistrust the temper of the troops, would not \nadvise the venture. As to burning the town \nby throwing carcasses 1 into it, Lee told the \nothers that the town could not be set on \nfire by such means. Washington looked for \na chance to assault the town by crossing on \nthe ice, but for a long time the Back Bay did \nnot freeze, and when at last it did, he had \nneither men nor powder. Such then was \nhis situation when he answered the letter \nof Hancock. 2 He begged Congress to consider \nhis situation if, in spite of their wishes, he did \nnot act. And that they should clearly un- \nderstand, he wrote these words : — \n\n\"It is not in the pages of history, perhaps, \n\n1 Carcasses were hollow shells with several openings. \nThey were filled with combustibles, and when thrown \ninto a town were intended to set fire to buildings. \n\n2 Washington's communications to Congress were ad- \ndressed to Hancock, as its President. \n\n\n382 The Siege of Boston \n\nto furnish a case like ours. To maintain a \npost within musket shot of the enemy, for \nsix months together, without \nand at the same time to disband one army, \nand recruit another, within that distance \nof twenty-odd British regiments, is more, \nprobably, than was ever attempted.\" \n\nThe significant omission in this passage is \nthe word \"powder.\" At another time, when \ndoubtful of the safety of his letter, he used \nthe paraphrase, \"what we greatly need.\" \nHe knew that his correspondents would \nsupply the omission and interpret the ref- \nerence. But once at least, on the I4th of \nJanuary, when writing to Joseph Reed, for- \nmerly his aide, to whom at this period he \nseems to have written more freely than to \nany one else, Washington gave a complete \naccount of his situation when almost at its \nworst, and ended with an explanation of \nhis state of mind. Conditions are so com- \npletely summarized, and his thoughts are \nso frankly given, that the paragraphs had \nbest be given entire. \n\n\nWashington's Difficulties 383 \n\n\"Our enlistments are at a stand; the fears \nI ever entertained are realized ; that is, the \ndiscontented officers (for I do not know how else \nto account for it) have thrown such diffi- \nculties or stumbling-blocks in the way of \nrecruiting, that I no longer entertain a hope \nof completing the army by voluntary enlist- \nments, and I see no move or likelihood to do \nit by other means. In the last two weeks \nwe have enlisted but about a thousand men ; \nwhereas I was confidently led to believe, by \nall the officers I conversed with, that we \nshould by this time have had the regiments \nnearly completed. Our total number upon \npaper amounts to about ten thousand five \nhundred; but as a large portion of these are \nreturned not joined, I never expect to receive \nthem, as an ineffectual order has once issued \nto call them in. Another is now gone forth, \nperemptorily requiring all officers under pain \nof being cashiered, and recruits of being \ntreated as deserters, to join their respective \nregiments by the 1st day of next month, \nthat I may know my real strength ; but if \n\n\n384 The Siege of Boston \n\nmy fears are not imaginary, I shall have a \ndreadful account of the advanced month's \npay.1 In consequence of the assurances given, \nand my expectation of having at least men \nenough to defend our lines, to which may \nbe added my unwillingness to burthen the \ncause with unnecessary expense, no relief of \nmilitia has been ordered in, to supply the \nplaces of those, who are released from their \nengagements tomorrow, and as to whom, \nthough many have promised to continue \nout the month, there is no security for their \nstay. \n\n\"Thus I am situated with respect to men. \nWith regard to arms I am yet worse off. \nBefore the dissolution of the old army, I \nissued an order directing three judicious men \nof each brigade to attend, review, and ap- \npraise the good arms of every regiment ; \nand finding a very great unwillingness in \nthe men to part with their arms, at the same \ntime not having it in my power to pay them \nfor the months of November and December, \n\n1 He had paid in advance all who had enlisted. \n\n\nWashington's Difficulties 385 \n\nI threatened severely, that every soldier, \nwho should carry away his firelock without \nleave, should never receive pay for those \nmonths ; yet so many have been carried off, \npartly by stealth, but chiefly as condemned, \nthat we have not at this time one hundred \nguns in the stores, of all that have been taken \nin the prize ship and from the soldiery, not- \nwithstanding our regiments are not half com- \nplete. At the same time I am told, and believe \nit, that to restrain the enlistment to men with \narms, you will get but few of the former, \nand still fewer of the latter which would be \ngood for anything. \n\n\"How to get furnished I know not. I have \napplied to this and the neighboring colonies, \nbut with what success time only can tell. \nThe reflection of my situation, and that of \nthis army, produces many an unhappy hour \nwhen all around me are wrapped in sleep. \nFew people know the predicament we are in, \non a thousand accounts ; fewer still will be- \nlieve, if any disaster happens to these lines, \nfrom what cause it flows. I have often \n\n2C \n\n\n386 The Siege of Boston \n\nthought how much happier I should have \nbeen, if, instead of accepting the command \nunder such circumstances, I had taken my \nmusket on my shoulder and entered the \nranks, or, if I could have justified the measure \nto posterity and my own conscience, had \nretired to the back country, and lived in a \nwigwam. If I shall be able to rise superior \nto these and many other difficulties, I shall \nmost religiously believe, that the finger of \nProvidence is in it, to blind the eyes of our \nenemies ; for surely if we get well through \nthis month, it must be for want of their \nknowing the difficulties we labor under. \n\n\"Could I have foreseen the difficulties, \nwhich have come upon us ; could I have \nknown, that such a backwardness would have \nbeen discovered among the old soldiers to \nthe service, all the generals on earth should \nnot have convinced me of the propriety of \ndelaying an attack upon Boston till this \ntime.\"1 \n\nOne more blow Washington was to receive, \n\n1 \"Writings of Washington,\" iii, 238-241. \n\n\nWashington's Difficulties 387 \n\nin the news of the failure of the expedition \nagainst Quebec. This came to him on the \n1 7th of January. But from about that time, \nthough very slowly, the prospect began to \nbrighten. His army strengthened, money was \nloaned him by Massachusetts, and though \nearly in February he reported that he had in \ncamp two thousand men without guns, even \nmuskets were eventually provided. More- \nover, cannon were now supplied him, through \nthe exertions of Henry Knox. Washing- \nton had detached him in November to \ngo to Ticonderoga and Crown Point, and \nprovide means for bringing the captured \ncannon to camp. The general had even \nhoped that more might be had from Quebec, \nbut that expectation was now gone. Knox, \nin the face of many difficulties, fulfilled his \nmission. On December 17 he wrote from \nLake George that he had got the cannon as \nfar as that point, and with forty-two \"ex- \nceedingly strong sleds\" and eighty yoke of \noxen expected to make the journey to Spring- \nfield, whence fresh cattle would bring him to \n\n\n388 The Siege of Boston \n\nCambridge. The artillery, in this humble \nmanner, at last arrived, howitzers, mortars, \nand cannon, fifty-five pieces of iron or brass. \nWith what had been captured elsewhere \nthe supply was ample, and the guns, after a \ndelay at Framingham, were mounted at the \nfortifications, or reserved for the attempt to \ntake Dorchester. Powder also had slowly \ncome in faster than it was used or could \nspoil, and Washington found himself almost \nready to act. \n\nWhen at last he could draw a long breath, \nwith the feeling that the worst of the situa- \ntion was over, he gave, in letters to Joseph \nReed and John Hancock, his opinion of his \narmy as it then was, and of the means to \nmake it better. Placed behind any kind of \nshelter, his provincials would give a good \naccount of themselves. But they could not \nyet be depended on to make an assault in the \nopen field. For this they would have to receive \nseverer training, and in order to acquaint \nthem with their proper duties a longer term \nof service was necessary. Even now, at the \n\n\nWashington's Difficulties 389 \n\nbeginning of another year of service, the \nmen had the officers too much in their power, \nfor indulgence was necessary in order to \nmake them enlist again. He was therefore \nfirmly of the opinion that his present army, \nand all new recruits, should be enlisted \"for \nand during the war.\" Thus Washington, \nlooking beyond his still uncompleted task, \nlike Lincoln many years later, perceived the \nonly means to final success. \n\nBut with the means which he had at hand \nhe was now impatient to act. It was almost \nMarch, and at any time Howe might receive \nthe reinforcements which would enable him \nto take the offensive. Washington prepared \nto fortify Dorchester as soon as the state \nof the ground would permit of digging, and \nin order to lessen the work he prepared \nfascines — which were bundles of sticks — \nand chandeliers or frameworks to hold the \nbundles in place in order to serve as the body \nof an embankment. Remembering how at \nBunker Hill the regulars had been led to \nsuppose that the troops at the rail fence, \n\n\n39° The Siege of Boston \n\nprotected by nothing except the rails and \nhay, were behind an embankment, he col- \nlected ropes of hay to use if necessary for \nthe same purpose, but also to bind the wheels \nof his carts that they might make no noise. \nCarts he collected to the number of three \nhundred. In the Charles River he prepared \nboats enough to carry twenty-eight hundred \nmen. Two floating batteries were also made \nready there ; a third had earlier been destroyed \nby the bursting of its cannon when firing at \nthe camp on the Common. Washington was \nabout to strike, with the suddenness which \ncharacterized him, but also with the thorough \nreadiness. \n\nFor his camp, even if temporarily, was \nnow full. Early in February came in ten \nregiments of militia, summoned on service \nuntil the first of April. They manifested, \nhe wrote with satisfaction, the greatest alert- \nness, and the determination of men engaged \nin the cause of freedom. And on the first of \nMarch he called into camp the militia of the \nneighboring towns, who were to report at \n\n\nWashington's Difficulties 391 \n\nRoxbury fully equipped for three days' ser- \nvice. To these men was read his general \norder, preparing their minds for action. They \nwere forbidden to play at cards or other games \nof chance, and advised to ponder the im- \nportance of the cause in which they were \nenlisted. \"But it may not be amiss for the \ntroops to know,\" he added, \"that if any man in \naction shall presume to skulk, or hide himself, \nor retreat from the enemy without the orders \nof his commanding officer, he will be instantly \nshot down.\" And with this exhortation and \nwarning Washington concluded his prepara- \ntions. \n\n\nCHAPTER XIV \n\nTHE WINTER IN BOSTON \n\nWHEN the British army went into \nwinter quarters it was nearly at the \nend of its difficulties concerning food. \nSupplies from England had been very meagre, \nand the occasional raids had provided poorly \nfor the wants of the town. But since October \nmatters had improved, largely because of the \ncriticism of the English Whigs in Parliament. \nThese pointed out the inactivity of the troops, \nthe humiliation of the situation, the sickness \nand want in Boston. In order that nothing \nshould be left undone to remedy the last, \nthe perplexed ministry spent money lavishly \nto provision its garrison. Five thousand \noxen, fourteen thousand sheep, with a great \nnumber of hogs, were purchased, and shipped \nalive. Vegetables, preserved by a new pro- \ncess, were bought in quantities ; wheat and \n\n392 \n\n\nThe Winter in Boston 393 \n\nflour were collected; wood, coal, hay, and \nother fodder, with beer, porter, rum, Geneva, \nand the more innocent vinegar, were gener- \nously provided. To be sure, the commissions \non all these purchases provided fortunes \nfor the relatives of those in office, and the \nship-owners found excuses for setting sail as \nlate as possible, in order to increase the hire \nof their craft. As a result, much of the vast \nexpense — some six hundred thousand pounds \nfor provisions alone — was wasted. Con- \ntrary gales detained the ships ; the live stock \ndied by wholesale, and was thrown over- \nboard ; the vegetables spoiled ; and numbers \nof the ships were lost outright. Others, ar- \nriving without convoy at the American coast, \nwere captured by the watchful privateers. \nBut of such vast supplies enough reached \nBoston to relieve the worst distresses of the \ninhabitants. Though the poorer of the Whigs \nhad either to sign humiliating declarations \nin order to share in the rations of the troops, \nor else to continue on meagre fare, there was \nenough in the general market for the well-to-do \n\n\n394 The Siege of Boston \n\namong them to supply themselves. John \nAndrews, for instance, though he lived at \nthe rate of six or seven hundred sterling a \nyear, after October ate scarcely three meals of \nsalt meat, \"for I was determined to eat fresh \nprovissions, while it was to be got, let it cost \nwhat it would.\" \n\nThere was, however, for months a great \nshortage of fuel. As the winter set in early, \nand with severity, large quantities were \nneeded, and there was little on hand. The \ntroops, of their own initiative, had already, \neven in the summer, begun to make depre- \ndations on private property, stealing gates \nand breaking up fences. This the com- \nmanders endeavored to stop, but took the \nhint and did the same by official condem- \nnation. As so many of the inhabitants had \nleft the town, the abandoned houses were \ntorn down for fuel. When the winter came, \nthe troops again began on their own account \nto steal wood. Howe threatened to hang the \nnext man caught in the act, but still was \nforced to follow the example. \n\n\nThe Winter in Boston 395 \n\nIn choosing buildings for destruction, it \nwas very natural to select Whig property. \nPerhaps the harshest assault on provincial \nsentiment had been made in summer, when \nduring August Liberty Tree was felled. The \nWhigs felt very indignant, but took a peculiar \npleasure in the reflection that during the \noperation a soldier had been accidentally killed. \nIn the various poems written on the occasion \nthe wretch's soul was unanimously consigned \nto Hades. It was besides remarked that \nthe genuine tree of liberty, of which this had \nbeen but a symbol, had now grown so great \nas to overshadow the continent. \n\nBesides Liberty Tree, the property of \nleading Whigs suffered. \"My house and \nbarn,\" writes Newell the selectman, on the \ni6th of November, \"pulled down by order \nof General Robinson.\" Leach the school- \nmaster, whose imprisonment had made him \na marked man, had a hard fight to save his \nproperty. On Christmas Day he found a \nparty of soldiers destroying his wharf, which \nhad been allotted, as was the custom, to one \n\n\n396 The Siege of Boston \n\nof the regiments, in this case the light dra- \ngoons. In spite of his efforts Leach was not \nable to stop this destruction, as evidently in \nthe present state of the town there was no \nuse for wharves. But when his schoolhouse \nwas threatened he carried the matter to \nheadquarters. Howe said Leach had corre- \nsponded with the people without. \" I denied \nthe charge. . . . Finally I told him, as an \nEnglishman, and a subject of the King's, I \nclaimed protection of my property; and if \nmy House was pulled down, I would follow \nhim to England, or to China, for satisfaction. \nI expected he would get angry, and order me \nunder Guard, or else to Gaol again. How- \never, in General he behaved kindly.\" Howe \nreferred him to his subordinates, who de- \nlayed giving orders until the soldiers had \nalready broken into the schoolhouse. With \nmuch resolution Leach got them from the \nhouse and stood on guard at the door until \nby referring to Howe the schoolhouse was \nsaved. But Leach had meanwhile lost \"valu- \nable Books and Instruments, Drawings, Col- \n\n\nThe Winter in Boston 397 \n\nours, Brushes, several curious Optick Glasses, \nand sundry things of Value that I brought \nfrom India and China, that I cannot replace \nfor money.\"1 \n\nAt this time was pulled down the Old \nNorth Church, the steeple of the West Church, \nand John Winthrop's house, one of the oldest \nlandmarks in the town. Over in Charlestown \nthe troops used for fuel the deserted houses \nthat had not been consumed on the iyth of \nJune. At one time they were demolishing a \nmill near the American lines, but the pro- \nvincials drove them away and presently \nburnt the mill. At another time, by a similar \nendeavor to lessen the British supply of fuel, \nthere was brought about one of the more \namusing incidents of the siege. \n\nThe officers in Boston, having little active \nwork to do, were endeavoring to forget the \nirksomeness and the humiliation of their situa- \ntion. Through no fault of their own the \nposition was a hard one; they had boasted, \nand were not allowed to make good their \n\n1 \"N. E. Hist, and Gen. Register,\" 1865, 313-314. \n\n\n398 The Siege of Boston \n\nvainglory; they had despised their adver- \nsaries, and were cooped up in a provincial \ntown. In letters home they uneasily en- \ndeavored to explain their inaction ; by return \nmail they learned what the wits of London \nhad to say of both them and the country. \n\"Mrs. Brittania,\" remarked Horace Walpole, \n\"orders her Senate to proclaim America a \ncontinent of cowards, and vote it should be \nstarved, unless it would drink tea with her. \nShe sends her only army to be besieged in \none of her towns, and half her fleet to besiege \nthe terra firma; but orders her army to do \nnothing, in hopes that the American Senate \nin Philadelphia will be so frightened at the \nBritish army being besieged in Boston that \nit will sue for peace.\" There was sting in \nthese words, but no remedy for the smart. \n\nIn order to forget such flings, and to \nbanish the consideration of crowded quarters, \nirregular rations (for there still were periods \nof lean supply), slow pay, and inaction, the \nofficers tried to kill time. The cavalry regi- \nments searched for a means of exercising their \n\n\nThe Winter in Boston 399 \n\nhorses, and Burgoyne is credited with the \nsolution of their problem. Newell recorded in \nhis journal how his church, after being profaned \nby Morrison, was examined by the colonel of the \nlight horse, to see if the building was available \nfor a riding-school. \"But when it was con- \nsidered that the Pillars must be taken away, \nwhich would bring down the roof, they altered \ntheir mind — so that the Pillars saved us.\" \nA more notable building had to suffer in- \nstead. The Old South was taken for the \npurpose. The furnishings were torn out, and \nDeacon Hubbard's carved pew was carted \naway to be used as a hog-sty. The dis- \nmantled church was transformed into a riding- \nring, with tanbark on the floor, and a leaping- \nbar. One of the galleries was fitted up for \na social meeting-place ; the remainder were \nused for spectators, for whose comfort was \nput in a stove into which disappeared for \nkindling many of the books and manuscripts \nstored in the building. For the rest of the \nsiege the Old South, once so formidable, was \na centre of Tory fashion. \n\n\n400 The Siege of Boston \n\nBurgoyne was credited, also, with the de- \nsign of putting an almost equally sacred \nedifice to a purpose still more horrifying to \nthe good Calvinists of Boston. Faneuil Hall, \nthe cradle of liberty, was made a theatre. \nVarious plays were performed, and the ama- \nteurs were even so ambitious as to attempt \nthe tragedies of Z,ara and Tamerlane. For \nthe latter performance Burgoyne wrote a \nprologue and epilogue, which were spoken by \nLord Rawdon, who had distinguished himself \nat Bunker Hill, and \"a young lady ten years \nold.\" But the great event of the season was \nto be the production of a farce called the \nBlockade of Boston. It was this performance \nwhich the Americans interrupted, to the peren- \nnial satisfaction of all students of local history. \n\nThe play was to be performed on a Jan- \nuary night. The Busy Body had just been \ngiven, and the curtain rose on the farce, pre- \nsenting a view of the American camp, and \nthe figure of Washington absurdly burlesqued \nin uniform, wig, and rusty sword. At' this \nmoment a sergeant suddenly appeared on \n\n\nThe Winter in Boston 401 \n\nthe stage, calling out, \"The Yankees are \nattacking our works on Bunker's Hill !\" \nConceiving this spirited action a part of the \nplay, the audience began to applaud. But \nthe sergeant vigorously repeated his state- \nment, the sounds of distant cannonading \nwere heard, and an aide called out, \"Officers, \nto your posts !\" The officers responded in \nall haste, and the performance was over for \nthe evening. The reason for this interrup- \ntion was that Washington had despatched a \nparty to burn some of the houses still stand- \ning in Charlestown. The success of the at- \ntempt had caused the cannonading, and the \nconsequent interruption of the play. No \nhistorian of the siege has failed to remark \nthat the Whig ladies had the laugh of their \nTory sisters, forced to return without their \nescorts. \n\nA month before this incident, on the 5th \nof December, Burgoyne had sailed for home, \nrecalled largely at his own instance, but al- \nready under consideration for the disastrous \nexpedition from Canada. He did not return \n\n20 \n\n\n402 The Siege of Boston \n\nto Boston until 1777, when he came as a \nprisoner. It was when entering the town \nthat he learned that the townspeople had \nlong memories for his real or ascribed indig- \nnity to the Old South, for when he remarked \nto a friend upon the Province House, the \nheadquarters during the siege, a voice from \nthe crowd reminded him that the riding-school \nwas close at hand. Since on the same occa- \nsion an old lady loudly beseeched her neigh- \nbors to \"give the general elbow-room,\" Bos- \nton may be said to have taken its mild \nrevenge on him. \n\nTheatrical performances, balls, and parties \nwere the amusements of the officers at this \nperiod of the siege, and persons of fashion \ndoubtless were pleasantly situated. It was \nnot so comfortable for the troops and their \ndependents, as we have already seen. The \nlack of fuel and consequent depredations on \nproperty led to plundering of a different kind, \nand petty thievery, which Howe put down \nwith a stern hand. Heavy floggings were \nmeted out to delinquents, and a wife of one \n\n\nThe Winter in Boston 403 \n\nof the privates was even sentenced to public \nwhipping for receiving stolen goods. While \nthere were no true horrors at this siege, there \nwas thus much roughness of conduct among \nthe soldiery, and of this the Whigs were sure \nto be the victims. With the example of \nLeach and Lovell before their eyes, the wiser \namong the provincials spoke cannily and \nwalked softly, and attracted as little attention \nas possible. But among the poorer class \nthere was much distress for lack of food and \nfuel, for even when the troops had plenty, it \nwas difficult for the patriots to buy. \n\nWith their strength somewhat depleted, it \nwas not to be wondered at that the poorer \nclass was visited by smallpox. The epidemic \nwas a mild one, and few persons died, - but \nthe visitation created great uneasiness. To \nlessen his burden, during the winter Howe \nsent out several companies of the poorer folk \nfrom the town, landing them at Point Shirley, \nwith the certainty that the Americans would \ncare for them. But his action called down \nmuch reproach, and he was accused of send- \n\n\n404 The Siege of Boston \n\ning out persons with the smallpox, in order \nto infect the besieging army. It was even \ncharged that he had purposely inoculated \nsome of the evicted. This, of course, is not \nto be believed ; but it is curious to find the \nBritish at last taking satisfaction in the epi- \ndemic, since it would prevent Washington \nfrom attacking. \n\nGradually a feeling of security came over \nthe besieged town. Admiral Graves had \nbeen recalled, and Shuldham took his place. \nThe lighthouse was rebuilt and guarded. \nHowe felt strong enough to detach a squad- \nron from the fleet in order to carry Clinton \nwith a body of troops to the southward. \nThis was the expedition that made the un- \nsuccessful attack upon Charleston. Howe \nsent other vessels to the northern provinces \nand the West Indies, which brought in sup- \nplies. The store-ships from England con- \ntinued to come in, and though Howe was \nvexed and at times alarmed by the loss of the \nvaluable stores that fell into Washington's \nhands, on the whole he felt very strong. So \n\n\nThe Winter in Boston 405 \n\nmuch fuel arrived that in January the de- \nstruction of houses and wharves was stopped, \nand the men who had been on duty for the \npurpose were commanded to make themselves \npresentable. Neatness was a hobby with \nHowe, and he enforced it on his men, though \nat times the untidiness of his troops seems to \nhave been remarkable.1 \n\nThere are two expressions which show the \nconfidence entertained at this period, not \nonly by the garrison at large, but by the \nBritish general. One Crean Brush had made \nhimself a place in the service, not in a mili- \ntary capacity, but as a useful hanger on. In \nJanuary, anticipating the result of the spring \ncampaign, he offered to raise a body of volun- \nteers, not less than three hundred, with which \nhe proposed, after the \"subduction of the \nmain body of the rebel force,\" to keep order \nalong the Connecticut, and to maintain com- \nmunication westward with Lake Champlain. \nThere is no record that Howe took him at \n\n1 See his general order enumerating faults, in Sparks, \n\"Writings of Washington,\" iii, 236, note. \n\n\n406 The Siege of Boston \n\nhis word, but he well might have done so, so \ncompletely did he misjudge the situation. For \nabout the same time he wrote to Lord Dart- \nmouth that he was not apprehending any \nattempt by Washington, \"by surprise or \notherwise.\"1 \n\nBut the surprise came. On the night of \nthe second of March the American batteries, \nso long~ silent, began to play. From Cobble \nHill, Lechmere Point, and Lamb's Dam in \nRoxbury, the three redoubts nearest to Bos- \nton, the Americans bombarded the town, and \nHowe's gunners instantly responded. The \nAmerican fire was ineffective. \"Our people,\" \nwrote David How, \" splet the Congress the \nThird Time that they fired it.\" Other heavy \nmortars were likewise burst, doubtless owing \nto the inexperience of the gunners. But \nWashington's purpose, to \"divert the atten- \ntion\" of the British from Dorchester, was ful- \nfilled. They had no eyes save for the oppo- \ning batteries. For three nights the diversion \ncontinued ; on the 4th it was, wrote Newell, \n\n1 See Frothingham's \"Siege,\" 294-295. \n\n\nThe Winter in Boston \n\n\n407 \n\n\n\"a most terrible bombardment and cannon- \nade, on both sides, as if heaven and earth \nwere engaged.\" At \nBraintree, miles away, \nAbigail Adams listened \nto the roar, and re- \ncorded the rattling of \nthe windows, and the \ncontinual jar of the \nhouse. \"At six in the \nmorning,\" she writes, \n^ there was quiet,\" but \nthe quiet was from sat- \nisfaction on the one \nside, and amazement \non the other. \n\nOn the two heights \nof Dorchester, com- \nmanding the town and \nthe harbor, stood two \nAmerican redoubts, \nlarger and stronger \nthan the redoubt at Breed's Hill. On lesser \nelevations stood smaller works. Seen from \n\n\nTOWER ON DORCHESTER HEIGHTS \n\nCOMMEMORATING THE EVACUA- \nTION OF BOSTON \n\n\n408 The Siege of Boston \n\nbelow, Washington's preparations seemed \ncomplete. \n\nAll that moonlit night, while the cannon- \nade proceeded, the Americans had been busy. \nEverything had been prepared: the forts \nwere staked out, the carts were loaded, the \nmen were ready. As soon as the cannonade \nbegan, the men and carts were set in motion ; \nthe road was strewn with hay, and bales were \npiled to screen the carts as they passed to and \nfro. The troops worked with a will, first \nplacing fascines in chandeliers to form the \noutlines of their works, and then covering \nthem with earth. There is no better con- \ntemporary account given than in the diary \nof an unnamed officer, published some ninety \nyears later.1 He wrote : — \n\n\"A little before sunset marched off from \nRoxbury; but for more than half a mile \nbefore we came to Dorchester lines,2 we over- \ntook teams in great plenty, nor did we find \n\n1 See the Historical Magazine for 1864, 328-329. \n\n2 These were a line of fortifications facing Dorches- \nter, made earlier in the siege. \n\n\nThe Winter in Boston 409 \n\nany vacancy till we came to the lines; in \nsome places they were so wedged in together, \nwe were obliged to leave the road to get \nforward; we reached the lines at seven \no'clock, where we waited half an hour for \norders, when a signal was given and the \ncannonade began at Lamb's fort, and was \nimmediately answered by a very warm fire \nfrom the enemy's lines ; a brisk fire between \nN. Boston and our fortifications on Cambridge \nside, began soon after. It was supposed \nthere was a thousand shot hove this night, \nby both armies, more than three fourths of \nwhich were sent from Boston.1 Our party, \nconsisting of about 2400 men, with 300 teams, \nwere crossing the marsh, onto the Neck, \nwhich together with a fresh breeze from \nthe S. W.2 concealed us from the enemy till \nthey could see our works by daylight. The \n\n1 According to Knox's return, given in Frothingham's \n\"Siege,\" 298, footnote, the Americans threw only 144 \nshot and 13 shells. The British seem to have needed \nonly an occasional stimulus. \n\n2 This breeze would bring the smoke of the Roxbury \ncannonade between the Heights and Boston. \n\n\n4i o The Siege of Boston \n\ndivision to which I was assigned, commanded \nby Col. Whitcomb, was ordered onto the \nnortherly hill, where in one hour's time we \nhad a fort enclosed, with fascines placed in \nshandelears ; and we immediately employed \nas many men at intrenching as could be \nadvantageously used for that purpose. A \nlarger party was assigned to the high hill, \nwhere they erected a larger fort, built much \nin the same manner as ours. There were \nfour other smaller forts and batteries erected \nthis night on other eminences on the Neck.\" l \nIt is not to be wondered that the British, \non making the discovery, \"seemed to be in \ngreat confusion.\" 2 The labor that had been \nexpended appeared prodigious. Washington \nhimself was satisfied with the works ; he \n\n1 It seems generally to be considered that there was \nbut one fort at Dorchester. The statement in the text \nis confirmed by the Revolutionary Journal of Colonel \nBaldwin, one of the engineers. \"Six works thrown up \nthis night at different places on the Hills & high ground \na very Great work for one Night.\" \n\n2 Washington's letter to Hancock, \"Writings,\" iii, \n304- \n\n\nThe Winter in Boston 411 \n\nknew them to be secure against the British \ncannon. To Howe the achievement was \namazing, and he is said to have exclaimed \nthat his whole army could not have done as \nmuch in a month. He wrote to Lord Dart- \nmouth that the rebels must have employed \nat least twelve thousand men, whereas it was \naccomplished by two details of little more \nthan two thousand men each. But in those \ndays the British soldier was a poor hand \nwith a shovel, while the Americans were all \nfarmers. Nevertheless it is worth noting the \ndifference in organization displayed in the tak- \ning of Dorchester and in the earlier seizure of \nBreed's Hill. Instead of a small detachment \nsent to unsurveyed ground, and unaided dur- \ning both the work and the battle, Washington \nhad his ground prepared,1 his detachments \nready, and his cannon in reserve to send upon \nthe Heights. In the morning the redoubts, \npresenting the appearance of finished fortifica- \ntions, were manned with fresh men. \n\n1 Colonel Baldwin records that he was on the ground \nin the afternoon. \n\n\n412 The Siege of Boston* \n\nHowe called at once a council of war. To \nit the admiral was summoned, and declared \npositively that his fleet was at the mercy of \nthe rebels. There was but one opinion as to \nthe situation : the honor of the army was at \nstake, and in addition the military reputation \nof the general. It was promptly decided to \nstorm the works. \n\nFor this purpose twenty-four hundred men \nwere sent to the Castle, which lay close under \nthe Heights to the east, with but a narrow \nchannel between. The command of these \nmen was given to Lord Percy, who hoped \nnow for the distinction which illness had pre- \nvented his achieving at Bunker Hill. The \nattack was to be made at night. Within the \nlines at Boston Neck was to be gathered \nanother force of troops, which was to second \nthe attack from that direction. This last, \nin the face of the strong batteries at Rox- \nbury, was a forlorn hope; according to Lieu- \ntenant Barker the troops were not to load, \nbut to advance with fixed bayonets, and may \nhave hoped to carry the works by surprise. \n\n\nThe Winter in Boston 413 \n\nWashington would have welcomed the main \nattack. During the day his works were \nstrengthened and his men reinforced. Or- \nchards had been cut down to serve as abattis, \nand barrels of earth were ready to roll down \nupon the British. The men were confident; \nthey were commanded by Thomas, one of the \nbest of the brigadiers, and Washington was \nthere in person with a reminder that put \ncourage into the breast of every American. \nFor the day which he had chosen to decide \nthe fate of Boston was the fifth of March, \nthe anniversary of the Massacre. \n\nBesides all this, Washington had another \nweapon in reserve. In the Charles River, \nout of sight of Boston, were his two floating \nbatteries and his bateaux filled with soldiers. \nThey were under Putnam, Sullivan, and \nGreene ; and at a given signal, if Washington \ndeemed the opportunity good, they were to \ncross the Back Bay and attack the town. — \nTruly the preparations were for such fighting \nas had never been seen in America. \n\nBut they came to naught, for nature took \n\n\n414 • The Siege of Boston \n\na hand in the struggle. Mercifully, since \namid the projected battles the town itself \nmight have perished with its inhabitants, \nthere sprang up a gale. \"A Hurrycane,\" \nwrote Newell, \"or terrible sudden storm.\" \nThe violence of the wind was such that no \nboat could live in the channel between the \nCastle and Dorchester, two of Percy's trans- \nports were driven ashore, and the attack was \npostponed. The next day the wind con- \ntinued, accompanied by heavy rain. The \nAmericans continued to labor on their works, \nuntil to every eye they were impregnable by \nany force that Howe might send against \nthem. Howe called another council, and \nasked it to concur in his intention to evacuate \nthe town. There was no other decision to \nmake, and on the 6th of March 1 the orders \nwere given. \n\n\"Blessed be God,\" wrote Newell, \"our \nredemption draws nigh.\" \n\n1 Frothingham says the yth. But see the diaries of \nBarker (Atlantic, 39, 553) and Newell (Mass. Hist. Soc. \nColl., i, Series 4, 272). \n\n\nCHAPTER XV \n\nTHE EVACUATION \n\nWASHINGTON, looking into Boston \nfrom the Heights of Dorchester, wit- \nnessed the confusion of the British \nat the discovery of his works, and watched \nwith grim pleasure the preparations made to \nattack him. The abandonment of the assault \nwas to him a great disappointment. He had \nnever seen men more alert and willing than \nhis soldiers on the Heights. If Howe had \nsent a small force against them, Washing- \nton felt confident of repulsing it. Had the \nattacking force been so large as to have appre- \nciably weakened the army in Boston, Wash- \nington would have delivered his counter- \nstroke by means of the men in boats under \ncommand of Putnam. \"He would have had \npretty easy work of it,\" l wrote Washington, \n\n1 Trevelyan, in concluding that Washington disap- \nproved of this attack by Putnam, is apparently misled \n\n415 \n\n\n4i 6 The Siege of Boston \n\nstill after nearly a month regretting the \nissue. He wrote his brother, \"that this \nmost remarkable interposition of Providence \nis for some wise purpose, I have not a doubt. \nBut ... as no men seemed better disposed \nto make the appeal than ours did upon that \noccasion, I can scarcely forbear lamenting the \ndisappointment.\" \n\nWashington lay for a while inactive while \nthe enemy prepared for their departure. \nBut upon Howe's shoulders was thrown a \ntremendous task. He had under him, in the \narmy and the fleet, about eleven thousand \nmen.1 For them he had been gathering mili- \ntary stores and provisions ; he had many \n\nby General Heath's curious habit of referring to himself \nin his Memoirs as \"Our General.\" It was Heath who \nopposed the project. Against Howe's flimsy defences \non the Back Bay, if weakened of defenders, Putnam \nmight well have prevailed, especially in a night attack. \nThey were, wrote Edward Bangs, \" ill-constructed, and \ndesigned for little but to frighten us.\" James Warren, \nwho reported on these works, found them to be very \nweak. See Frothingham's \"Siege,\" 329. \n1 Frothingham's \"Siege,\" 311. \n\n\nThe Evacuation 417 \n\nhorses, much artillery, and at least a partial \nequipment for field service, in preparation for \nthe spring campaign. His army had been at \nBoston for many months, some of the regi- \nments for nearly two years ; consequently \nthere had been a natural accumulation of \npersonal effects, for the convenience of the \nofficers, with their wives and families. To \ncarry away this army, its stores, and its \nbelongings, there was not at hand enough \nshipping. \n\nBut the difficulty was greater than this, \nfor Howe had to consider the Tories and \ntheir families. Long before this, when Gage \nwas in command, the ministry had written \nthat in case of evacuation \"the officers and \nfriends of government must not be left to the \nrage and insult of rebels, who set no bounds \nto their barbarity.\" Howe's ships, there- \nfore, were to be at the service of the Tories, \nand with full knowledge of the involved re- \nsults, he so informed them. \n\nWhen the realization of the situation burst \nupon the Tories, they were, said a contem- \n\n2E \n\n\n4i 8 The Siege of Boston \n\nporary letter, \"struck with paleness and \nastonishment.\" 1 \"Not the last trump,\" \nwrote Washington, \"could have struck them \nwith greater consternation.\" 2 Until the very \nlast, no suspicion of such a result seems to \nhave disturbed them; they had borne them- \nselves confidently, and had expected to see \ntheir enemies scattered when the new forces \nshould arrive. Among their Whig brethren \nthey had been very high-handed. \"The select- \nmen say,\" wrote Eldad Taylor, who must \nhave been at Watertown when the selectmen \narrived there with the news of the evacua- \ntion, \"that the Tories were the most dreadful \nof any, that all the sufferings of the poor for \nthe want of provisions and the necessaries of \nlife, were not equal to the dreadful scorn, \nderision, and contempt from them.\" \n\nUpon the Tories was now put the hard \ndecision, whether to go or stay. In order to \ndecide, they needed to know what the Whigs \n\n1 Eldad Taylor to his wife, Watertown, March 18, \n1776. \n\n2 \"Writings,\" iii, 343. \n\n\nThe Evacuation 419 \n\nwould do to them; and to know that, they \nhad but to consider what they would do to \nthe Whigs in similar case. In their own \nprison languished the Whig Lovell. They \nthought of the Whig prisons which might be \nwaiting for them, and they decided to go. \n\nIt is not to be denied that the decision \nwas, under the circumstances, wise. The \nloyalists were right in supposing that the \ntreatment which they would have meted to \nthe Whigs, the Whigs would mete to them. \nFor the country was inflamed against the \nTories; Washington himself shared the sen- \ntiment against them. Much as we may \nregret this feeling, we must remember that it \nwas natural to the age. Kind treatment to \nan opponent in civil war was not yet gen- \nerally practised; it was Lincoln who made \nthe lesson acceptable to mankind. \n\nPractically all of the Tories, therefore, \nmade up their minds to go. Some few, in- \ndeed, remained behind, counting upon their \nhumble station, or inoffensiveness. No harsh \ntreatment of them is recorded. The one \n\n\n420 The Siege of Boston \n\nprominent Tory who remained, Mather Byles \nthe minister, soon weathered the storm that \nrose against him. The remaining loyalists, \nwho planned to depart, were some eleven \nhundred in number. It was necessary that \nthey should be accommodated in the ships, \nnecessary also that they should take with \nthem such of their valuables as were easily \nportable. Howe gave orders that room be \nmade for them, and the orders were unselfishly \nobeyed by the army and navy. \n\nBut the haste, the disorder, even the tu- \nmult, in the days immediately ^following the \norder to depart, were extreme. Each regi- \nment had to be assigned its transports, each \nTory to find space for himself and his family, \nand if possible his goods. There was sorting \nof effects, bundling up of valuables, and \nstrenuous efforts to get all in safety before \nWashington should bombard. Diarists agree \nin the concise terms with which they describe \nthe town. Says Newell for the 8th: \"The \ntown all hurry and commotion, the troops \nwith the Refugees and Tories all embarking.\" \n\n\nThe Evacuation 421 \n\nFor the 9th he adds : \"D°. D°. D°.\" And for \nthe loth writes Lieutenant Barker : \"Nothing \nbut hurry and confusion.\" \n\nIn the meantime the Americans at Dor- \nchester strengthened their works, and fortified \none more eminence, which commanded the \nchannel. Washington did not wish to cannon- \nade the British, for if not attacked he saw \nno advantage in attacking, lest the town \nshould be set on fire and burned. He there- \nfore bided his time. All his action until now, \nhe wrote Hancock, was but preparatory to \ntaking post on Nook's Hill, a low promontory \nwhich ran so far out upon Dorchester flats \nthat from its top cannon could enfilade the \nBritish lines at the Neck, and could com- \nmand almost any part of Boston. An attempt \nto fortify it upon the night of the 9th was \nbetrayed by the folly of the men, who kindled \na fire and were dispersed by British cannon. \nBut by this Washington was not disturbed. \nHe was willing that Howe should delay for a \nwhile, if the delay were not too long. He \nhimself had reasons for waiting, since he \n\n\n422 The Siege of Boston \n\nreasoned that the British would, on depart- \ning, attempt to seize New York, and he \nwanted time to prepare and despatch a force \nto hold that place. So he watched the \nBritish army, sent a regiment of riflemen to \nstrengthen New York, and made ready five \nother regiments to depart as soon as the \nBritish fleet should leave the harbor. \n\nBut at this time the inhabitants of Boston \nwere very uncertain of their own fate. Noth- \ning was more natural than that Washington \nshould attack, or that the exasperated British \nshould on departing, even if unassailed, set \nfire to the wooden town. The selectmen, as \nspokesmen for the inhabitants, therefore in- \nquired of Howe what his intentions were. \nHowe wrote in reply that he had no in- \ntention of destroying the town, if he were \nunmolested. This reply the selectmen sent \nin haste to Washington, begging for a similar \nassurance. Washington was not willing to \nbind himself, and returned answer that as \nHowe's note was \"unauthenticated, and ad- \ndressed to nobody,\" he could take no notice \n\n\nThe Evacuation 423 \n\nof it. Nevertheless, since no threat was \nmade, the Bostonians felt more at ease.1 \n\nAll this time the wind was contrary, and \nthe troops unable to set sail. They there- \nfore remained in their quarters, while com- \npleting their preparations for departure. As \nthe days passed Howe began to destroy \nwhat he could not take with him, and to \nseize what would be of advantage to the \nrebels. His troops spiked cannon, burned \nartillery and transport wagons, or else threw \nthem into the harbor, and ruined bulky \nstores. What he did deliberately, his men \nincreased through malice. The I3th seems \nto have been the worst day of this period. \n\"The Inhabitants,\" wrote Newell, \"in the \nutmost distress, thro' fear of the Town being \ndestroyed by the Soldiers, a party of New \nYork Carpenters with axes going thro' the \ntown breaking open houses, &c. Soldiers \nand sailors plundering of houses, shops, ware- \nhouses — Sugar and salt &c. thrown into the \n\n1 For this correspondence, see Newell's \" Diary,\" or \n\"Washington's Writings,\" iii, 531-533. \n\n\n424 The Siege of Boston \n\nRiver, which was greatly covered with hogs- \nheads, barrels of flour, house furniture, carts, \ntrucks &c. &c. — One Person suffered jour \nthousand pounds sterling, by his shipping being \ncut to pieces &c. — Another five thousand \npounds sterling, in salt wantonly thrown into \nthe river.\" No wonder that the sturdy old \nselectman thought these to be \"very dis- \ntressed times.\" \n\nHowe's agent in the work of plundering \nwas that Crean Brush who had offered to \npolice the western part of Massachusetts with \nthree hundred men. Him the general di- \nrected to receive all linen and woollen goods \nwhich were on sale, and to take those which \nwere not delivered, giving certificates for the \nsame. There is on file the petition of one \nJackson, begging for payment for goods \ntaken from him. Brush interpreted his com- \nmission very freely, and it was suspected \nthat he was plundering on his own account. \nEvery soldier or sailor who could give his \nofficer the slip was doing the same, in spite of \nHowe's honest efforts to stop the plundering. \n\n\nThe Evacuation 425 \n\nThere was a little genteel thievery as well. \nSome of the Tories had unfairly secured more \nthan their share of room on shipboard, and \nfound this the chance to take their pick of \nthe furniture of their Whig relatives. \" Wat,\" \nwrote John Andrews to his brother-in-law in \nPhiladelphia, \"has stripped your uncle's \nhouse of everything he could conveniently \ncarry off. ... He has left all the looking \nglasses and window curtains, with some \ntables and most of the chairs ; only two bed- \nsteads and one bed, without any bedding or \nsheets, or even a rag of linnen of any kind. \nSome of the china and the principal part of \nthe pewter is the sum of what he has left, \nsave the Library, which was packed up \ncorded to ship, but your uncle Jerry and Mr. \nAustin went to him and absolutely forbid it, \nupon his peril.\" \n\nAnother library did not fare so well. At \nthis time disappeared that part of the Prince \ncollection which had not been used for kind- \nling the fires in the Old South. With it van- \nished the Bradford manuscript history of \n\n\n426 The Siege of Boston \n\nthe Plymouth plantation, which a later gen- \neration freely returned. \n\nWhile the Tories were so carefully looking \nto the future, the Whigs were obliged to guard \nwhat they could. Newell covers too many \nincidents with etceteras, but John Andrews \nwho, as soon as the siege was lifted, was free \nto begin again his correspondence, speaks \nclearly of his difficulties. Through the siege \nhe had had the care of six houses with their \nfurniture, and as many stores filled with goods ; \nbut now he underwent more fatigue and \nperplexity than for the past eleven months, \nfor \"I was obliged,\" he says, \"to take my \nrounds all day, without any cessation, and \nscarce ever fail'd of finding' depredations \nmade upon some one or other of them, that \nI was finally necessitated to procure men at \nthe extravagant rate of two dollars a day to \nsleep in the several houses and stores for a \nfortnight1 before the military plunderers went \noff — for so sure as they were left alone one \nnight, so sure they were plundered.\" Later \n\n1 It cannot have been more than eleven days. \n\n\nThe Evacuation 427 \n\nhe was obliged to pay at the rate of a dollar \nan hour for hands to assist him in moving; \nbut \"such was the demand for laborers, that \nthey were taken from me, even at that, by \nthe tories who bid over me.\" \n\nSo, while the wind continued contrary, the \nplundering and the destruction continued. \nBefore long the seashore dwellers might do \ntheir share of rescue, as the articles which \nwere thrown into the harbor — \" mahogany \nchairs, tables, etc.,\" records Abigail Adams \n— were cast up on the beaches. But one by \none the transports filled and dropped down \nthe harbor, until at last Washington grew im- \npatient, and on the night of the i6th made his \nlast move. Though the British, aware of the \nattempt, fired with their remaining guns all \nnight at Nook's Hill, the Americans doggedly \nentrenched without returning a shot, and in \nthe morning showed a finished redoubt. It \nwas, as Trevelyan well says, Washington's \nnotice to quit. \n\nHowe meekly accepted it. \"At 4 o'clock \nin the Morn.,\" writes Lieutenant Barker, \n\n\n428 The Siege of Boston \n\n\"the troops got under arms, at 5 they began \nto move, and by about 8 or 9 were all em- \nbarked, the rear being covered by the Grena- \ndiers and Light Infantry.\" The ships sailed \ndown the channel, no shot was fired from \nthe American batteries, and in return the \nFowey, the last of the fleet, which Howe had \nthreatened should fire the town before she \ndeparted, carried away with her her \"carcases \nand combustibles,\" and Boston stood free \nand unharmed. \n\nIn half an hour the Americans were in \npossession. From Roxbury a company of \nfive hundred, picked for the service because \nthey had had the smallpox, entered the \nBritish lines, and manned the fortifications \nwhich looked toward the harbor. In the \nredoubt at Bunker Hill sentries appeared \nto be still doing their duty ; but two men who \nwere sent to reconnoitre found them to be \ndummies, and signalled their companions to \nfollow them. General Putnam was given \ncommand of the town, from entering which \nthe army in general, and all civilians, were \n\n\nThe Evacuation 429 \n\nprohibited until it was ascertained whether \nthere was danger of smallpox. \n\nWashington's other measures were decisive. \nHe directed Manly, admiral of his little \nsquadron, to follow the British fleet and cut \noff as many vessels as possible. One result \nof this order gave the greatest satisfaction. \n\"The brave Captain Manly,\" wrote Andrews, \n\"has taken the Brig that contained that \ncursed villain, Crean Brush, with great part of \nthe plunder he rob'd the stores of here, that \nI immagine she must be the richest vessell \nin the fleet.\" Other ships were either simi- \nlarly taken, or were forced to put ashore \nfrom lack of provision or of preparation. \n\nAnother of Washington's moves was to \ndespatch his five regiments to New York. \nThey went by way of Norwich, Connecticut, \nand from there, to save fatigue and time, \nwere taken by water to the city. They arrived \nfresh and ready for the expected struggle, \nbut though they watched long for the British \nfleet, it did not come. \n\nWashington's third action was to defend \n\n\n430 The Siege of Boston \n\nBoston against a possible return of the Brit- \nish. The \"lines\" at Boston and Charlestown \nnecks were demolished, and on the day after \nthe evacuation Putnam and his men were \nat work building on Fort Hill a redoubt to \ncommand the harbor. With this and the \nDorchester batteries the Bostonians might \nhave been satisfied, but within a month they \nbegan fortifying Noddle's Island against any \npossible attempt by sea. \n\nIn all these precautions the Americans \" \nwere hastened by the fact that the British, \nthough they had left the upper harbor, were \nstill in the lower, lying off Nantasket. \"From \nPenn's Hill,\" wrote Abigail Adams to her \nhusband, \"we have a view of the largest \nfleet ever seen in America. You may count \nupwards of a hundred and seventy sail. They \nlook like a forest.\" Their stay greatly puz- \nzled Washington : \" what they are doing,\" \nhe wrote, \"the Lord knows.\" He was \ntroubled as well. The ten regiments of militia, \nwhich had strengthened his army since the \nfirst of February, had promised to remain \n\n\nThe Evacuation 431 \n\nonly until the first of April, and he knew \nthat it was \"as practical to stop a torrent, as \nthese people, when their time is up.\" He \ntherefore feared lest the British, by striking \nwith all their force upon his rear, might do \nhim great injury. \n\nThis was not the first time that Washing- \nton, reasoning according to his own nature, \nexpected from Howe that vigorous action \nwhich the British general was unable to per- \nform. Howe, humiliated as he must have \nfelt at receiving, while his vessel passed down \nthe harbor, a despatch from the ministry \napplauding his decision not to evacuate the \ntown, had no thought of revenge. He blew \nup the fortifications at the Castle, and pre- \npared to destroy the lighthouse, but his pur- \nposes in remaining were to fit his fleet for \nsea, and to warn those British vessels which \nwere bound for Boston. Nor had he the \nslightest intention of seizing New York. \nThe statements which had come to Washing- \nton's ears, that Howe's destination was Hali- \nfax, in spite of the American's incredulity, \n\n\n432 The Siege of Boston \n\nwere correct. On the 27th of March, ten \ndays after the evacuation, the greater part \nof Howe's fleet weighed anchor, and sailed \naway for Halifax. His army felt its shame. \n\"I do not know the thing so desperate,\" \nwrote an officer, \"I would not undertake, \nin order to change our situation.\"1 But in \nspite of the chagrin in the hearts of his soldiers, \nand the despair in the breasts of the Tories, \nfew of them ever looked upon Boston again. \n\nBefore this time it had been ascertained \nthat Boston was in no serious danger from \nsmallpox, and on the 2Oth the main body \nof the army marched into Boston. It was \nan occasion of great happiness to the inhab- \nitants, and they \"manifested a lively joy.\" \nTwo days later the town was thrown open \nto all comers, and once more, as before the \nPort Bill, entrance by land or ferry was free. \n\nThe town was speedily examined in all \nparticulars, and those who had suffered by \nthe siege were encouraged to bring in claims \nfor damages. It was found that, except \n\n1 Frothingham's \"Siege,\" 310. \n\n\nThe Evacuation 433 \n\nfor the absolute destruction of buildings for \nfuel, the injury to houses was inconsider- \nable. Where the common soldiers had lived, \ninteriors were defaced; yet externally the \nhouses of the town looked much as they had \nbefore the siege. Where the officers had \nlived, the dwellings had suffered little, and \neven the homes of the prominent Whigs had \nnot been injured. Abigail Adams wrote to \nher husband that their house was \"very \ndirty, but no other damage has been done to \nit.\" She looked upon it as a new acquisition \nof property. Washington took pains to write \nHancock, who had been so ready to sacrifice his \nbelongings to the cause of the country, that \nhis house, and even his furniture and pictures, \nhad received no damage worth mentioning. \n\nTo the immense satisfaction of all Whigs, \nmany military stores were found in the town. \nMost important were more than two hun- \ndred pieces of ordnance, the larger part of \nwhich, though spiked, could soon be put into \nserviceable condition. Balls and shells for \nthe cannon and mortars were found; pro- \n\n2F \n\n\n434 \n\n\nThe Siege of Boston \n\n\nvisions, horses and their provender, medi- \ncines in quantity, and many other articles \nwere discovered, amounting in value to nearly \n\nforty thousand \npounds. The \nbooty of Brush \nof course swelled \nthis amount. \n\nThe Whigs \nnow might see \ntheir friends \nagain, and for a \nshort time en- \n\nGOLD MEDAL COMMEMORATING WASHINGTON'S joyed military \nVICTORY \n\nsociety of a new \n\nsort. John Andrews reports \"nothing but a \ncontinual round of company.\" \"Last week,\" \nhe recorded, \"I had the honor of General \nWashington with his lady, General Gates, \nMr. Gustos and Lady, with aid de Camps, \n&ca, to dine with me.\" It was an occasion \nof which he boasted to his dying day. In the \ntown, now flooded with provision, there were \nmany eager to feast Washington. \n\n\nThe Evacuation 435 \n\nBut he did not tarry long. While Howe \nand his fleet were in the bay, he kept his men \nat work demolishing the British defences \nagainst the land, and strengthening the forts \nwhich looked seaward, and he was continually \non his guard against the blow which Howe \nmight deliver. But when the British had \nsailed away to the north-east, Washington \nhimself, on the 4th of April, set off for New \nYork. \n\nHowe had nevertheless left vessels at Nan- \ntasket Roads, to intercept the troop-ships \nand stores which were on their way to him. \nIn this he was partly successful, for seven \nship-loads of Highlanders were by this means \nsaved from Yankee prisons. But even while \nthe evacuation was in progress British vessels \nwere captured in the harbor, and now in \nsight of the squadron and its Highlanders \nwas taken the richest store-ship that had \nyet fallen into American hands. There was \na brisk fight, also, between an American \nschooner, aground on Shirley Point, and \nthirteen boat-loads of men from the war- \n\n\n436 The Siege of Boston \n\nships. The boats were beaten off, but the \nBritish had accomplished the death of the \ncaptain of the schooner, America's first naval \nhero, Mugford of Marblehead. \n\nAt length a determined effort was made \nto drive away the squadron. The militia \nwas called out, and artillery was carried to \nislands down the harbor. There was a brief \ncannonade between the Americans and the \nfleet. Then the British commander, find- \ning his anchorage no longer safe, blew up \nthe lighthouse and followed Howe to Halifax. \nThis was on the second anniversary of the \nenforcement of the Port Bill. Two days \nlater the remainder of the Highlanders, un- \nsuspiciously entering the harbor, fell into \nthe hands of the Americans.1 \n\nThe British resentment aroused by this \nlast mischance was mild compared with the \ngeneral indignation which burst on Howe's \n\n1 See concerning these men and their commander the \ninteresting monograph by Charles H. Walcott: \"Sir \nArchibald Campbell of Inverneil, sometime Prisoner of \nWar in the Jail at Concord, Massachusetts.\" Privately \nprinted. \n\n\nThe Evacuation 437 \n\nhead at his conduct of the defence of Boston, \nand his hurried evacuation. The ministry \nannounced the departure from Boston in \nthe briefest fashion, but were forced to ex- \nplain and excuse it in both the Commons and \nthe Lords. \"The General thought proper \nto shift his position,\" explained the Earl of \nSuffolk to the Lords, \"in order, in the first \nplace, to protect Halifax.\"1 But the defence \nwas riddled, Howe's general weakness was \nexposed, his neglect to fortify Dorchester \nwas pointed out, and the English Whigs \nacutely reasoned that he must have had a \nvirtual agreement with Washington to pur- \nchase the safety of the fleet and army at the \nprice of immunity to the town. Newspapers \nand pamphleteers took up the subject, and \nHowe was eventually forced to ask for an \ninquiry into his conduct of the siege. To \nhis dying day he was severely criticised for \nhis generalship in America, and especially at \nBoston. \n\nOf the other British military leaders, not \n\n1 \"The Writings of Washington,\" iii, 531. \n\n\n43 8 The Siege of Boston \n\none was successful. Gage was never again \ngiven a command. Burgoyne returned to \nBoston only as a prisoner. Clinton for a \ntime commanded in America, but he was \nrecalled. \n\nAs for the master whom these generals \nserved, the king who was the cause of the \nwar, his failure was complete. George III lost \nnot only his revolted colonies, but also the \ndearer prize for which he fought, personal \ngovernment. When at last peace was signed, \nthe Americans had gained independence, and \nthe English people had finally established the \nsupremacy of Parliament. The king might \nreign, but he could no longer govern. \n\nThe fate of the Tories cannot detain us \nlong, painful as it was. Some few returned \nto America after the war, and made again \nplaces for themselves. Among these was \nJudge Curwen. Some went to England, where \nthey were out of their element. Dependent \nfor the most part on the bounty of the crown, \nthey lived in hope of a change of fortune. \nThey longed for their homes, and sickened \n\n\nThe Evacuation 439 \n\nfor a sight of the New England country, to \nthem the most beautiful on earth. Many of \nthem were too old to begin life anew : by the \nend of the war it was recorded that, of the \nMassachusetts Tory leaders, forty-five died \nin England. One of these was Hutchinson, \nupon whose life the best comment is the con- \ncluding sentence of Sabine's brief biography : \n\"I forget, in his melancholy end, all else.\" \n\nBut numbers of the Tories remained in \nCanada. Doubtless many were discouraged \nfrom going to England by the reports of \nthe condition of those already there. \"As \nto your coming here,\" wrote Governor Went- \nworth from London to a friend in New Bruns- \nwick, \"or any other Loyalist that can get \nclams and potatoes in America, they would \nmost certainly regret making bad worse.\"1 \nOn such advice as this many, indeed most, \nof the refugees remained in Canada, and after \nthe war, in which many of them fought, \nwere of great service in building up that \ncountry. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick \n\n1 Sabine's \"Loyalists,\" 217. \n\n\n440 The Siege of Boston \n\nreceived the larger number of them; they \nbecame leaders of the bar, judges, physicians, \nprominent office-holders. It is not to be \ndenied that among them were suffering and \nmisery ; they had lost much and had to begin \nagain from the bottom, and many succumbed \nto the difficulties of the new life. After the \nwar attempt was made to gain from the \nUnited States compensation for their losses ; \nbut the new country was unable even to \nrecompense those who had suffered in its cause. \nThe loyalists therefore looked to Britain for \nhelp, and in some measure found it, in pensions, \ngrants of money, and holdings of land. \n: There is much to regret in this emigration, \nwhich took from New England such numbers \nof men and women of good blood and gentle \nbreeding. For the Tories were largely of \nthe better class, many of them had been edu- \ncated at Harvard, and they represented an \nelement which no community can afford to \nlose. Some of the difficulties of the new \ncommonwealths were due to the loss of the \nconservative balance-wheel ; some further \n\n\nThe Evacuation 441 \n\ntroubles beset them from the bitterness of \nfeeling in the new colonists across the border. \nThis has now died away, but boundary and \nfisheries disputes long brought out the hos- \ntility latent in the descendants of the Tories. \n\nSo much for the losers in the fight. \nOf the winners, no American needs to be \nmore than reminded of their fame and their \nsuccesses. At the siege Washington made his \nfirst claim to fame. He proved his tenacity, \nhis mastery of men, and the greatness of his \nresolution and daring. Some of his gen- \nerals followed him in his success, some were \nfailures. Lee attempted treachery, but was \nfinally discarded by both sides. Gates en- \ndeavored to displace Washington, but ruined \nhimself in the attempt. But most of Wash- \nington's other generals were able men. Greene \nproved himself to be a military genius second \nonly to Washington. Knox, the sole Bos- \ntonian on Washington's staff, commanded \nthe artillery throughout the war. \n\nOf the chief Boston politicians, all ended \ntheir days honorably. Soon after the evacua- \n\n\n442 The Siege of Boston \n\ntion the body of Warren was sought for \namong the dead buried on Bunker Hill. It \nwas found, identified, and entombed at Boston \nwith solemn mourning. Hancock presently \nsigned his name on the Declaration of Inde- \npendence so large that King George could \nread it without his spectacles. The Boston \nmerchant served the Continental Congress \nfor another year as its president; then re- \nturning to Boston he became \"King\" Han- \ncock, the governor of Massachusetts practi- \ncally for life. John Adams passed to greater \nusefulness as envoy to France, first minister \nto Great Britain, and finally as Washington's \nsuccessor as President. But to a student of \nBoston itself the mind dwells most willingly \non Samuel Adams, \"the man of the town \nmeeting,\" who roused the rebellion, guided it \nskilfully, served usefully in many public capaci- \nties, and became governor after Hancock's \ndeath. His statue stands to-day in the square \nnamed after him, not far from the Old South \nand the old Town House, and within sight \nof Faneuil Hall. \n\n\nThe Evacuation 443 \n\nBut we trespass beyond the period of \nthis history. When Howe sailed away, Bos- \nton's share in the Revolution was practically \nended. No attempt was made to retake the \ntown, for there could be no profit in gaining \nwhat could not be held. In the remaining \nyears of the war the town had no more serious \nduty than fitting out ships of war and priva- \nteers, and of entertaining the officers of the \nFrench fleet. But Boston had earned its \nrest. For nearly sixteen years the town had \nstood as the spokesman for liberty, the \nleader of revolt. In bringing the country \nsafely through a critical period, the services \nof Boston were essential. \n\n\nINDEX \n\n\nAdams, John. 57. 65. Quoted, 67- \n69. 103. 104-105. Elected to \nContinental Congress, in. Re- \nfuses to support the king, 112. 126. \n297-299. His house, 433. 442. \n\nAdams, Samuel. 37. His earlier \ncareer, 46-50. Independence his \nobject, 55-57. After the Mas- \nsacre, 67-70. Sam Adams regi- \nments, 70. 74. 78-103. Attempt \nto bribe him, 106-107. no- Tricks \nthe Governor at Salem, in. Dem- \nonstration of respect for, 114-115. \nGoes to the Continental Congress, \n116. 138. Returns to Boston, \n140. 155. 158. 178. 183. 187. \n189. 251. 291. 294. 298. 442 \n\nAndrews, John. 82. 91. 95. 97. \n101. 102 and note. 107. 114. \n124. 147. 158. 224. 226. 231- \n232. 394. 425. 434. \n\nAndros. Seizing of, 8. 70. \n\nArnold, Benedict. 218. 247. 362. \n\nBarker, Lieut., Quotations from \nDiary. 148-150. 157. 184. 186. \n192. 195. 196. 212-213. 228. \n246. 249-250. 252. 254. 274. \n268. 412. 421. 427. \n\nBernard, Francis. Arrives as gov- \nernor, 23. Cowardice of, 51. 53. \n54- 66. \n\nBerniere, Ensign de. His expeditions \nto map the roads, 162 ff. 196. \n203. 207. 215. \n\nBoston, The Town of. Proposition \nto make Boston a city, 14. Det- \nestation of mobs, 37. Non-im- \nportation resolve, 46. Stamp Act \n\n\nmob, 34-36; Discussed, 37. Not \nriotous, 51. Customs riot, 53. \nTea-party town meetings, 79, 81. \nWhigs, four classes of, 92-96, \nPort Bill enforced, 98. Measures \nof relief, 100. Refusal of town to \npay for tea, 110. The selectmen's \nanswer to Gage, 113-114. State \nof, 1 2o-i 21. Geography of, 126- \n127. After Powder Alarm, 131. \nIgnores Gage, 134. Situation in, \n147. Troubles with the troops, \n148-150. Growing intensity, 158- \n160. The Whig watch upon Gage, \n176 ff. The igth of April hi, 206; \n210— 212. The Siege begins, 214. \nThe agreement with Gage to give \nup arms, 224. .Inhabitants leav- \ning, 225; prevented, 226-227. For- \ntifications, 234-236. Evacuated, \n428 ff. Boston's service to the \nRevolution, 443. \n\nBrush, Crean. 405. 424. 429. 434. \n\nBunker Hill. 219. 253-255. Battle \nof, 256 ff. British redoubt on, \n336, 358. 353- 428. \n\nBurgoyne, Sir John. 141-142. Ar- \nrives at Boston; \"Elbow-room,\" \n239. His opinion of the situa- \ntion, 240. Writes proclamation \nfor Gage, 250-251. 253. Descrip- \ntion of Bunker Hill, 271, note. \nWrites Gage's letter to Washing- \nton, 3 1 2-3 1 3 . Correspondence wi th \nLee, 314 ff. Opinion of the situa- \ntion after Bunker Hill, 332-333. \n334. Opinion of the Admiral, 330- \n340. Makes Old South a riding- \nschool, 399; and Faneuil Hall a \n\n\n445 \n\n\n446 \n\n\nIndex \n\n\ntheatre, 400. Sails for home, 401. \nReturns as a captive, 402. 438. \nByles, Mather. 93. 420. \n\nCambridge. The Powder Alarm \ngathering, 123-124. Ward's head- \nquarters, 216. Washington's head- \nquarters, 374. \n\nCastle, The; or Castle William. 58. \n67. 70. 122. 431. \n\nCharlestown. Strategic importance \nof its hills, 127. Regulars encamp \nat, 210-220, 252. 253-254. Battle \nof Bunker Hill, 256 ff . Set on fire, \n270. Further destruction of, for \nfuel, 397, 400. \n\nCharter, The, of Massachusetts. \nOriginal grant by Charles I, 5. Of \nWilliam, 9-11. 86. Laws practi- \ncally abrogating the Charter, 88- \n89. \n\nChatham, Earl of. Pitt takes title, \n41. Illness, 41. 146. \n\nChurch, Dr. Benjamin. A trusted \npatriot leader, 176. Enters Bos- \nton, 223. The first American \ntraitor, 224. Treason discovered, \n327 ff. \n\nClinton, Sir Henry. 141. Arrives \nat Boston, 239. 260. 257, note. \n438. \n\nCobble Hill. 360. 378. 406. \n\nCommon, Troops encamped on, 58. \n\nConcord, Provincial Congress meets \nat, 137. Berniere's visit to, 164. \nProvincial Congress meeting in, \n171. The stores in, 172. Removal \nbegun, 173. \n\nConcord Fight. Nothing acci- \ndental in its occurrence, 173. The \nmilitia gather, 194. Geography of \nthe town, 195. The British in, \n195 ff. The Fight, 200 ff. The \nBritish retreat, 203. The Pursuit, \n204 ff. \n\nContinental Congress. \n\nThe First. Massachusetts dele- \ngates elected, in. They depart \n\n\nfor Philadelphia, 116. Resolve \nof Congress, 139-140. \n\nThe Second. 188. 291. Hesi- \ntates before rebellion, 292. \n\"Adopts\" the army, 298-299. \nSends committee to Washington, \n3 64-3 65 . Is irregular and niggardly \nin appropriations, 371. Suggests \nthat Washington storm Boston, \n380-381. \n\nCorrespondence, Committee of, 74. \n80. 96-97. no. Preserve order \nin Massachusetts, 132. ^ \n\nCurwen, Judge Samuel. 229-230, \n232. 233. 439. \n\nCustoms, Officials of. Petition for \nWrits of Assistance, 23. Com- \nmissioners, 44, 45. 50. 99. \n\nDawes, William. His ride to Lexing- \nton, 1 80, 1 86. Starts for Concord, \n1 88. Strategy to escape pursuers, \n189. \n\nDorchester. Strategic importance of \nthe Heights, 127, 252. 256. 335. \nFortified, 406 ff. 415. Nook's \nHill, 421, 427. \n\nEdes, Peter. 350-351. 352. 353. \nEmerson, Rev. William. Views Con- \ncord Fight, 201 . 203. 303. 308. \n\nFalmouth, Burning of. 356-357. \nFaneuil Hall. 58. 66. 244. 400. \nFlag. 378-379- \n\nFranklin, Benjamin. 84-85. 86-87. \n160. 292. 293. 326. 364. \n\nGage, Thomas. 87. Governor; his \ntemperament, 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. \n103. 108. 109. Is tricked by \nSam Adams, 110-112. 113. Is \nbaffled by selectmen of Boston, \n113-114. 116. 119. Seizes the \nPowder, 121-122. 123. Fortifies \nthe Neck, 126-128. 129. 133. 137. \n138. Disgusts the king, 141. 143. \nHis character, 145. 148. Sends \n\n\nIndex \n\n\n447 \n\n\nout Berniere to map roads, 161 ff. \nPrepares to act, 178. 214. Be- \ntween two fires, 219-220. With- \ndraws from Charlestown, 220. Let- \nter from Warren, 221-222. Agree- \nment with the town, 224. The \nexodus checked, 226-227. He forti- \nfies Boston, 240. Tries to get hay, \n247 ff- Issues a proclamation, 251. \nStrategy of Bunker Hill, 258-259. \n260. 335. Continues to fortify, \n336. Interview with Newell, 355. \nRecalled, 355. Departs rom Bos- \nton, 356. In retirement, 438. \n\nGage, Mrs. Thomas. 185. 348. \n\nGeorge III. His mother's training, \n12. His environment, 15-17. 38. \n73- 74- 75- 84. 86. 87. Plans \nthe Port Bill, 88. 340-341. 438. \n\nGraves, Admiral. 251. 338-340. 404. \n\nGreene, Nathanael. 242. 323. 329. \n362. 413. 441. \n\nHallowell, Benjamin. Chased into \nBoston, 124. 252. \n\nHancock, John. 57. 103. 119. 131. \n132. 178-179. 183. 187. 189. \n251. 291. 380. 381. 388. 442. \n\nHow, David, 324-325. 377-378.406. \n\nHowe, Sir William. 143. Arrives at \nBoston, 239. Is given command in \nBunker Hill battle, 260. His \nstrategy, 263; 267. 269. 273. \n277. 287. 333. Becomes com- \nmander-in-chief, 357. Inactivity, \n\n358. Desires to go to New York, \n\n359. Interview with John Leach, \n396. Sense of security, 404-406. \nSurprised by the taking of Dor- \nchester, 411. Calls council of war, \n412. Plans to attack, 414. Is \nprevented by a gale, 414. Orders \nevacuation, 414. Prepares to \ndepart, 416 ff. Accepts \"notice to \nquit,\" 427. Evacuates, 428. \nStays at Nantasket with his fleet, \n430. Sails for Halifax, 432. Public \nindignation against him, 436-437. \n\n\nHutchinson, Thomas. In Writs of \nAssistance case, 24. 26. Opposi- \ntion to Stamp Act, 32. At Stamp \nAct riot, 34. His house sacked, 36. \n53. After the Massacre, 66. 68. \nGives way to Adams, 69-70. \nGovernor, 73. Tea-party, 70-81. \nThe Hutchinson Letters, 8*r-7s6. \nCalled to England, 91. Quoted, \n106. 187. Death, 439 . \n\nKnox, Henry. At the Massacre, 62. \n\n326. 387. 409, noJve. 441. \n\nLabor, Restrictions on, £Aine's \n\nopinion of their effect on the Revo'1- \n\nlution, 30-31. \nLeach, John. 34,^. 350. 351. 352- \n\n353- 395-397- \nLechmere's Point. 323. 358. 360. \n\n367. 378. 406. \nLee, Charles. Correspondence with \n\nBurgoyne, 314 ff. 362. 441. \nLexington. Hancock and Adams in, \n\n178-179. 183. 187. 189. Militia \n\nassemble, 190. The fight on the \n\nGreen, 190 ff. The retreat to, 205. \n\nThe British are reinforced, 206, \n\n208. \nLiberty, Sloop, the Affair of the. 52. \n\nSamuel Adams at, 56. \nLiberty, Sons of. 36. 37. 78. \nLiberty Tree. The Great Tree, 34- \n\nNamed, 37. 78. Felled, 395. \nLovell, James. 350. 352. 353. 419. \n\nMandamus Councillors. ii6-n8. \n123. 252. \n\nManly, Captain. 429. \n\nMarshfield. Troops sent to, 143-144. \nDriven from, 218-219. \n\nMassacre, The. 50-65. Town Meet- \ning that followed, 66-70. 71. 104. \nWarren's second oration on, 154 ff. \n\n327. 413- \nMast trees. 12. \n\nMilitia of New England. 165-168. \nThe Minute Men, 168-169. Sys- \n\n\n448 \n\n\nIndex \n\n\ntern of summoning, 160-170. \nGather at Concord, 194-195. The \ngathering about Boston, 216-218. \n300-391. 430-431. 436. \nMorrison the deserter. 353 flf. \n\nNewell, Timothy. 353. 354. 355. \n\n395. 399. 414. 420. 423, and note. \nNew England sentiment toward \n\nEngland. 8. 9. n. 18-19. 29. \n\n42-44. \nNon-Importation Resolves. 46. \n\nBroken, 72-73. 97. 102. \nNorth, Lord. 87. 89. \n\nOld South Church. Massacre Town \nMeeting, 66. Tea-party meeting, \n81. 153 flf. Becomes a riding- \nschool, 400, 402. 425. 442. \n\nOliver, Andrew. Tax-collector, 33. \nBurned in effigy, 34. Resigns \noffice, 35. At the Powder Alarm, \n123-124. \n\nOliver, Peter. 121. \n\nOtis, James. 25-27. 46. 266. \n\nPercy, Lord. Opinion of the Ameri- \ncans, 153. Opinion changed, 213. \n185. 226. 412. 414. \n\nPitcairn, Major. 184. 192-194. 198. \n\n11 279. 284. \n\nPomeroy, Seth. 19. 146. 266. 305. \n\nPort Bill. 88. In force June i, 1774, \n98. 436. \n\nPowder Alarm. 123 flf. \n\nPrescott, Dr. Rides with Revere, \n1 88. Escapes capture, 188, 189. \n197. \n\nPrescott, William, of Pepperell. 216. \n255. 256. 258. 260. 261. 264. \n270. 278. 279. 280. 284. 362. \n\nProvincial Congress of Massachusetts. \nThe First. Suggested by Suffolk \nResolves, 130. Boston delegates \nelected, 134-135. Organized, 137. \nMeets at Concord, 137. Acts of, \n138. \nThe Second. Meets, 146. \n\n\nPutnam, Israel. 121. 125. 217. \n242. 246. 253. 257. 264. 270. \n277. 282. 283. 288. 289, and note. \n304. 362. 413. 415. 428. 430. \n\nQuincy, Josiah, Jr. 57. 65. \n\nRegulating Act. 89. News of its \npassage, 121-113. Declared un- \nconstitutional, 130. \n\nRemonstrance and Circular Letter. \n49. Refusal of Assembly to rescind, \n54- \n\nRevenue Acts. Provisions of, 44. \nPassed, 45. Repealed, 72. \n\nRevere, Paul. 37. 54. 138. 170. \n173. His account of himself, \n174 flf. His ride, 180 ff. Is cap- \ntured, 188. Released, 189. Story \nof Dr. Church, 223. \n\nSafety, Committee of. Appointed, \n139. Warren a member of, 146. \n242. 254. \n\nSalem. Made port of entry, 88. 97- \n98. 99. Town meeting, 119. \nGage withdraws to Boston, 133. \nTroops sent to, 144-145. \n\nShuldham, Admiral. 404. 412. \n\nSiege. Summary of, 2-3. Froth- \ningham's history of, 3, note. Be- \nginning of, 214-215, The army \nbefore Boston, 241 ff . The provin- \ncials seize the hay and livestock on \nthe harbor islands, 248-250. They \nplan to seize Bunker Hill, 253. \nThe battle, 256 flf. Washington \ntakes command, 301. He strips \nthe harbor islands, 318-319. The \nAmerican navy, 319-320. Dicker- \ning in camp, 324. The British in \nBoston, 332. Operations, 336-338. \nDesertion, 343~344- Diversions \nof the garrison, 348 ; and of Whigs, \n349. Imprisonments, 351 ff. Brit- \nish go into winter quarters, 359. \nEfforts to provision Boston, 392- \n393. Shortage of fuel, 394. Di- \n\n\nIndex \n\n\n449 \n\n\nversions of the officers, 397-398. \nThe Old South becomes a riding- \nschool, 399; and Faneuil Hall a \nplayhouse, 400. The interrupted \nfarce, 400. Discomforts in the \ntown, 402-403. Smallpox, 403. \nWashington seizes Dorchester, 406 \nff. Howe decides to attack, 412. \nIs prevented by a storm, 414. \nEvacuation ordered, 414. Confu- \nsion in the town, 420 ff. Nook's \nHill taken, 427. Evacuation, 428. \nPutnam enters, 428. The town \ndefended from sea attack, 430. \nHowe' s fleet sails, 43 2 . The Ameri- \ncans enter, 432. Highlanders cap- \ntured, 436. Howe's squadron \ndriven away, 436. \n\nSons of Liberty. 36. 37. 78. \n\nStamp Act. 26. Provisions of, 27. \nOpposition to its passage, 31. \nOpposition to its enforcement, 32- \n34. 38. Stamp Act Congress, 38. \nRepeal, 38. \n\nStark, John. 218. 242, 266-7. 27o, \n288. 362. \n\nSuffolk County Convention. 128. \nResolves of , 120-130. \n\nSugar Act, The, of 1733. 23. Re- \nenacted 1763, 26. 42. \n\nTaxation of the Colonies. 27-30. \n31. 38-39. Declaratory Act, 41. \n42. 44-45. \"Farmer's Letters,\" \n46. Revenue Acts, 44, 45, 72. \nTax on Tea, 72. \n\nTea. Tax on, 72. 75-76. Its con- \nnection with the Revolution, 77. \nBoston refuses to pay for, no. \n\nTea-Party. Boston. 74-84, 138. \n\nThomas, John. 146. 245-6. 289. \n362. 413. \n\nTiconderoga. Taking of, 247. Can- \nnon brought to Boston, 387. \n\nTories. 21-23, 28. 39. no. 133. \nTory sentiment, 151-152. Tories \nprevent the Whigs from leaving \nBoston, 226-7. Tory refugees, \n\n\n228. Situation in the country, \n232-3. Military companies, 234. \n251. 331. 345-6. Enlistments, \n347-348. Surprised at order for \nevacuation, 418. Decide to leave \nBoston, 419. Genteel thievery, \n425. Evacuation, 428. Their fate, \n438 ff. \n\nTown government. 7. 15. \n\nTownshend, Charles. 42. \n\nTrade restrictions. 12-13, 28. See \nalso Taxation, Non-Importation \nResolves. \n\nTroops in Boston. Demands for, 50, \n54. Sent, 55. Landed, 58. Their \nlife in Boston, 59. The Massacre, \n60 ff. Withdrawn to the Castle, \n70. 147-8. Diary of Lieut. \nBarker, 148. Discontent, 148-150. \nOpinion of Americans, 153. Opin- \nion changed, 213. Gage's force, \nApril, 1775, 161. The Concord \nexpedition, 184, 186. Condition in \nearly siege, 237. Opinion of the \nYankees, 238. Reinforcements, \n239, 252. Opinion of Bunker Hill \nbattle, 286. Lack of fresh provi- \nsion, 341. High death rate among \nthe wounded, 342-343. Summer \ncomfort, 345. Feel shame at \nevacuation, 432. \n\nWard, Artemas. 146. 241. 242. \n\n245. 246. 264. 274. 275. 281. \n\n284. 289- 304- \nWarren, Joseph. 57. 103. 104. no. \n\nAt Powder Alarm, 124. 128. 131. \nBecomes leader in absence of \nAdams, 135. Letter concerning \nEpiscopalians, 136. Leads the Pro- \nvincial Congress, 137-138. 146. \nSecond Oration on the Massacre, \n153 ff. 176. 179. Sends out \nDawes and Revere, 180. His ac- \ntions on the 1 9th of April, 208-9. \n214. Letter to Gage, 221-2. 242. \nGoes to Bunker Hill, 266. His \nconduct and death, 281-3. 44*- \n\n\n4SO \n\n\nIndex \n\n\nWashington, George. 136. 272. \n294-297. 298. 299. 300. Takes \ncommand, 301. His importance \nin the war, 302. 303. 304. Diffi- \nculty with generals, 304-5; with \nsoldiers, 305-8; with uniforms, \n308-9. Fortifies, 310, 311. Corre- \nspondence with Gage, 313. 314. \nBurns the lighthouse, 318-9. His \nnavy, 319. Difficulties, 320-1. \nLack of powder, 321, 382; of \nmuskets, 323, 384-385. His use \nof pikes, 326. Councils of war, 329, \n336. Seizes Cobble Hill and Lech- \nmere Point, 360. His military \nstrength and weakness, 362-363. \nReorganization, 364-5. Winter \nquarters, 366. Difficulties, 368 ff. \nJoined by his wife, 373. Trouble \nwith Connecticut troops, 374. \nEnlistments, 375 ff. Eager to \nattack Boston, 381. His summary \nof his difficulties, 381-82; 383 ff. \nOpinion of his men, 388-389. Pre- \npares to take Dorchester, 389-392. \nSeizes Dorchester, 406 ff. Is \nready for Howe's assault, 413. \n\n\nDisappointed at its prevention, \n\n415. Awaits Howe's departure, \n\n416. 418. 419. Sends troops to \nNew York, 422, 429. Fortifies \nNook's Hill, 427. Takes posses- \nsion of Boston, 428. Fortifies, 430. \nPuzzled by Howe's stay at Nan- \ntasket, 430. Dines with John An- \ndrews, 434. Starts for New York, \n435. His conduct of the siege, 441. \n\nWhigs and Tories contrasted. 2 1-23 . \n418. \n\nWhigs. Their four classes in Boston, \n92-96. Leaders of, 103 ff. 108. \nTheir acts betrayed, 109. Their \ndifficulties, 113. Force resigna- \ntions of Mandamus councillors, \n117-118. 131. 138. Their watch \non Gage, 176 ff. Difficulties at \nevacuation, 426. \n\nWinthrop, John. \"Avoid or pro- \ntract,\" 8. His house pulled \ndown, 397. \n\nWrits of Assistance. Petition for, 23. \nCase tried before Hutchinson, 24. \nOtis' speech, 25. Judgment de- \nlayed, 26. \n\n\n'\"THE following pages contain advertisements of a \nfew of the Macmillan books on kindred subjects \n\n\nStories from American History \n\nYankee Ships and Yankee Sailors \n\nBY JAMES BARNES \n\nTales of 1812, by the author of \" Drake and his Yeomen,\" \"For King \nand Country,\" etc. Illustrated by R. F. ZOGBAUM and CARLTON T. \nCHAPMAN. \n\nDecorated cloth, illustrated, $1.50 net; by mail, $1.61 \n\nThe Wilderness Road \n\nBY H. ADDINGTON BRUCE \n\nThe central figure in this story of the early development of the Middle \nWest is Daniel Boone, the man who blazed the famous Wilderness road. \nIn telling his story Mr. Bruce touches on such matters as the economic \nand social factors influencing the movement across the mountains, and \nthe significance of that movement with relation to the growth of revo- \nlutionary sentiment in the American colonies, etc. \n\nDecorated cloth, illustrated, $f.$o net; by mail, $f.6j \n\nThe Story of the Great Lakes \n\nBY EDWARD CHANNING AND MARION F. LANSING \n\nThe Professor of American History in Harvard University, author of a \nnumber of volumes on the History of the United States, has found an im- \nmense amount of romance centred about the Great Lakes, from the time \nof their discovery and early exploration by the French missionaries down \nto the present time when they play so important a part in the industrial \nprogress of the Middle West. This book tells the story of these great in- \nland waterways, with special reference to those picturesque aspects of his- \ntory which interest the general reader. \n\nDecorated cloth, illustrated, $f.jo net ; by mail, $f.6j \n\nThe Story of Old Fort Loudon \n\nBY CHARLES EGBERT CRADDOCK \n\nA Tale of the Cherokees and the Pioneers of Tennessee, 1760, by the \nauthor of \" The Prophet of the Great Smoky Mountains.\" Illustrated by \nERNEST C. PEIXOTTO. \n\nDecorated cloth, illustrated, $f.jO net ; by mail, $f.6j \n\n\nSTORIES FROM AMERICAN HISTORY— Continued \n\n\nSouthern Soldier Stories \n\nBY GEORGE GARY EGGLESTON \n\nForty-seven stories illustrating the heroism of those brave Americans who \nfought on the losing side in the Civil War. Humor and pathos are found \nside by side in these pages, which bear evidence of absolute truth. Illus- \ntrated by RUFUS F. ZOGBAUM. \n\nDecorated cloth, illustrated, $1.50 net ; by mail, $f.6o \n\nTales of the Enchanted Isles of the Atlantic \n\nBY THOMAS WENTWORTH HIGGINSON \n\nLegends showing that the people of Europe were for centuries fed with \nromances of marvellous and beautiful countries beyond the Atlantic. Be- \nsides the early Irish, Spanish, and other traditions of the Happy Islands \nof the West, there come to us, among others from our own race, the old \nstories of King Arthur and his Avalon; of St. Brandan's Isle; of the Voy- \nages of Erik the Viking; and of the vanishing Norumbega, so real a vision \nto the imaginations of Queen Elizabeth's day. Illustrated by ALBERT \nHERTER. \n\nDecorated cloth, illustrated, $f.$o net ; by mail, $1.62 \n\nDe Soto and His Men in the Land of Florida \n\nBY GRACE KING \n\nThe author of \" New Orleans : The Place and the People \" has collected \ninto an entertaining volume stories of the brilliant armada which sailed \nwestward under De Soto in 1538 to subdue the natives and bring this \ncountry under the Spanish crown. Old Spanish and Portuguese narra- \ntives are the basis of its history. Illustrated by GEORGE GIBBS. \n\nDecorated cloth, illustrated, $1.50 net ; by mail, $1.63 \n\n\nSTORIES FROM AMERICAN HISTORY— Continued \n\n\nThe Story of the New England Whalers \n\nBY JOHN R. SPEARS \n\nSome of the most romantic and adventurous characters in American his- \ntory are dealt with in this book, in which Mr. Spears tells of the Ameri- \ncan whaling industry. He has given us the life stories of the men to \nwhom more than to any others was due the upbuilding of the American \nmerchant service. Illustrated from photographs. \n\nDecorated cloth, illustrated, $1.50 net ; by mail, $f.6j \n\nThe Story of the American Merchant Marine \n\nBY JOHN R. SPEARS \n\n\" For over twenty years Mr. Spears has been regarded as an authority on \nAmerican sea enterprises. The books from his pen are based upon long \nstudy of the topics he treats. ... In the present volume he tells the \nstory of our merchant marine from its beginnings, through all the phases \nof its history . . . that have marked this feature of our activities since \nthe Civil War.\" — Advocate of Peace. \n\nDecorated clotk, illustrated, $1.50 net; by mail, $1.64 \n\nBuccaneers and Pirates of Our Coast \n\nBY FRANK R. STOCKTON \n\nThis book is an account of the offshoots of the early English, French, and \nDutch combinations against Spanish exactions in West India waters. \nFrom the early buccaneer and later pirates Mr. Stockton has told these \nwild and entertaining stories of picturesque figures. Illustrated by G. \nVARIAN and B. W. CLINEDINST. \n\nDecorated cloth, illustrated, $1.50 net; by mail, $i.6j \n\nThe Last American Frontier \n\nBY PROFESSOR FREDERIC L. PAXSON \n\n\" His happy mastery of his subject enables his readers to grasp it far \nmore effectually than by the method of supplying them with dates and \nincidents and leaving them to shape their own vision of the progress of \nsettlement as a whole.\" — The Living Age. \n\nDecorated cloth, illustrated, $f.$o net ; by mail, $r.6r \n\n\nPUBLISHED BY \n\nTHE MACMILLAN COMPANY \n\n64-66 Fifth Avenue, New York \n\n\nILLUSTRATED DESCRIPTIONS OF \nAMERICAN PLACES AND PEOPLE \n\nBY M. A. DfiWOLFE HOWE \n\nBoston : The Place and the People \n\nWith over one hundred illustrations, including many from pen drawings \nexecuted especially for this volume by L. A. HOLMAN. \n\nDecorated cloth, boxed, $2.00 net; by mail, $2.20 \n\nBY MRS. ST. JULIEN RAVENEL \n\nCharleston : The Place and the People \n\nIllustrated from photographs and drawings by VERNON H. BAILEY. \n\nDecorated cloth, boxed, $2.00 net; by mail, $2.20 \n\nBY GRACE KING \n\nNew Orleans : The Place and the People \n\nWith eighty-three illustrations from drawings by FRANCES JONES. \n\nDecorated cloth, boxed, $2.00 net; by mail, $2.20 \n\nBY AGNES REPPLIER \n\nPhiladelphia : The Place and the People \n\nWith eighty-two illustrations from drawings by ERNEST C. PEIXOTTO. \n\nDecorated cloth, boxed, $2.00 net; by mail, $2.20 \n\nBY JOHN C. VAN DYKE \n\nThe New New York : The Place and the People \n\nWith one hundred and twenty-six illustrations, including twenty-four in \ncolor, by JOSEPH PENNELL. \n\nDecorated cloth, $4.00 net; by mail, $4.22 \n\n\nWelcome books, either for the traveller's use during his visit, or as a \npleasant reminder of bygone days, or to bring the different districts vividly \nbefore the minds of intending travellers, or before those who are unable to \nleave home. \n\nPUBLISHED BY \n\nTHE MACMILLAN COMPANY \n\n64-66 Fifth Avenue, New York \n\n\nPLEASE DO NOT REMOVE \nCARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET \n\nUNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY \n\n\nE \n\n231 \n\nF87 \n\n1911 \n\nC.I \n\nROBA \n\n\n- \n\n\n","title":"The Siege of Boston","updated_at":"2026-09-05T10:00:24.067199Z","urn":"urn:lemay:boston:document:the-siege-of-boston","version":1,"withdrawn_reason":null},"urn":"urn:lemay:boston:document:the-siege-of-boston","version_history":[{"change_note":"accessioned from the Internet Archive, item siegeofboston00frenuoft","changed_by":"archive-ingest 0.1.0","recorded_at":"2026-09-05T10:00:24.364343Z","version":1}]}